Teague v. Remington Arms Co.

• Decision Date: 22 November 2022
• Docket Number: CV 18-184-M-DLC
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Montana
• Parties: SHARON TEAGUE and RANDALL TEAGUE, Individually, and in their official capacity as Co-Personal Representatives of the ESTATE OF MARK RANDALL TEAGUE, Plaintiffs, v. REMINGTON ARMS COMPANY, LLC, REMINGTON OUTDOOR COMPANY, INC., SPORTING GOODS PROPERTIES, INC., E.I. EU PONT DE NEMOURS & COMPANY, DOES A TO K, Defendants.

SHARON TEAGUE and RANDALL TEAGUE, Individually, and in their official capacity as Co-Personal Representatives of the ESTATE OF MARK RANDALL TEAGUE, Plaintiffs,
v.
REMINGTON ARMS COMPANY, LLC, REMINGTON OUTDOOR COMPANY, INC., SPORTING GOODS PROPERTIES, INC., E.I. EU PONT DE NEMOURS & COMPANY, DOES A TO K, Defendants.

No. CV 18-184-M-DLC

United States District Court, D. Montana, Missoula Division

November 22, 2022

ORDER

DANA L. CHRISTENSEN, DISTRICT JUDGE, DISTRICT COURT

Before the Court are Defendants' Motions in Limine (Docs. 67, 69, 71, 73, and 75) and Plaintiffs' Motions in Limine (Docs. 65, 77, and 83).

BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs allege that Defendants are strictly liable for the death of Mark Teague due to the “defective, unreasonably dangerous design of the Remington Model 700 and Defendant[s'] conduct in failing to remedy or repair that design, failing to recall these rifles despite many decades of knowledge of its dangers, and

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failing to warn the consuming public of these dangers.” (Doc. 1 at 29.) Plaintiffs seek compensatory and punitive damages under Montana law. (Id. at 29-33.)

Strict products liability under Montana law requires the plaintiff to prove: (1) the defendant is a “seller” of the product; (2) the product was in a defective condition that rendered it unreasonably dangerous; (3) the defect caused the accident; and (4) the defect is traceable to the defendant. MONT. CODE ANN. § 271-719 (2021); Brown v. N. Am. Mfg. Co., 576 P.2d 711, 716 (Mont. 1978). A “seller” is defined as “a manufacturer, wholesaler, or retailer.” § 27-1-719(1).

To recover punitive damages, the plaintiff must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant acted with “actual fraud or actual malice.” § 27-1-221. Actual malice requires proof that:

the defendant has knowledge of facts or intentionally disregards facts that create a high probability of injury to the plaintiff and: (a) deliberately proceeds to act in conscious or intentional disregard of the high probability of injury to the plaintiff; or (b) deliberately proceeds to act with indifference to the high probability of injury to the plaintiff

§ 27-1-221(2). Actual fraud requires proof that “the defendant: (a) makes a representation with knowledge of its falsity; or (b) conceals a material fact with the purpose of depriving the plaintiff of property or legal rights or otherwise causing injury.” § 21-1-221(3).

DISCUSSION

A motion in limine is a “procedural mechanism” through which questions

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regarding the admissibility of “testimony or evidence in a particular area” may be resolved before trial. United States v. Heller, 551 F.3d 1108, 1111 (9th Cir. 2009). Such in limine rulings are preliminary, and the Court “may always change [its] mind during the course of a trial.” Ohler v. United States, 529 U.S. 753, 758 n.3 (2000). “Evidence shall be excluded in limine only when it is shown that the evidence is inadmissible on all potential grounds. Unless evidence meets this high standard, evidentiary rulings should be deferred until trial so that questions of foundation, relevancy and potential prejudice may be resolved in proper context.” Speaks v. Mazda Motor Corp., 118 F.Supp.3d 1212, 1217 (D. Mont. 2015) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

As an initial matter, the Court finds it necessary to define the scope of the alleged defect in this case. The Court will then address the pending motions, beginning with those filed by Plaintiffs.

I. The Alleged Defect.

The Parties have staked out extreme positions on the nature of the defect in this case. In one briefing, Plaintiffs argue that the alleged defective condition “is the fact that the Model 700 goes off without a trigger pull.” (Doc. 124 at 16.) The Court finds this description to be too broad. In contrast, Defendants offer too narrow a definition, stating that the alleged defect is that “debris caus[ed] a reduced sear engagement condition in the rifle.” (Doc. 70 at 16 (emphasis added).)

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While debris is one of the “interferences” that Plaintiffs' expert proposes may have caused a misfire in this case, the alleged defect is broader than the specific circumstances of this one instance.

