Teal v. Chancellor
| Decision Date | 11 May 1898 |
| Citation | 117 Ala. 612,23 So. 651 |
| Parties | TEAL ET AL. v. CHANCELLOR. |
| Court | Alabama Supreme Court |
Appeal from chancery court, Pike county; Jere N. Williams Chancellor.
The bill in this case was filed by Sophronia Chancellor against A. L. Teal and others. The appeal is from a decree of the chancellor overruling the demurrers interposed to the bill. Affirmed.
Parks & Harmon, for appellants.
Hubbard Wilkerson & Hubbard, for appellee.
The appellee, one of the next of kin and distributees of her deceased father, Arnold Teal, who died intestate, leaving three children, his only next of kin, filed the original bill against her co-distributees, a brother and sister, for the recovery of her distributive share, upon allegations that the defendants had taken possession of the personal property of the intestate, wasting or converting much thereof. The bill alleges that the deceased left no debts whatever, and that there had been no administration taken on his estate. Subsequently the bill was amended so as to make Palestine Teal, the wife of one of the defendants (A. L. Teal), a party defendant; and in the amendment it is alleged that the deceased was the owner of a large amount of personal property, other than that stated in the original bill, and also of real estate, describing the two as "all the real estate and personal property named in the instrument attached to the answer in this case of respondent A. L. Teal, marked as 'Exhibits A and B,"' and alleging a conversion of the personal property by Palestine Teal and her husband, and averring that Palestine claimed and was using it "in connection with, and by the consent of, her husband," and further averring the "fact to be that the said Palestine Teal is not the owner of any of the property mentioned or referred to in the original nor in this amended bill, nor has she any interest therein." The prayer of the bill, as amended, is that Palestine's claim be canceled; that she and her husband be charged with the property converted by them to the extent of complainant's interest; and for distribution of the estate, and for general relief. The bills (original and amended) were demurred to by all the defendants, and numerous causes were assigned. The demurrers were overruled, and from the decree overruling them the appeal is taken.
1. The causes of demurrer it is perhaps the more orderly first to consider rest upon the proposition that for the grievances which make up the gravamen of the original and amended bill the complainant has an adequate remedy at law. This, to a certain extent, would be true, if the title of the complainant, and her consequent right to sue, were legal; but her title and her capacity to maintain suit are purely and strictly equitable. By the common law, the legal title to all personal property of a deceased person devolves on his personal representative,-if he dies testate, on the executor of his appointment; if intestate, upon the administrator of the future appointment of the court of probate; the title of such administrator having relation to the death of the intestate. In courts of law, the personal representative only can maintain suits of which personal assets are the subject-matter. 1 Brick. Dig. p. 932, § 264. And in courts of equity the general rule is that personal assets are recoverable only by the personal representative. Neither creditors nor legatees nor distributees can maintain suits concerning them, though, when recovered, the personal representative holds them in trust for their ultimate benefit. There are recognized exceptions to the rule prevailing in courts of equity, all of which, however, proceed on the theory that the right and title of the creditor or of the legatee or of the distributee are purely equitable. We have concern now with only one of these exceptions, and that is that when a person dies intestate, owing no debts, and the only duty which would devolve on the administrator, if one were appointed, would be that of making distribution, the equity of the distributees is perfect, and the court will dispense with an administration, entertaining suits by them for the recovery of the personal assets. Hopkins v. Miller, 92 Ala. 513, 8 So. 750; De Bardelaben v. Stoudenmire, 82 Ala. 574, 2 So. 488; Glover v. Hill, 85 Ala. 41, 4 So. 613; Fretwell v. McLemore, 52 Ala. 124, and authorities cited. It is sufficient now to say that the bills make a case falling within this exception, and the demurrers we are considering were properly overruled.
2. The bill is not exclusively a bill for partition. It is a bill for an accounting of the personal property which has been wasted or converted, and for the allotment to complainant of her share in such parts thereof as may remain in specie, capable of division or partition. We may concede that it is shown by the bill that the possession of Palestine Teal to such parts of the property as it is alleged she claims was hostile and adverse to the title of the complainant. The concession does not render the bill demurrable; for, as we have already held, the right and title of the complainant were purely equitable, as was her remedy. The complainant stands in the relation of an administrator, so far as the recovery of her share of the personal assets is the matter of suit, with all the rights which would have devolved on him; and surely it would not be insisted that he could not have recovered the assets from an adverse holder. Besides, an adverse possession is not, in a court of equity, a bar to a suit for partition of personal property, for the reason that a co-tenant has no remedy at law which he can pursue against the wrongdoer. Freem. Co-Ten. § 426; Smith v. Dunn, 27 Ala. 315; Marshall v. Crow's Adm'rs, 29 Ala. 278. There was, of consequence, no error in overruling the third and ninth causes of demurrer to the amended bill.
3. The first, second, and third causes of demurrer proceed on the theory that the amended bill introduces a new cause of action, because it seeks the partition of lands, and of other personal property than that mentioned in the original...
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