Teamsters Local Union No. 177 v. United Parcel Servs.

• Decision Date: 22 August 2019
• Docket Number: Civ. No. 19-726 (KM) (MAH)
• Citation: 409 F.Supp.3d 285
• Parties: TEAMSTERS LOCAL UNION NO. 177, Petitioner, v. UNITED PARCEL SERVICES, Respondent.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of New Jersey

409 F.Supp.3d 285

TEAMSTERS LOCAL UNION NO. 177, Petitioner,

v.UNITED PARCEL SERVICES, Respondent.

Civ. No. 19-726 (KM) (MAH)

United States District Court, D. New Jersey.

Signed August 22, 2019

Edward H. O'Hare, Zazzali, Fagella, Nowak, Kleinbaum & Friedman, PC, Newark, NJ, for Petitioner.

Mary B. Rogers, Michael Henry Dell, Day Pitney LLP, Parsippany, NJ, for Respondent.

Kevin McNulty, United States District Judge

Before the Court is the motion (DE 2) of Teamsters Local Union No. 177 (the "Union") for an order confirming the Arbitration Award dated January 21, 2018, pursuant to the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C.§§ 1 - 14, ("FAA") and Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185 ("Section 301"). Also before the Court is the motion (DE 11) of United Parcel Services ("UPS") to dismiss the Union's petition pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) and (6).

UPS states that there is no justiciable controversy; it is abiding by the arbitrator's ruling and intends to go on doing so. The Union replies that caution requires it to confirm the award within the one-year deadline to do so, lest the Union change its mind and violate the award later. Here as elsewhere, labor law provides a highly specialized context and a unique set of policy concerns, discussed herein. I have followed what appears to be the most applicable appellate authority, and, for the reasons set forth below, I will deny the Union's motion and grant UPS's motion to dismiss. I do so, however, with the understanding that the Union here enjoys the benefit of a six-year statute of limitations under Section 301.

I. Summary

a. Facts

The Union and UPS are parties to a Collective Bargaining Agreement, comprised of two separate agreements: the National Master Agreement between UPS and the International Brotherhood of Teamsters ("Teamsters"), and a Supplemental Agreement between UPS and Local 177, i.e. , the Union. (Declaration of Steven Radigan, DE 11-2; Declaration of Edward H. O'Hare, DE 1-1). The arbitration award in this matter is dated January 21, 2018. (Id. ). In the arbitration award, the arbitrator, Melissa H. Biren, determined that "[t]he grievance is sustained. UPS shall cease and desist assigning package car drivers to work in buildings outside the area designated in Article 46, Section 3 of the parties' [Collective Bargaining] Agreement." (Id. ; see also Opinion and Award, Exhibit B, DE 1 pp. 36–43).

UPS asserts that it accepts the award and in no way seeks to vacate or challenge it. (Declaration of Steven Radigan, DE 11-2). UPS's actions in this matter do not contradict that contention.

The Union refers to several grievances filed since the CBA was entered. (Declaration of Christopher Eltzholtz, DE 13-1). However, those grievances were considered by the arbitrator, Melissa H. Biren, and were resolved in the Union's favor. (Id. ¶¶ 4–5). Later, the Union accused UPS of violating the arbitrator's award. (Id. ¶¶ 7–8). The Union and UPS then settled those claims with a monetary settlement. (Id. ).

The Union does not claim that UPS is in violation of the arbitrator's ruling at this time. Rather, the Union seeks confirmation of the arbitration award so that, in the future, the Union will "not be required to continually monitor, grieve and/or re-litigate a settled dispute." (Declaration of Christopher Eltzholtz, DE 13-1 ¶ 8).

UPS asserts that its Labor Relations Manager, Steven Radigan, "contacted Union Secretary-Treasurer Chris Eltzholtz to ask why the Union filed the instant Petition. Eltzholtz stated that the Union is attempting to position itself to penalize UPS in the event the Union perceives violations of the Award in the future. He also stated that the Union may try this tactic with other awards, and that he ‘has to protect this Local from the Company." (Declaration of Steven Radigan, DE 11-2). In his own affidavit, Christopher Eltzholtz asserts that "Local 177 is not attempting to ‘position itself to penalize UPS.' Instead, given the aforesaid history, Local 177 has no confidence UPS will abide by the award. As I understand it, an arbitration award must be confirmed in as little as one year from its issuance." (Declaration of Christopher Eltzholtz, DE 13-1).

b. Procedural History

On January 18, 2019, the Union filed a petition to confirm an arbitration award. (DE 1). On that same day, the Union moved to confirm the arbitration award. (DE 2). It asserted that "[a] brief is unnecessary in light of the simple facts of this case and the clear authority of this Court to confirm arbitration awards." (DE 1 ¶ 5).

