Teamsters for a Democratic Union v. Sec. of Labor

• Decision Date: 06 March 1986
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 85-3511.
• Citation: 629 F. Supp. 665
• Parties: TEAMSTERS FOR A DEMOCRATIC UNION, et al., Plaintiffs, v. SECRETARY OF LABOR, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Columbia

629 F. Supp. 665

TEAMSTERS FOR A DEMOCRATIC UNION, et al., Plaintiffs, v. SECRETARY OF LABOR, et al., Defendants.

Civ. A. No. 85-3511.

United States District Court, District of Columbia.

March 6, 1986.

Arthur L. Fox, II, Washington, D.C., for plaintiffs.

Dennis Linden and Jeffrey Paulsen, U.S. Dept. of Justice, Washington, D.C., for defendant Secretary of Labor.

Gary S. Witlen, Washington, D.C., for intervenor Intern. Broth. of Teamsters.

MEMORANDUM

GASCH, Senior District Judge.

This case challenges the Secretary of Labor's interpretation of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act ("Act"), 29 U.S.C. §§ 401-531 (1982). Plaintiffs assert that the Secretary has incorrectly interpreted the provision of Title IV of the Act governing the election of officers of national and international unions. See Act § 401(a), 29 U.S.C. § 481(a) (1982). Plaintiffs seek declarations that the Secretary of Labor's current interpretation is contrary to the Act and that the Secretary has the statutory authority to issue a new regulation requiring unions to utilize different voting procedures.

Currently before the Court are three motions. Plaintiffs move for summary judgment. The Secretary of Labor and the International Brotherhood of Teamsters ("Teamsters"), an intervenor, move for dismissal.

I. BACKGROUND

The Act was enacted in 1959 in response to congressional investigations of labor-management relations that disclosed numerous "instances of breach of trust, corruption, disregard of the rights of individual employees, and other failures to observe high standards of responsibility and ethical conduct." Act § 2(b), 29 U.S.C. § 401(b) (1982). A "pervading premise" of the Act was that these abuses could be prevented by "full and active participation by the rank and file in the affairs of the union." American Federation of Musicians v. Wittstein, 379 U.S. 171, 182-83, 85 S.Ct. 300, 307, 13 L.Ed.2d 214 (1964).

To that end, Congress set certain standards to govern election of union officials in Title IV of the Act. All local labor organizations must elect their officers "not less often than once every three years by secret ballot among the members in good standing." Act § 401(b), 29 U.S.C. § 481(b) (1982). Intermediate union bodies must elect officers "not less often than once every four years by secret ballot among the members in good standing or by labor organization officers representative of such members who have been elected by secret ballot." Id. § 401(d). Finally, international and national unions must elect their officers "not less often than once every five years either by secret ballot among the members in good standing or at a convention of delegates chosen by secret ballot." Id. § 401(a). The latter provision is the focus of this case.

The Secretary of Labor has construed section 401(a) of the Act as follows:

Officers of labor organizations who have been elected by secret ballot vote of their respective memberships may, by virtue of their election to office, serve as delegates to conventions at which officers will be elected, if the constitution and bylaws of the labor organization so provide.

29 C.F.R. § 452.120 (1985). Thus, in the Secretary's view the law does not require special elections for delegates to national conventions. Rather, a union may provide that local union officials elected by secret ballot will automatically serve as delegates to national conventions. The Secretary's interpretation was first made soon after the Act became law and has remained unchanged for twenty-five years.¹

Many unions either directly elect their national officers by secret ballot or hold special elections in which all delegates for their national conventions are elected by secret ballot. Other unions, including the Teamsters, use a different procedure. The Teamsters' constitution provides that local officers and business agents who have been elected by secret ballot shall serve as delegates to any national convention held during their term of office. Because of the staggered terms of local officers, election of those officers who become ex officio delegates occurs between six and twenty-nine months prior to the national convention. If a local chapter is entitled to more delegates, those delegates are selected by secret ballot elections held between ninety and thirty days before the convention. The Teamsters have used this method of selection since 1961.

