Teague v. Lane, 84-2474
Citation | 820 F.2d 832 |
Decision Date | 11 May 1987 |
Docket Number | No. 84-2474,84-2474 |
Parties | Frank TEAGUE, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Michael LANE, Director, Department of Corrections, and Michael O'Leary, Warden, Respondents-Appellees. |
Court | United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (7th Circuit) |
Patricia Unsinn, Office of State Appellate Defender, State of Ill., Chicago, Ill., for petitioner-appellant.
Mark L. Rotert, Asst. Atty. Gen., Chicago, Ill., for respondents-appellees.
Before BAUER, Chief Judge, CUMMINGS, WOOD, CUDAHY, POSNER, COFFEY, EASTERBROOK, and RIPPLE, Circuit Judges.
The original panel decision in this case reversing the order of the district court that denied the appellant Frank Teague's petition for a writ of habeas corpus was vacated, United States ex rel. Teague v. Lane, 779 F.2d 1332 (7th Cir.1985), and the case set for rehearing en banc pursuant to Circuit Rule 16(e). 1 We now affirm the order of the district court denying Teague's petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
Teague, a black man, was convicted after a jury trial in an Illinois court for attempted murder and armed robbery. 2 In the process of selecting the Teague jury, the prosecution in the exercise of its peremptory challenges excluded ten black jurors. In the exercise of the defendant's peremptory challenges, the only other black on the juror list was removed. The defendant initially challenged the State's use of its peremptory challenges after the State had exercised six of its peremptories and again after jury selection was completed claiming that the State's exclusion of all blacks from the jury deprived him of his right to "trial by a jury of his peers." The trial court rejected the defendant's argument that he was deprived of a "trial by his peers" stating that "the jury appears to be a fair jury" and the Illinois Court of Appeals affirmed the defendant's conviction explaining that no restriction could be placed on a prosecutor's exercise of peremptory challenges in the absence of a demonstration that blacks had been systematically excluded under the Swain v. Alabama test. People v. Teague, 108 Ill.App.3d 891, 64 Ill.Dec. 401, 439 N.E.2d 1066 (1st Dist.1982). The Illinois Supreme Court denied Teague's Petition for Leave to Appeal, 93 Ill.2d 547 (1983), and the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari. 464 U.S. 867, 104 S.Ct. 206, 78 L.Ed.2d 179 (1983). Teague then filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the federal district court.
The district court denied Teague's petition for a writ of habeas corpus explaining that Teague's claim that his constitutional rights were violated by the prosecution's use of its peremptories was "foreclosed by Swain and the Seventh Circuit's recent decisions in United States v. Clark [737 F.2d 679 (7th Cir.1984) ], and United States ex rel. Palmer v. DeRobertis, [738 F.2d 168 (7th Cir.1984) ]."
In Batson, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986), the Supreme Court decided that "the Equal Protection Clause forbids the prosecutor to challenge potential jurors solely on account of their race or on the assumption that black jurors as a group will be unable impartially to consider the State's case against a black defendant." 3 The Batson decision expressly overruled Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 85 S.Ct. 824, 13 L.Ed.2d 759 (1965), but did not address the sixth amendment question concerning the right to a trial by an impartial jury. In Allen v. Hardy, --- U.S. ----, 106 S.Ct. 2878, 92 L.Ed.2d 199 (1986), the Supreme Court held that Batson was not to be applied "retroactively [to cases such as Teague's] on collateral review of convictions that became final before our opinion [in Batson ] was announced." 4 However, even if Batson were to be applied retroactively to Teague's case, it would not control this court's disposition of Teague's petition for habeas corpus, since Teague challenges his conviction on sixth amendment 5 grounds and does not raise an equal protection claim subject to the holdings in Batson and Allen. 6
In Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986), the United States Supreme Court held that "The Equal Protection Clause forbids the prosecutor to challenge potential jurors solely on account of their race or on the assumption that black jurors as a group will be unable impartially to consider the State's case against a black defendant." Id. 106 S.Ct. at 1719. The Batson decision
adopted a new analysis for establishing whether the prosecution's use of its peremptory challenges had violated the Equal Protection Clause and "reject[ed] this [the Swain v. Alabama ] evidentiary formulation [for establishing Equal Protection violation] as inconsistent with standards that have been developed since Swain for assessing a prima facie case under the Equal Protection Clause." Id. Under Batson
Id. at 1722-23. The Swain court refused to adopt a rule that would allow a criminal defendant to establish an Equal Protection violation simply by demonstrating that in his particular case, the prosecution had used its peremptories to remove all blacks from the jury actually empanelled to try the defendant:
380 U.S. at 223, 85 S.Ct. at 837. Instead, Swain required that a defendant seeking to establish an Equal Protection violation must demonstrate that the prosecutor systematically used his peremptories to exclude Blacks or other suspect classes from petit juries in case after case, and not just that all Blacks were peremptorily removed from the jury in the particular defendant's case:
Id. (emphasis added).
Batson rejected this approach as a requirement for establishing an Equal Protection violation based on the prosecutor's use of The Batson decision makes clear that the court decided the case on equal protection grounds and declined to rule on Batson's claimed sixth amendment violation:
Batson, 106 S.Ct. at 1716 n. 4. 7 Although in Batson a criminal defendant was allowed to establish a violation of the equal protection clause by alleging, as Teague has, that the prosecution exercised its peremptories solely on the basis of a prospective juror's race, the Supreme Court's Allen v. Hardy, --- U.S. ----, 106 S.Ct. 2878, 92 L.Ed.2d 199 (1986) decision, precludes an application of the Batson rule to Teague's appeal. In Allen, decided just two months after Batson, the court held that...
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