Teal v. Mathews

Decision Date28 October 1976
Docket NumberCiv. A. No. Y-75-1602.
PartiesHelen TEAL v. F. David MATHEWS, Secretary, Department of Health, Education & Welfare.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Maryland

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Dennis M. Sweeney, Baltimore, Md., for plaintiff.

John W. Sheldon, Baltimore, Md., for defendant.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

JOSEPH H. YOUNG, District Judge.

Plaintiff, Helen Teal, filed this action on November 7, 1975 to obtain judicial review, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), of the final decision of the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare, who denied plaintiff's claim for disability benefits.

This case is before the court on a motion by plaintiff to reverse or in the alternative, to remand to the Secretary and a motion for summary judgment made by defendant.

The plaintiff's claim for benefits was transferred from the Maryland State Welfare Program to the Supplemental Security Income Program on January 1, 1974. (Tr. 10). After evaluation, the Bureau of Supplemental Security Income notified plaintiff on May 30, 1974 that her entitlement to Supplemental Security Income benefits had terminated because she had not received a payment as a result of a disability from a state or local public assistance office for at least one month prior to July, 1973, and she did not meet the definition of disability prescribed by federal law. On October 30, 1974, plaintiff requested a reconsideration, and on November 14, 1974, the initial disallowance was affirmed. On November 27, 1974, the plaintiff filed a request for hearing. (Tr. 10). A hearing was held on March 12, 1975, after which the Hearing Examiner decided that the plaintiff was not under a "disability" and was not prevented from engaging in "substantial gainful activity", and was not eligible for Supplemental Security Income. (Tr. 16). On April 25, 1975, plaintiff filed a request for review by the Appeals Council. (Tr. 8). The decision of the Hearing Examiner was affirmed by the Appeals Council on September 24, 1975. (Tr. 3). Thereupon, plaintiff filed this action for review of the decision of the Appeals Council.

At the time of the hearing, plaintiff was 56 years old (Tr. 29) and was living with a girlfriend. (Tr. 30). Plaintiff testified, with regard to her daily activities, that she washes her own clothes (Tr. 42), does a little cooking (Tr. 42), and generally spends her days visiting with her friends and father (Tr. 40, 41), and goes to the nearby store for him. (Tr. 41).

The medical evidence in the record reveals that plaintiff suffered three fractures of her right leg. The discharge summary of Maryland General Hospital, where the third injury was treated, discloses that as a result of the first and second operations, a side plate had been inserted in plaintiff's right femur and a Smith-Petersen nail in plaintiff's right hip. (Tr. 89). The result of the third fracture was a posterior angulation. (Tr. 90). The medical reports of Dr. Elmer Ellsworth Cook, Jr., who examined plaintiff on eight occasions between March 7, 1963 and July 18, 1974 confirmed this medical history (Tr. 103), and also reported leg edema (Tr. 100) and increased emotional tension (Tr. 103).

Plaintiff testified at the hearing that she has some swelling in her leg (Tr. 46), that it bothers her in bad weather (Tr. 44), that one leg is an inch shorter than the other (Tr. 33), and that her feet are sore (Tr. 47). She may have been diagnosed for cirrhosis of the liver two years earlier. (Tr. 51). Generally, she said she has bad teeth (Tr. 56), that she has dizzy spells (Tr. 43), that she is tired (Tr. 48), nervous (Tr. 54), and too old to work (Tr. 70).

Plaintiff also testified as to her medications. She said that she is taking phenobarbital, fluid pills, and cough syrup. (Tr. 42).

With respect to her prior work history, plaintiff testified that she left school after the seventh grade and worked as a domestic (Tr. 32), capping bottles and running errands in a distillery (Tr. 37), boxing mail (Tr. 33), as a barmaid (Tr. 34), in several factories packing jars and working at tables (Tr. 35), as a superintendent (Tr. 35), and babysitting (Tr. 38).

A vocational expert, Dr. Ronald A. Ziegler, was also present at the hearing. After hearing the testimony of plaintiff, and being asked several questions by the Hearing Examiner, Dr. Ziegler testified that several types of sedentary, bench-work factory jobs existed in the economy and that these were in keeping with plaintiff's prior work history.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

The issues before this Court are whether the findings and decision by the Secretary are supported by substantial evidence and whether there is good cause to remand for a new hearing.

In reviewing the Secretary's decision, the following standard must be applied:

The findings of the Secretary as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive . . .

