Teal v. KING FARMS COMPANY

• Decision Date: 24 February 1960
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 19276.
• Parties: Victor Alvarez TEAL v. KING FARMS COMPANY.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania

181 F. Supp. 235

Victor Alvarez TEAL v. KING FARMS COMPANY.

Civ. A. No. 19276.

United States District Court E. D. Pennsylvania.

February 24, 1960.

Techner, Rubin & Shapiro, by Martin Techner, Philadelphia, Pa., for plaintiff.

Harris, Hammond & Harris, by Peirce A. Hammond, Jr., Philadelphia, Pa., for defendant.

WOOD, District Judge.

This was a suit for personal injuries incurred when plaintiff was apparently robbed and beaten while on the property of defendant, King Farms Company, by a fellow laborer, one Gomez. Plaintiff had been employed by the defendant as a laborer, but a few days prior to the alleged beating, plaintiff had been fired. At the time of the alleged beating, plaintiff was on the defendant's property, not as an employee, but as a licensee, since defendant had allowed plaintiff to remain on defendant's premises long enough to gather together his possessions.

At the trial the alleged robber and assaulter of plaintiff was not available to testify, and the plaintiff himself was physically and mentally incapable of testifying. Plaintiff's attorney attempted to prove the actual occurrence of the robbery and beating by repeated attempts to introduce hearsay testimony. Although we do not base our decision of this motion on the sufficiency of plaintiff's proof of the assault, we do note the inadequacy of that proof.

Plaintiff's attorney tried the case on the theory that the defendant had a duty to employ a "reasonable number" of policemen or constables to patrol the farm, that defendant breached this duty, and that as a result of this breach of duty plaintiff was exposed to the assault and suffered injuries at the hands of the said Gomez. After plaintiff had presented all his evidence, the Court directed a verdict for the defendant. Plaintiff then made this motion for a new trial.

We recognize that plaintiff is not here arguing that the defendant could be held responsible for Gomez' alleged assault upon plaintiff on any principles of agency law. Indeed, such an argument would be completely without merit, since Gomez was clearly acting outside the scope of his employment when he committed the alleged assault. Plaintiff's motion for a new trial is based on the following argument: (1) The plaintiff's evidence established a kind of relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant which placed upon the defendant a duty to plaintiff; (2) that duty was to "reasonably police" the area of the farm so as to protect plaintiff from the conduct of other employees; and (3) the question of whether or not the defendant provided "reasonable police protection" on the farm was a question for the jury — therefore, the Court erred in directing a verdict for the defendant.

Fortunately, The Law is much more specific than plaintiff would have it in defining the obligation of an employer to control the acts of his employees when they are acting outside the scope of their employment. We say "fortunately" because it would be a hard society which would make an employer liable for the vicious act of an employee simply because the act took place on the employer's premises. But we need make no social judgments here in order to hold this defendant blameless for the vicious act allegedly committed by its employee, Gomez. The Restatement of Torts, Section 317,¹ defines the duty of the master to control the conduct of his servant. It reads in part as follows:

"A master is under a duty to exercise reasonable care so to control his servant while acting outside the course of his employment as to prevent him from intentionally harming others * * *, if

"(a) the servant

"(i) is upon the premises in possession of the master * * *, and

"(b) the master

"(i) knows or has reason to know that he has the ability to control his servant, and

"(ii) knows or should know of the necessity and opportunity for exercising such control."

This rule of law is based on the premise that a master ordinarily has the ability to control his servant because the master can threaten him with loss of his employment if the servant does not obey. It logically follows that unless the master had some warning that a particular servant was going to act lawlessly, there would be no occasion for the master to attempt to exercise his measure of control over that servant. Therefore, the Restatement rule requires the master to be aware of his ability to control his servant and to have reason to know of "the necessity and opportunity for exercising such control."

Applying...