TEAMSTERS L. 251, HEALTH S. & INS. F. v. LOCAL 251

• Decision Date: 27 June 1988
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 87-0281 L.
• Citation: 689 F. Supp. 48
• Parties: TEAMSTERS LOCAL 251, HEALTH SERVICES AND INSURANCE FUND, Plaintiff, v. TEAMSTERS, CHAUFFEURS, WAREHOUSEMEN AND HELPERS LOCAL 251, affiliated with the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Rhode Island

689 F. Supp. 48

TEAMSTERS LOCAL 251, HEALTH SERVICES AND INSURANCE FUND, Plaintiff, v. TEAMSTERS, CHAUFFEURS, WAREHOUSEMEN AND HELPERS LOCAL 251, affiliated with the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, Defendant.

Civ. A. No. 87-0281 L.

United States District Court, D. Rhode Island.

June 27, 1988.

James T. Grady, Grady, Dumont & Dwyer, Boston, Mass., and Patricia Zesk, Edwards & Angell, Providence, R.I., for plaintiff.

Richard M. Peirce, Roberts, Carroll, Feldstein & Tucker, Providence, R.I., for defendant.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

LAGUEUX, District Judge.

This matter is before the Court on the cross-motions of defendant for summary judgment and of plaintiff for partial summary judgment. These motions present this Court with three issues to decide: (1) whether the statute of limitations provided by R.I.Gen.Laws (1956) § 9-1-13(a) (1985 Reenactment) governs a pension fund's right to collect delinquent contributions under 29 U.S.C. § 1132; (2) whether the current ten year limitations period provided in R.I.Gen Laws § 9-1-13(a) applies retroactively to causes of action not time-barred on July 1, 1978 when the period was extended from six to ten years; (3) whether a pension fund that forgets to bill an employer for contributions required to be made to the fund is estopped from seeking past payments due when it discovers its error. The Court heard oral arguments on these questions on March 16, 1988. At that time, the Court requested additional briefing on the estoppel and retroactive limitations issues and took the matter under advisement. The matter is now in order for decision.

Background

The parties do not dispute the material facts of this case. Plaintiff Teamsters Local 251, Health Services and Insurance Fund is an employee welfare benefit plan as defined in 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1). Defendant Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers Local 251 is a labor union sued in its capacity as an employer as defined in 29 U.S.C. § 1002(5). At all times relevant to this case, Plaintiff Fund and defendant Union have been signatories to the Agreement and Declaration of Trust of the Teamsters Local 251 Health Services and Insurance Plan. On September 25, 1968 the trustees of plaintiff Fund adopted a benefit plan for certain officers of defendant Union. The plan included a vested death benefit, group life insurance and accidental death and dismemberment insurance. At the time of adoption, the estimated cost of the vested death benefit was $12.00 per month for each eligible employee and $6.74 per month for the group life and accidental death insurance. The actual cost of the benefits, however, required calculations by plaintiff's actuary. Therefore, defendant Union could not submit contributions on a self-reporting basis.

From 1968 to August of 1986, plaintiff Fund did not perform the actuarial calculations or submit a statement of cost to defendant for the vested death benefits, group life insurance and accidental death and dismemberment insurance. During this period, the Union did not contribute money to the Fund for these benefits because it did not receive a statement of costs. Plaintiff's certified public accounting firm, during eighteen annual audits, failed to realize that plaintiff had not determined costs for these benefits and that defendant had not paid for them. However, the benefits remained available to the covered employees.

In August 1986, plaintiff's new certified public accounting firm discovered that defendant had never made contributions for the vested death benefits, group life insurance and accidental death and dismemberment insurance. The accountants determined that defendant Union owed $52,708 in contributions for the period January 1, 1976 to September 30, 1986. Plaintiff notified defendant that it owed money for these benefits. On June 3, 1987, defendant tendered to plaintiff a check for $23,752— the amount which defendant estimated it owed for the period August 1, 1983 to December 31, 1986. The parties agreed that acceptance of this payment was not an acknowledgement by either party of payment in full for either the period August 1, 1983 to December 31, 1986 or the period January 1, 1976 to September 30, 1986. A dispute has now arisen between plaintiff Fund and defendant Union as to what further sums, if any, are due. Plaintiff filed this action on May 19, 1987 seeking a declaratory judgment of the amount that defendant owes to plaintiff Fund and an award of costs and fees under 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g).