To define the defect, the Court looks first to the Plaintiffs' Complaint. Plaintiffs allege that the Remington Model 700 rifle-the subject of this litigation-utilizes a trigger assembly known as the “Walker Fire Control.” (Doc. 1 at 13.) Plaintiffs allege that this trigger design is defective because “[w]hen the rifle is fired the connector separates from the trigger body, creating a gap between the two parts” that can “collect field debris, manufacturing scrap, burrs from the manufacturing process, lubrication applied at the factory, other lubrication or buildup, or moisture.” (Id. at 14.) This “debris or foreign material restricts the return of the trigger connector to proper engagement under the sear” which can cause the rifle to fire without a trigger pull. (Id.) The risk of misfire is “increased by binding and other interferences with connector engagement created by other parts of this fire control . . . [that] are the result of tolerances that Remington has adopted for ‘ease of manufacture' and as a cost saving measure.” (Id. at 14-15.) Such unintended firing can occur under a number of circumstances, commonly referred to as Fire on Bolt Closure (“FBC”), Fire on Bolt Opening (“FBO”), Fire on Safety Release (“FSR”), Fire from Normal Rifle Jarring (“JO”), and Fire Off Safe (“FOS”). (Doc. 1 at 15-16; Doc. 47-4 at 7-8.)

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Notably, other defective conditions that may cause an unintended misfire were identified by Plaintiffs' expert Charles Powell but were determined not to have caused the misfire in this case. Those conditions include “low ConnectorSear engagement,” “inadequate sear lift,” and “post-manufacture adjustment of the housing screws.” (Doc. 47-4 at 9, ¶ 6.9.) Plaintiffs' theory also excludes any defective conditions associated with misfires when the trigger has been pulled. (See id. at 14, ¶ 6.14.)

To summarize, Plaintiffs allege that the design of the Walker fire control is defective because “this fire control design includes a Trigger Connector that does not reliably return to full engagement with the Sear each time the rifle bolt is cocked,” causing it to misfire without a trigger pull. (Id. at 8, ¶ 6.6.) The Court approaches the remaining motions in the context of the defect as defined above.

II. Plaintiffs' Motions in Limine.

a. Motion to Exclude Specific Opinions of Derek Watkins

Plaintiffs seek to exclude from trial the opinions of Defendants' liability expert, Derek Watkins, that: (1) “biologic material was present on the outside of the rifle and inside the barrel/muzzle of the rifle;” and (2) “unburnt propellant was present in the inside of the barrel/muzzle of the rifle.” (Doc. 65 at 2.) Plaintiffs argue that these opinions fail to meet the requirements of FED. R. EVID. 702 and Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). (Id.)

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Watkins is an engineering consultant specializing in firearms and ammunition who offered an expert opinion as to the circumstances of Mark Teague's death and whether the subject rifle was defectively designed or manufactured. (Doc. 129-2 at 1, 30.) Watkins examined the rifle's “mechanical components and operation” through “CT scan, 2D radiography, optical measurements, actuation force measurements and physical testing.” (Id. at 1.) Watkins identified “unburned propellant granules lodged on the surfaces of the interior rifling,” (id. at 13), and “what appeared to be biological residue stains on the surface of the interior rifling,” which led Watkins to conclude that the muzzle of the rifle was in contact with Mark Teague's head at the time it was fired, (id. at 14). Ultimately, Watkins concluded that the subject rifle has no design or manufacturing defects, (id. at 1), and that “[t]here is no physical or testing evidence to support an allegation that the rifle fired at the time of the decedent's death in any manner other than when the chamber was loaded, the bolt was cocked, the safety was in the ‘Fire' position, and the trigger was pulled,” (id. at 3).

Plaintiffs claim Watkins is not qualified because “[d]etermining the difference between biologic material and not biologic material and unburnt propellant and not unburnt propellant requires specialized knowledge of chemical and biologic testing” that Watkins lacks. (Doc. 66 at 6.) Plaintiffs point to Watkins's lack of experience and formal training in the relevant areas and lack of

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qualifications required to perform the relevant chemical analysis. (Id. at 6-7.) Plaintiffs add that Watkins “did not follow specific and reliable scientific methods, [so] his testimony on these topics would be speculative and only confuse and mislead the jury.”^[1](Doc. 66 at 8.)

Defendants contend that Watkins properly relied on Deputy Coroner Parcell's finding that the muzzle of the subject rifle was in contact with Mark Teague's forehead, which “provided the means for biologic material and blood to enter the muzzle of the rifle.” (Doc. 129 at 4 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).) Next, Defendants argue that chemical testing was not required to identify the presence of biological material and unburnt propellant. (Id. at 5.) Rather, Watkins relied on “his prior firearms and ballistics experience,” examination with “an optical camera and a magnifying borescope,” and “a process of elimination.” (Id. at 6.) Defendants also argue that Watkins is qualified to testify to his findings based on his education in mechanical engineering, years spent employed at Remington, and experience “as a firearms engineering consultant and as an expert witness in cases involving firearms and ammunition.” (Id. at 16.) Additionally, Defendants point to Watkins's “expertise in the forensics and physics of a firearm...