On February 19, 2019, UPS filed an opposition to the verified petition and a cross-motion to dismiss the verified petition with prejudice. (DE 11).

On March 1, 2019, the Union filed a reply brief in support of its motion to confirm the arbitration award. (DE 13).

On March 5, 2019, I granted UPS permission to file a short surreply (DE 15), and on March 7, 2019, it did so. (DE 16).

II. Discussion

a. Legal standards

i. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1)

The burden of establishing federal jurisdiction rests with the party asserting its existence. [citing DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno , 547 U.S. 332, 342 n. 3, 126 S. Ct. 1854, 164 L.Ed.2d 589 (2006).] "Challenges to subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1) may be facial or factual." [citing Common Cause of Pa. v. Pennsylvania , 558 F.3d 249, 257 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting Taliaferro v. Darby Twp. Zoning Bd. , 458 F.3d 181, 188 (3d Cir. 2006) ).] A facial attack "concerns ‘an alleged pleading deficiency’ whereas a factual attack concerns ‘the actual failure of [a plaintiff's] claims to comport [factually] with the jurisdictional prerequisites.’ " [citing CNA v. United States , 535 F.3d 132, 139 (3d Cir. 2008) (alterations in original) (quoting United States ex rel. Atkinson v. Pa. Shipbuilding Co. , 473 F.3d 506, 514 (3d Cir.2007) ).]

"In reviewing a facial attack, the court must only consider the allegations of the complaint and documents referenced therein and attached thereto, in the light most favorable to the plaintiff." [citing Gould Elecs. Inc. v. United States , 220 F.3d 169, 176 (3d Cir. 2000).] By contrast, in reviewing a factual attack, "the court must permit the plaintiff to respond with rebuttal evidence in support of jurisdiction, and the court then decides the jurisdictional issue by weighing the evidence. If there is a dispute of a material fact, the court must conduct a plenary hearing on the contested issues prior to determining jurisdiction." [citing McCann v. Newman Irrevocable Trust , 458 F.3d 281, 290 (3d Cir. 2006) (citations omitted).]

Lincoln Ben. Life Co. v. AEI Life, LLC , 800 F.3d 99, 105 (3d Cir. 2015) (footnotes

omitted; case citations in footnotes inserted in text).

ii. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)

Rule 12(b)(6) provides for the dismissal of a complaint, in whole or in part, if it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The defendant, as the moving party, bears the burden of showing that no claim has been stated. Animal Science Products, Inc. v. China Minmetals Corp. , 654 F.3d 462, 469 n. 9 (3d Cir. 2011). For the purposes of a motion to dismiss, the facts alleged in the complaint are accepted as true and all reasonable inferences are drawn in favor of the plaintiff. N.J. Carpenters & the Trustees Thereof v. Tishman Const. Corp. of N.J. , 760 F.3d 297, 302 (3d Cir. 2014).

Federal Rule of Procedure 8(a) does not require that a complaint contain detailed factual allegations. Nevertheless, "a plaintiff's obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitlement to relief’ requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). Thus, the complaint's factual allegations must be sufficient to raise a plaintiff's right to relief above a speculative level, so that a claim is "plausible on its face." Id. at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ; see also W. Run Student Housing Assocs., LLC v. Huntington Nat. Bank , 712 F.3d 165, 169 (3d Cir. 2013). That facial-plausibility standard is met "when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (citing Twombly , 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ). While "[t]he plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement’... it asks for more than a sheer possibility." Iqbal , 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937.

b. Analysis

Here, I am presented to with a motion to confirm an arbitration award which UPS, the losing party, says it does not dispute. Even so, the Union argues, it is not required to accept the employer's assurances; the court must confirm the arbitration award pursuant to the FAA. The Union asserts that the Court is mandated to confirm arbitration awards because 9 U.S.C. § 9 states that a court "must grant [a confirmation] order" unless the arbitration award is modified, vacated, or corrected. (DE 13, p. 9). Further, the Union asserts that it is under a one-year deadline to confirm the award, and therefore must act now. (DE 13; DE 13-1). If it does not do so, it fears that UPS will violate the terms of the award after the one-year deadline to render it judicially enforceable has passed.

The following excerpts of the FAA and Section 301 are pertinent to this motion. In part, Section 9 of the FAA states:

If the parties in their agreement have agreed that a judgment of the court shall be entered upon the award made pursuant to the arbitration, and shall specify the court, then at any time within one year after the award is made any party to the arbitration may apply to the court so specified for an order confirming the award, and thereupon the court must grant such an order unless the award is vacated, modified, or corrected as prescribed in sections 10 and 11 of this title.

9 U.S.C. § 9 (emphasis added)....