Teamsters, Chauffeurs, & Helpers of America, Locals 222, & 976 of Intern. Broth. v. Orange Transp. Co.

Citation296 P.2d 291,5 Utah 2d 45
Decision Date11 April 1956
Docket NumberNo. 8428,8428
Partiesd 45 TEAMSTERS, CHAUFFEURS, AND HELPERS OF AMERICA, LOCALS NO. 222 AND 976 OF INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD, for and on behalf of membership, Plaintiffs, v. ORANGE TRANSPORTATION COMPANY, and Inland Freight Lines, The Industrial Commission of the State of Utah, its Board of Review, Appeals Referee and Claims Supervisor, Intermountain Operators League, Defendants.
CourtSupreme Court of Utah

Reid W. Nielson, Salt Lake City, for plaintiffs.

E. R. Callister, Jr., Atty. Gen., Fred F. Dremann, Salt Lake City, for defendants.

CROCKETT, Justice.

Review of the action of the Industrial Commission in denying unemployment compensation to plaintiffs. Plaintiffs belong to Locals 222 and 976 of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs and Helpers of America (hereinafter called the Union). The Union had negotiated a master contract with the Intermountain Operators League (hereafter called the Employers' Group), a voluntary association of trucking companies. That contract terminated on May 1, 1955, but operations continued pending negotiations of a new contract. On May 19, the Union struck two only of the Employers' Group--that is Pacific Intermountain Express (P.I.E.) and Consolidated Freightlines Inc. (Consolidated). All of the other employers shut down operations, acting on the announced principle that 'a strike against one is a strike against all.' Their employees (the plaintiffs here) were notified not to report for work until called.

Under the above facts the defendant board denied plaintiffs' claims for unemployment compensation on the basis of our statute which provides:

'An individual shall be ineligible for benefits or for purposes of establishing a waiting period: * * * '(d) For any week in which it is found by the commission that his unemployment is due to a stoppage of work which exists because of a strike involving his grade, class, or group or workers at the factory or establishment at which he is or was last employed.' 1

The Commission held that under our interpretation of this provision in Olof Nelson Construction Co. v. Industrial Commission, 2 plaintiffs would come within a 'group' whose 'unemployment is due to a stoppage of work which exists because of a strike involving [the worker's] grade, class or group.'

The Olof Nelson case involved a labor dispute between a multiple employer bargaining unit of 75 general contractors and a multiple employee bargaining unit of 5,000 workers. The parties had entered a master contract that could be reopened only in regard to wage provisions. The union informed the contractors that it intended to strike against two of the 75 contractors in order to force acceptance of its wage demands, and indicated an intention of later proceeding successively against other employers in carrying out its design. The contractors replied that a strike against one would be considered a strike against all. The union struck the two as threatened and the other contractors ceased operations. Their employees applied for unemployment compensation. The Industrial Commission granted the claims on the theory that the work stoppage as it applied to the other 73 contractors involved a lockout rather than a strike. This court reversed, holding that the legislature intended that the employee's right to compensation depended upon the volitional action of the union or other group with which he was identified. 3 Under the facts of the Olof Nelson case, it seemed clear that the economic sanctions of the strike were directed against the entire employer group and the strike was called for all of the employees, and that all would benefit from forcing acceptance of union demands. Consequently the court concluded that the finding should have been that the multiple employee association constituted a 'group' within the meaning of the statute and that the multiple employer association could stand together as a group against the action aimed at all of them collectively.

Plaintiffs' Union seeks to distinguish the instant situation on several grounds. They contend that the only dispute in the negotiations then being carried on was with P.I.E. and Consolidated over a change proposed by these companies in terminal or division points which affected the number of miles and hours in the shifts driven by truck drivers, and that the strike was purposed to force acceptance of the Union's position in that regard. It is the plaintiffs' position that the shutdown of operations by others of the Employers' Group was because of division points--an issue that did not directly concern them--and that their shutdown placed their drivers out of work involuntarily. However, the Appeals Referee did not make any such finding, nor was he obliged to do so. The only instance in which he would be required to so find, or where we would interfere with his refusal to so find, would be where the evidence was uncontradicted and pointed so unerringly to one conclusion that reasonable minds could not remain unconvinced of the fact, so that it would be manifest therefrom that he had acted arbitrarily or capriciously in disregard of such evidence. 4

Another claim of plaintiffs is that the instant case is distinguishable from the Olof Nelson case on the grounds that here there was no longer any contract between the parties, it having terminated on May 1, and that the Employers' Group had ceased to exist as a bargaining unit. In support of the latter point, plaintiffs argue that negotiations were transferred to the West Coast, and that two of the employers here involved--Orange Transportation and Inland Freight Lines--had given notice in an attempt to withdraw from the...

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