Teague v. Scott
| Decision Date | 15 August 1995 |
| Docket Number | No. 92-2299,92-2299 |
| Citation | 60 F.3d 1167 |
| Parties | Edward L. TEAGUE, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Wayne SCOTT, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division, Respondent-Appellee. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit |
Edward L. Teague, Huntsville, TX, pro se.
Catherine M. Cramer, Jim Mattox, Atty. Gen., Austin, TX, for appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas.
Before WISDOM, GARWOOD and DAVIS, Circuit Judges:
Edward Teague is currently serving 99 years in a Texas prison after his conviction on charges of indecency with a child. After exhausting all of his direct appeals, and unsuccessfully pursuing a state habeas corpus petition, Teague petitioned for a federal writ of habeas corpus. Teague appeals from the federal district court's grant of summary judgment against him on all claims. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.
On September 11, 1987, while serving twenty-five years on parole for a prior rape conviction, Edward Teague was arrested and charged with indecency with a child, Shauna Teague, his ten-year-old stepdaughter, in violation of Section 21.11(a)(1) of the Texas Penal Code. Fred Heacock was retained to represent Teague. On October 21, after a hearing was conducted, Teague's parole was revoked.
Prior to trial, the state offered Teague a twenty-five year sentence, running concurrent with the sentence he was already serving, in exchange for a guilty plea. Although Teague maintains that he was never informed of this offer, Teague sent a letter to Heacock, dated shortly after the offer was made, telling Heacock that he was not interested in any deals. The offer was rejected, and Teague went to trial.
During the questioning of the veniremen, several members admitted that they knew Mrs. Francis Martisek, the grandmother of the victim and a key government witness, and that they would give her testimony more weight. Despite the admitted bias of some of the veniremen, Heacock allowed a jury to be empaneled without attempting to identify or challenge the biased veniremen for cause.
At trial, both the victim and Mrs. Martisek testified against the defendant. The victim testified in graphic detail about the alleged sexual assault, and also testified that she thought Teague might have been using drugs. Mrs. Martisek's testimony was used to impeach the testimony of Dianna Teague, the victim's mother and the only defense witness. Martisek testified that she warned Dianna not to leave the children alone with Teague. Heacock did not object to the admission of any of this testimony.
Before the case went to the jury, Heacock objected to the jury instructions, alleging that the wording of the indictment actually charged Teague with a different crime, carrying a maximum sentence of 20 years. Despite Heacock's objection, the jury found Teague guilty of indecency with a child, and Teague was sentenced to 99 years in jail.
After exhausting his direct appeals and unsuccessfully petitioning for habeas corpus relief in the state courts, Teague sought habeas corpus relief from the federal district court. In his petition, Teague maintained that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. Teague alleged that Heacock (1) failed to inform him of the 25 year plea offer, (2) told him that the maximum sentence he could receive was 20 years, (3) failed to identify and challenge veniremen that knew the victim's grandmother, (4) failed to object to inadmissible evidence of prior acts and drug use, (5) undermined his "family situation" defense theory during closing arguments, and (6) failed to adequately investigate the case. Teague also maintains that his appellate counsel provided ineffective assistance. The district court granted summary judgment on all claims. Teague appeals.
In reviewing the grant of summary judgment in a habeas case, we presume that the state court findings of fact are correct unless there is affirmative proof that the findings are inadequate. 1 Mere disagreement with the state court factual findings is not sufficient to overcome those findings. 2 Even an ambiguous record entitles the state court findings to this presumption of correctness. 3 If there are no state court findings on an issue, however, we review the grant of summary judgment de novo, employing the traditional standard that summary judgment is only appropriate when there is no dispute as to the material facts. 4
Teague's arguments center around his contention that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. The Sixth Amendment guarantees criminal defendants the right to an effective counsel. 5 This right applies both at trial and on direct appeal. 6 In Strickland v. Washington, the Supreme Court established the following test to determine if counsel was ineffective:
First, the defendant must show that counsel's performance was deficient. This requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the "counsel" guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment. Second, the defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. This requires showing that counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable. 7
In order to amount to ineffective assistance of counsel, the performance of counsel must have fallen below an objective standard of reasonableness as determined by the norms of the profession. 8 We review counsel's performance from counsel's perspective at the time of trial, not from hindsight. 9 This review is highly deferential, with the presumption being that counsel's performance was reasonable. 10 Whether a defendant was prejudiced is a mixed question of law and fact, for which we are not obligated to defer to the judgment of the state court. 11
Teague's first argument is that Heacock failed to provide effective assistance because he did not inform Teague of the government's offer of a 25 year sentence, running concurrent with his current sentence, in exchange for a guilty plea. In determining whether or not to plead guilty, the defendant should be made aware of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences so that he can make an intelligent choice. 12 Several other circuit courts have found that the failure of trial counsel to inform the defendant about a government plea offer amounts to ineffective assistance of counsel. 13
Although we agree that failing to inform the defendant of a plea offer could amount to ineffective assistance of counsel, we find that the record in the present case adequately supports the state court finding that Teague knew of the plea offer and specifically rejected it. 14 Support for this finding includes Heacock's affidavit stating that he informed Teague of the offer and Teague's letter to Heacock, dated after the offer had been made, stating that Teague was not interested in any deals. Although Teague maintains that he was not told of the offer, the state trial court found that Teague's testimony was not credible. Because the state court finding that Teague knew of the offer is adequately supported in the record, we must presume that it is correct. Therefore, on this claim, we conclude that summary judgment was appropriate because Teague failed to provide sufficient evidence to show that Heacock's performance fell below the objective standard required by Strickland.
Teague's next allegation is that Heacock improperly advised him that the crime with which he was charged carried a maximum sentence of 20 years, when, in reality, Teague could have received a sentence of 99 years. Teague argues that he was prejudiced by this incorrect information when he ultimately received a 99 year sentence, because, had he known that he could receive such a severe sentence, he would have accepted the state's plea offer which would have run concurrently with the sentence he was currently serving.
Because there was no state court finding on this issue, we review the district court's grant of summary judgment de novo. 15 To establish that the defendant has been prejudiced by the counsel's ineffective assistance, he must show "a reasonable probability that but for trial counsel's errors", the defendant's sentence would be significantly less severe. 16
This Court was faced with a similar situation in Beckham v. Wainwright in which a defendant withdrew a guilty plea that would have resulted in a five year sentence after his counsel advised him that he could be sentenced to a maximum of only five years in prison if convicted at trial. 17 In that case, we found that the defendant had not received the effective assistance of counsel when, despite his counsel's advice, the defendant was sentenced to 50 years in prison. 18 Failing to properly advise the defendant of the maximum sentence that he could receive falls below the objective standard required by Strickland. When the defendant lacks a full understanding of the risks of going to trial, he is unable to make an intelligent choice of whether to accept a plea or take his chances in court.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, as we must do in reviewing a summary judgment, we conclude that Teague provided sufficient evidence for a reasonable factfinder to find that Teague was not properly advised of the maximum sentence he could receive if he went to trial. Teague provided a sworn affidavit stating that Heacock told him that the maximum sentence he could receive for a conviction would be 20 years. Heacock's affidavit does not contradict Teague's allegations because it merely states that Heacock advised his client of the full range of the possible sentence. It did not state whether Heacock knew that Teague could face 99 years or just 20 years. In addition, by arguing that the wording of the indictment charged Teague with an offense punishable by a...
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