Teale v. American Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co., WD

• Decision Date: 26 December 1984
• Docket Number: No. WD,WD
• Citation: Teale v. American Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co., 687 S.W.2d 218 (Mo. App. 1984)
• Parties: John H. TEALE, Appellant, v. AMERICAN MANUFACTURERS MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, A Foreign Corporation, Respondent. 35443.
• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals

Page 218

687 S.W.2d 218

John H. TEALE, Appellant, v. AMERICAN MANUFACTURERS MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, A Foreign Corporation, Respondent.

No. WD 35443.

Missouri Court of Appeals Western District.

Dec. 26, 1984.

Motion for Rehearing and/or Transfer to

Supreme Court Overruled and Denied

March 5, 1985.

Thomas J. Downey, Jefferson City, for appellant.

Laurence R. Tucker, W. Robert King, Morris, Larson, King, Stamper & Bold, Kansas City, for respondent.

Before KENNEDY, P.J., and DIXON and CLARK, JJ.

CLARK, Judge.

This appeal is brought from the order of the trial court dismissing plaintiff's first amended petition. The order sustained defendant's motion for dismissal which asserted that the petition failed to state a claim on which relief could be granted, that plaintiff was not the real party in interest and was without legal capacity to sue and that the court lacked jurisdiction over the subject matter. The order did not state which of the several causes were relied on as grounds for dismissal.

The pleaded facts of the case are as follows. One Whelchel, an employee of a supermarket, sustained a work related injury and sought medical treatment from appellant, a chiropractor. Appellant treated Whelchel from October 8 to October 27, 1982. Respondent is the worker's compensation insurance carrier for the market and, on the last mentioned date, it gave notice to appellant that any further services by appellant to Whelchel would be at Whelchel's expense because it had selected another physician. At about the same time, respondent furnished Whelchel a list of five doctors from which Whelchel could select a physician to provide continued medical care at respondent's expense. The list included no chiropractors. Because respondent declined further payment for appellant's services, Whelchel discontinued her treatments from appellant. The petition asserted that respondent's conduct amounted to actionable, tortious interference with the contractual and business relationship between doctor and patient resulting in actual damage amounting to $564.00. ¹ The claim for punitive damages was also asserted.

On familiar and established authority, we consider appellant's pleading allegations in the light most favorable to the cause of action asserted and give appellant the benefit of intendments, recognizing, however, that facts essential to statement of the claim must be alleged. In this case, the task of analysis is simplified because the facts are relatively uncomplicated. The employee, Whelchel, was receiving health care treatment from appellant for a job related injury. The services of appellant and the course of treatment had been authorized by the employer and the expense was borne by the employer as a worker's compensation benefit. When respondent insurance company notified Whelchel and the employer that it would no longer sustain the expense of appellant's fees for treatment, the services of appellant were terminated. The pleaded facts warrant the inferences, first that the course of appellant's treatment to Whelchel had not been concluded and, second that Whelchel's medical care was placed with another physician because Whelchel and her employer were unwilling to assume the burden of paying appellant's fees outside respondent's insurance benefits.

Some guiding propositions applicable to this case must first be noted. The cause of action for tort is recognized where the acts of a third party cause the interruption of an existing contract or business relationship. The elements of the cause of action are (1) a contract or a business relationship (2) knowledge by the third party of that contract or business relation (3) intentional conduct by the third party inducing or causing the breach of the contract or interruption of the business relation (4) absence of justification for the conduct of the third party, and (5) resulting damages. Francisco v. Kansas City Star Co., 629 S.W.2d 524 (Mo.App.1981). The business relationship which is contended to have been disrupted by the acts of the defendant need not necessarily be evidenced by a contract but may consist of reasonable expectancies of commercial relations. Casterline v. Stuerman, 588 S.W.2d 86 (Mo.App.1979).

Respondent here contends that the first element of the tort is lacking in appellant's pleading because it is not alleged that a contract for continuing care existed between Whelchel and appellant. Such was not a necessary component of the action. Whelchel had been attended for her injury by appellant for a period of more than two weeks, the course of treatments and the expectancy for its continuation were interrupted by respondent's notice, the effect of which was to require Whelchel to seek the services of another doctor, and, in consequence, appellant lost the expectancy of benefits from the future relationship with Whelchel as a patient. It is immaterial that Whelchel was not bound to a predetermined course of treatment with appellant. As pleaded, Whelchel would have continued her treatments provided by appellant, but for respon...