42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (1970); 42 U.S.C. § 1383(c)(3) as amended Pub.Law 94-202, January 2, 1976. Substantial evidence has been defined as that evidence which a reasonable mind would accept to support a particular conclusion. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 91 S.Ct. 1420, 28 L.Ed.2d 842 (1971); Carter v. Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare, 532 F.2d 749 (4th Cir.). The Administrative Law Judge must make explicit findings on all facts that are essential to the conclusion of ineligibility. Smith v. Weinberger, 394 F.Supp. 1002 (D.Md.1975). However, the Secretary, and not the courts, must weigh the evidence and resolve any conflicts. It is immaterial that evidence before the Secretary would permit another conclusion, Thomas v. Celebrezze, 331 F.2d 541 (4th Cir. 1964); Snyder v. Ribicoff, 307 F.2d 518 (4th Cir. 1962), so long as there is evidence to justify a refusal to direct a verdict were the case before a jury. Laws v. Celebrezze, 368 F.2d 640 (4th Cir. 1966); Blalock v. Richardson, 483 F.2d 773 (4th Cir. 1972).

In addition, a court must investigate whether the Administrative Law Judge (formerly Hearing Examiner) considered four essential factors in reaching his decision: a) objective medical facts as reported by examining physicians; b) the medical opinions of these doctors; c) subjective evidence of pain and disability, as testified to by the claimant and corroborated by other evidence; d) the claimant's background, work history, and present age. Hicks v. Gardner, 393 F.2d 299 (4th Cir. 1968); DePaepe v. Richardson, 464 F.2d 92 (5th Cir. 1972).

In the present case it appears that the Hearing Examiner did consider each of the above factors. Based on the medical evidence and plaintiff's testimony, he found that the plaintiff suffered three fractures of her right leg, and the resultant existence of pins and plate in that leg, occasional pain and weakness, and edema. (Tr. 16). He found that plaintiff had previously worked at unskilled jobs, including general factory work, and that these impairments would not prevent her from returning to factory work of this type. (Tr. 16). He thus concluded that the plaintiff was not prevented from performing occupations consistent with her prior background and work history.

On appeal, plaintiff argues that the Hearing Examiner improperly refused to consider her subjective complaints without objective medical evidence. These subjective complaints included plaintiff's testimony that she is too tired and nervous to work.

In support of this criticism, plaintiff cited several cases which were remanded for failure of the Hearing Examiner to consider subjective evidence. These cases, however, are clearly distinguishable from the present one; and, taken together, they present contrary dicta.

In Young v. Weinberger, 366 F.Supp. 81 (D.Md.1973), claimant was suffering from blackouts which escaped physiological explanation. That was a case of testimony of an objective nature, corroborated by doctors and family, even though unexplained by medical evidence. In Zambrana-Domenech v. Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare, (1974), 370 F.Supp. 399 (D.P.R.1974), claimant suffered from a back ailment with resulting symptoms of pain and discomfort. The medical evidence on the record corroborated and supported these subjective symptoms. In Page v. Weinberger, CCH 17,373 E.D.Tex. (August 1, 1973), there was overwhelming evidence presented by the claimant and his neighbors as to the effect of claimant's fractures on his ability to work contrasted by conflicting medical evidence. In Longo v. Weinberger, 369 F.Supp. 250 (E.D.Pa.1974), the Hearing Examiner ignored reports of several doctors which corroborated claimant's testimony of pain and suffering from arthritis and bursitis.

While these cases do support the rule that the Hearing Examiner must consider subjective evidence in reaching his conclusion, there is a common denominator implicit in them which is absent in the present case. The cited cases dealt with testimony as to the pain arising from the medically observable impairments, or with overwhelming testimony as to the total effect of the impairments on the person. See also, Underwood v. Ribicoff, 298 F.2d 850 (4th Cir. 1962); Dillon v. Celebrezze, 345 F.2d 753 (4th Cir. 1965).

Plaintiff here did not stress the pain resulting from her leg operations, as to which the Hearing Examiner did inquire and which he did consider, but rather, asserted separate ailments. In the cited cases, separate ailments were corroborated by symptoms, occurrences, or testimony by other people. Plaintiff failed to corroborate her assertions with any facts or symptoms. The credibility and weight to be given such testimony is in the judgment of the Hearing Examiner. In evaluating the evidence, the Hearing Examiner may consider credibility and even the absence of objective evidence. Longo v. Weinberger, supra. Thus, plaintiff's testimony as to her nervousness and fatigue is not conclusive and the Hearing Examiner's decision to give it little weight is not a fatal error.

Plaintiff has thus failed...

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