The legality of 29 C.F.R. § 452.120 was first challenged in January, 1981, when several Teamsters members asked the Secretary to require special delegate elections before the Teamsters' 1981 national convention. The Secretary declined to do so. While he found special elections to be "a worthy concept," the Secretary concluded: "As desirable as this may be for members, the Act does not prescribe when delegate elections should be conducted. Nor does the Act prohibit local officers from serving as ex officio delegates to an international convention."²

On August 9, 1985, plaintiffs herein filed a petition asking the Secretary to formally rescind 29 C.F.R. § 452.120 and to promulgate a new interpretation requiring special delegate elections to be held within a specified time prior to national conventions. The Secretary refused, reaffirming his 1981 position and noting that the "policy set forth in 29 C.F.R. § 452.120 is not inconsistent with the provisions of the Act" because section 401(a) of the Act "requires only that the delegates be elected by secret ballot."

Plaintiffs responded by filing the instant action on November 4, 1985. They allege that 29 C.F.R. § 452.120 undermines the Act's purpose of promoting union democracy because local officials often are elected well in advance of national conventions, before the issues to be addressed in those conventions have surfaced. In addition, they contend that union members voting for local officers usually make their decision solely upon the candidates' positions on issues of purely local concern. As such, the Teamsters' delegate selection process allegedly has the effect of muting members' voices on issues of national significance because the ex officio delegates are not accountable to the union rank and file for their positions on national union issues.

Resolution of the plaintiffs' claims has some immediacy, because the Teamsters are preparing for their 1986 convention, which is scheduled to commence on May 19, 1986.

II. DISCUSSION

The parties have raised a number of issues, both as to justiciability and on the merits of plaintiffs' claims. The Court need not reach the merits, however, since it concludes that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over the case because Congress intended to preclude pre-election judicial review at the instigation of union members.³

Under the Administrative Procedure Act, an aggrieved party has no cause of action to challenge an administrative action if the authorizing Act "precludes judicial review" of that action. 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(1) (1982). There is a presumption in favor of judicial review, but that presumption may be overcome "whenever the congressional intent to preclude judicial review is `fairly discernible in the statutory scheme.'" Block v. Community Nutrition Institute, 467 U.S. 340, 104 S.Ct. 2450, 2457, 81 L.Ed.2d 270 (1984) (quoting Data Processing Service v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 157, 90 S.Ct. 827, 831-32, 25 L.Ed.2d 184 (1970)). The Supreme Court recently noted,

Whether and to what extent a particular statute precludes judicial review is determined not only from its express language, but also from the structure of the statutory scheme, its objectives, its legislative history, and the nature of the administrative action involved.... Therefore, we must examine this statutory scheme "to determine whether Congress precluded all judicial review, and, if not, whether Congress nevertheless foreclosed review to the class to which the respondents belong."

Id. at 2454 (quoting Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159, 173, 90 S.Ct. 832, 841-42, 25 L.Ed.2d 192 (1970) (opinion of Brennan, J.)). Under this standard, courts have found preclusion of judicial review in a number of cases.⁴

The question for this Court therefore is whether Congress intended to foreclose pre-election review of the Secretary's interpretation of Section 401(a) in suits brought by union members. The language and scheme of the Act, its legislative history, and its objectives all lead this Court to conclude that such preclusion was intended.

A. Language and Structure of the Act

The Act provides a mechanism for enforcement of Title IV. See Act § 402, 29 U.S.C. § 482 (1982). Union members who believe that a union election has violated the Act must first exhaust their internal union procedures for resolving their grievances. Id. § 402(a). Thereafter, the members may file a complaint with the Secretary, who must investigate the claims of illegality. Id. Upon finding "probable cause" to believe that a violation has occurred, the Secretary must bring a civil action against the union. Id. § 402(b). If the reviewing court finds that violation of the Act "may have affected the outcome of an election," the court must declare the election void and direct that a new election be held under the Secretary's supervision. Id. § 402(c). The Act expressly declares that, "The remedy provided by this title for challenging an election already conducted shall be exclusive." Id. § 403.

If the Secretary declines to bring an enforcement action, dissatisfied union members may obtain judicial review of their grievances by challenging the Secretary's decision. See Dunlop v. Bachowski, 421 U.S. 560, 95 S.Ct. 1851, 44 L.Ed.2d 377 (1975). In such cases, courts are to determine whether the Secretary's statement of reasons for not bringing an action "evinces that the Secretary's decision is so irrational as to constitute the decision arbitrary and capricious." Id. at 573, 95 S.Ct. at 1860-61.

There is nothing in the Act to indicate that Co...