The matter is now before the Court on the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment. Summary judgment can only be granted where there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and where the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Emery v. Merrimack Valley Wood Products, Inc., 701 F.2d 985, 986 (1st Cir.1983). In determining whether these conditions have been met, the Court must view the record in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. Id. For the reasons discussed below this Court holds that the applicable statute of limitations in an action for delinquent contributions under 29 U.S.C. § 1132 is the statute of limitations for breach of contract provided for in R.I.Gen.Laws § 9-1-13(a), that plaintiff may recover for contributions accruing since July 1, 1978, and that plaintiff is not estopped from collecting the contributions owed by defendant Union. Further proceedings will be scheduled to determine the actual amount payable to plaintiff.

Statute of Limitations

Plaintiff brings his action for unpaid contributions under 29 U.S.C. §§ 1132 and 1145 (1985). Section 1145 provides:

§ 1145. Delinquent contributions

Every employer who is obligated to make contributions to a multiemployer plan under the terms of the plan or under the terms of a collectively bargained agreement shall, to the extent not inconsistent with law, make such contributions in accordance with the terms and conditions of such plan or such agreement.

Section 1132 authorizes a plan fiduciary to bring a civil action to enforce the contribution requirements of Section 1145. Section 1132, however, does not contain a statute of limitations. Plaintiff argues that this Court should adopt as the appropriate period, Rhode Island's ten year statute of limitations for breach of contract. See R.I. Gen.Laws (1956) § 9-1-13(a) (1985 Reenactment). Defendant contends that this Court should adopt a six year statute of limitations applicable to actions involving multiemployer benefit plans brought under 29 U.S.C. § 1451(f).

"When Congress has not established a time limitation for a federal cause of action, the settled practice has been to adopt a local time limitation as federal law if it is not inconsistent with federal law or policy to do so." Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 266-267, 105 S.Ct. 1938, 1942, 85 L.Ed.2d 254 (1985) (footnote omitted) (statute of limitations applicable to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 actions); UAW v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696, 703-04, 86 S.Ct. 1107, 1112, 16 L.Ed.2d 192 (1966) (LMRA § 301 claims); See also DelCostello v. Int'l Brotherhood of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 103 S.Ct. 2281, 76 L.Ed.2d 476 (1983) (hybrid section 301/fair representation claims). To determine the appropriate Rhode Island statute of limitations, this Court employs the so-called "resemblance test." After examining the nature of the cause of action involved, the Court determines the most analogous state cause of action and adopts its statute of limitation. See Walden III, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 442 F.Supp. 1168, 1171 (D.R.I.1977), aff'd, 576 F.2d 945 (1st Cir.1978).

Rhode Island law does not provide a cause of action directly parallel to the federal right asserted in this case. For example, there is no Rhode Island cause of action analogous to the Pennsylvania Wage Payment and Collection Law relied on in Teamsters Pension Trust Fund v. John Tinney Delivery Service, Inc., 732 F.2d 319 (3rd Cir.1984). In the absence of a parallel or "mirror-image" state cause of action, federal courts faced with claims for delinquent contributions under ERISA have applied the limitations period governing state contract actions. See, e.g., Robbins v. Iowa Road Builders, 828 F.2d 1348, 1354 (8th Cir.1987); Hotel Employees v. Elks Lodge, 827 F.2d 1324, 1328 (9th Cir. 1987); Central States Pension Fund v. Kraftco, Inc., 799 F.2d 1098 (6th Cir.1986); Jenkins v. Local 705 Int'l Broth. of Teamsters Pension Plan, 713 F.2d 247 (7th Cir. 1983); Miles v. New York State Teamsters Conference Pension and Retirement Fund, 698 F.2d 593 (2d Cir.1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 829, 104 S.Ct. 105, 78 L.Ed. 2d 108 (1983).

Rhode Island's statute of limitations for contract actions is found in R.I. Gen. Laws § 9-1-13(a) entitled "Limitations of Actions Generally." Prior to July 1, 1978 R.I. Gen. Laws § 9-1-13(a) provided for a six year statute of limitations. In 1978, however, the Rhode Island General Assembly amended § 9-1-13(a) to provide that "except as otherwise specially provided, all civil actions shall be commenced within ten (10) years next after the cause of action shall accrue, and not after." P.L. 1978 ch. 299 § 2. Section 4 of P.L. 1978 ch. 299 specifically provides that "this act shall apply to all causes of action accruing after July 1, 1978."

Adopting § 9-1-13(a) in this case would require applying the six year statute of limitations to causes of action for contributions due before July 1, 1978 and the ten year period to causes of action which accrued for monies due after that date. Neither the six or the ten year period is inconsistent with federal law or the policy underlying ERISA. Congress has expressed its clear desire "`to remove jurisdictional and procedural obstacles which ... appear to ... hamper effective ... recovery of benefits due.'" Hawaii Carpenters v. Waiola Carpenter Shop, Inc., 823 F.2d 289, 298 (9th Cir.1987) (quoting S.Rep. No. 127, 93 Cong., 1st Sess., ...