Teague v. Cooper, Nos. 12–2413

• Court: United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (8th Circuit)
• Writing for the Court: LOKEN
• Citation: 720 F.3d 973
• Parties: Ron TEAGUE and Kathy Teague, on behalf of minor children T.T. and S.T.; Rhonda Richardson, on behalf of minor child A.R., Plaintiffs–Appellants/Cross–Appellees v. Jim COOPER, in his official capacity, et al., Defendants–Appellees/Cross–Appellants Arkansas Board of Education, et al., Defendants–Appellees Camden Fairview School District No. 16 of Ouachita County; El Dorado School District # 15, Union County, AR, Intervenors below-Appellees/Cross–Appellants.
• Docket Number: Nos. 12–2413,12–2418.
• Decision Date: 25 July 2013

720 F.3d 973

Ron TEAGUE and Kathy Teague, on behalf of minor children T.T. and S.T.; Rhonda Richardson, on behalf of minor child A.R., Plaintiffs–Appellants/Cross–Appellees
v.
Jim COOPER, in his official capacity, et al., Defendants–Appellees/Cross–Appellants
Arkansas Board of Education, et al., Defendants–Appellees
Camden Fairview School District No. 16 of Ouachita County; El Dorado School District # 15, Union County, AR, Intervenors below-Appellees/Cross–Appellants.

Nos. 12–2413, 12–2418.

United States Court of Appeals,
Eighth Circuit.

Submitted: Jan. 16, 2013.
Filed: July 25, 2013.

[720 F.3d 974]

Jess Askew, III, argued, Little Rock, AR, (Andrew King of Little Rock, AR, Andrea L. Davis of Hot Springs, AR, on the brief), for Appellant.

Scott P. Richardson, Assistant Attorney General, argued, Little Rock, AR, for Appellees Bray, Gullett, Mays, Cooper, Ledbetter, Newton, AR Board of Education, Mahony, Saviers, the AR Department of Education, Black and Reith.

Allen P. Roberts, argued, Camden, AR, (Bill Brazil of Conway, AR, and David M. Fuqua and Whitney F. Moore of Little

[720 F.3d 975]

Rock, AR, on the brief), for Appellees Camden Fairview School District No. 16 of Ouachita County, El Dorado School District # 15 and Union County.

Christopher Heller, argued, Little Rock, AR, (Clay Fendley and John C. Fendley, Jr., of Little Rock, AR, on the brief), for Amicus party Little Rock School District.

Before LOKEN, MURPHY, and COLLOTON, Circuit Judges.

LOKEN, Circuit Judge.

In the summer of 2010, Ron and Kathy Teague and Rhonda Richardson (“the Parents”) applied to transfer their school-age children, who are white, from the racially heterogenous Malvern Public School District to the neighboring, majority-white Magnet Cove Public School District, pursuant to the Arkansas Public School Choice Act of 1989, Ark.Code Ann. § 6–18–206 (“the 1989 Act”). The applications were denied based on the race-related limitation in § 6–18–206(f)(1):

(f) The provisions of this section and all student choice options created in this section are subject to the following limitations:

(1) No student may transfer to a nonresident district where the percentage of enrollment for the student's race exceeds that percentage in the student's resident district.

(This limitation was subject to exceptions not here at issue.) The Parents commenced this action against Magnet Cove School District, the Arkansas Board of Education, the Arkansas Department of Education, and several board members (collectively, “the Educators”), seeking a declaratory judgment that section (f)(1) violates the Equal Protection Clause and an injunction transferring their children to the Magnet Cove School District. The Camden Fairview School District and the El Dorado School District as intervenors in the district court, and the Little Rock School District as amicus curiae on appeal, appeared to support the constitutionality of section (f)(1).

Applying the Supreme Court's fractured decision in Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District Number 1, 551 U.S. 701, 127 S.Ct. 2738, 168 L.Ed.2d 508 (2007), to the “complicated history” of equal-opportunity education in Arkansas, the district court ¹ concluded that section (f)(1)'s racial limitation cannot survive the required strict scrutiny because its “blanket rule on inter-district transfers based solely on [racial] percentages” was not narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest. However, applying state law, the court further concluded that section (f)(1) is not severable from the remainder of the 1989 Act. Accordingly, the court declared § 6–18–206 “unconstitutional in its entirety” and, for this reason, denied the Parents' request for injunctive relief transferring their children. The Parents and the Educators cross-appealed this ruling; the district court stayed enforcement of its judgment pending the appeals.

After the appeals were briefed and argued, the Arkansas General Assembly enacted the Public School Choice Act of 2013 (“the 2013 Act”). Act 1227, 2013 Ark. Acts 1227 (Apr. 16, 2013), codified at Ark.Code Ann. §§ 6–18–1901 et seq. The 2013 Act repealed the 1989 Act in its entirety, replacing it with a similarly broad school choice transfer option without section (f)(1)'s categorical race-based limitation. In providing that the 2013 Act would be

[720 F.3d 976]

effective on the date of its approval by the Governor, the General Assembly found:

that certain provisions of the Arkansas Public School Choice Act of 1989, § 6–18–206, have been found to be unconstitutional by a federal court; that thousands of public school students are currently attending public schools in nonresident school districts under that law; that there is now uncertainty about the viability of those transfers and future transfers; that this act repeals the disputed provisions of that law while preserving the opportunity for public school choice; and that this act is immediately necessary to resolve the uncertainty in the law before the 2013–2014 school year and preserve existing student transfers.

Act 1227, § 7. We asked the parties to address whether the repeal of the challenged law moots the Parents' lawsuit. After reviewing the parties' supplemental briefs and responses, we conclude that it does. Therefore, we vacate the decision of the district court and remand with instructions to dismiss the Parents' complaint as moot.

Article III of the Constitution grants federal courts the power to hear “Cases” and “Controversies.” This “requirement subsists through all stages of federal judicial proceedings, trial and appellate.” Lewis v. Continental Bank Corp., 494 U.S. 472, 477, 110 S.Ct. 1249, 108 L.Ed.2d 400 (1990). “A case becomes moot—and therefore no longer a ‘Case’ or ‘Controversy’ for purposes of Article III—when the issues presented are no longer ‘live’ or the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome.” Already, LLC v. Nike, Inc., ––– U.S. ––––, 133 S.Ct. 721, 726, 184 L.Ed.2d 553 (2013) (quotation omitted). Thus, we will dismiss as moot a case in which “changed circumstances [have] already provide[d] the requested relief and eliminate[d] the need for court action.” McCarthy v. Ozark Sch. Dist., 359 F.3d 1029, 1035 (8th Cir.2004).

In this case, the Parents sought a declaratory judgment that section 6–18–206(f)(1) of the...