Teamsters Local Union No. 404 v. Secretary of Administration

Decision Date07 May 2001
Docket NumberSJC-08482
Citation751 N.E.2d 399
Parties(Mass. 2001) TEAMSTERS LOCAL UNION NO. 404 vs. SECRETARY OF ADMINISTRATION AND FINANCE & others. <A HREF="#fr1-1" name="fn1-1">1
CourtUnited States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

County: Suffolk.

Present: Marshall, C.J., Greaney, Ireland, Spina, Cowin, Sosman, & Cordy, JJ.

Summary: Labor, Collective bargaining, Public employment.Public Employment, Collective bargaining.Unlawful Interference.Sheriff.Governor.Practice, Civil, Affidavit, Deposition.

Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on January 29, 1999.

The case was heard by John M. Xifaras, J., on motions for summary judgment.

The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative transferred the case from the Appeals Court.

Matthew E. Dwyer(Joseph A. DeTraglia with him) for the plaintiff.

Daniel J. Hammond, Assistant Attorney General, for the defendants.

IRELAND, J.

The plaintiff union filed a complaint in the Superior Court seeking an order: (1) declaring that the defendants unlawfully interfered with its collective bargaining rights under G. L. c. 150E; and (2) enjoining the defendants from interfering with its right to secure funding for a collective bargaining agreement executed between the union and the sheriff of Franklin County(sheriff).On cross motions for summary judgment, a Superior Court judge allowed the defendants' motion, ruling that they did not unlawfully interfere with the negotiations of the collective bargaining agreement.The union appealed and we transferred the case to this court on our own motion.We affirm the judgment of the Superior Court.

1.Background.The following facts are not disputed.The union serves as the exclusive bargaining agent for the approximately seventy-five correction officers and other professionals employed at the Franklin County jail and house of correction.Pursuant to St. 1996, c. 151, § 567 (o), andG. L. c. 150E, the sheriff is designated the "employer" of the bargaining unit represented by the union.2

In September, 1997, the sheriff and the union commenced negotiations with respect to a collective bargaining agreement.In October, the personnel administrator (administrator) of the human resources division (division) of the Executive Office for Administration and Finance(EOAF) requested that the sheriff temporarily suspend negotiations with the union until the administrator and the sheriff could have "the opportunity to meet and agree on parameters for those negotiations."The sheriff complied and the administrator and the sheriff met on October 30, 1997.At that meeting, the administrator reported the pay increase terms that would be acceptable to the Secretary of Administration and Finance (Secretary) and, ultimately, to the Governor.3Thereafter, collective bargaining between the sheriff and the union resumed.

In January, 1998, the sheriff sent a letter to the administrator advocating an agreement providing for a pay increase in excess of that discussed during the October meeting.Later in the month, the sheriff sent another letter, similar in content, to the administrator.Neither letter asked the administrator to take any sort of action, and there was no response.However, in early spring, a division official informed one of the sheriff's subordinates that the pay increases reflected in the two letters "weren't going to fly."After several additional telephone calls, a meeting was scheduled between the sheriff and the administrator.

The day before the scheduled meeting, the sheriff and the union negotiated and signed a collective bargaining agreement containing the pay increase that the administrator previously had indicated was not acceptable.At the meeting, the sheriff informed the administrator that the agreement had been signed.The administrator reiterated that the pay increase was unacceptable.

One week later, the sheriff sent a copy of the executed bargaining agreement to the Governor, requesting that the agreement be submitted to the Legislature for appropriation, pursuant to G. L. c. 150E, § 7 (c).4Forty-five days after the Governor's receipt of the agreement, he had not submitted it to the Legislature.Thus, according to the mandates of G. L. c. 150E, § 7 (c), the agreement was deemed rejected.In June, the administrator sent a letter to the sheriff, explaining the rationale for the disapproval of the proposed collective bargaining agreement, and he restated the acceptable terms and instructed the sheriff to return to the bargaining table for further negotiations.

2.The collective bargaining agreement negotiations.The union argues that the defendants' actions constitute unlawful interference with the statutory process established under G. L. c. 150E, § 7 (c), for the negotiation of collective bargaining agreements.We conclude that the Governor may enlist the aid of his subordinates in deciding whether to recommend that the Legislature appropriate funds for such agreements, and that the Governor and his subordinates may communicate the views of the administration during the negotiation process.Such communications do not constitute unlawful interference.

"General Laws c. 150E is a comprehensive scheme which governs the collective bargaining rights of public employees."Boston Teachers Union, Local 66 v. Boston, 382 Mass. 553, 559(1981).SeeBoston Teachers Union, Local 66 v. School Comm. of Boston, 370 Mass. 455, 472-473(1976).Specifically, G. L. c. 150E, § 7 (c), provides the framework for funding collective bargaining agreements between certain specified public employers, including county sheriffs.5Pursuant to § 7 (c), within thirty days of the execution of a collective bargaining agreement, the public employer must submit a request to the Governor for an appropriation to fund the agreement.The Governor may then recommend that the Legislature appropriate the requested funds.The Governor's failure to make this recommendation within forty-five days operates to veto the request, which is "referred back to the parties for further bargaining."G. L. c. 150E, § 7 (c).

The union contends that the defendants may play no role in this statutory bargaining scheme before the Governor makes a recommendation to the Legislature.There is no dispute that the sheriff, as the public employer, "is the sole State employer representing management at the bargaining table."Massachusetts Probation Ass'n v. Commissioner of Admin., 370 Mass. 651, 659(1976).6Thus, the union claims, the defendants unlawfully interfered with the negotiation of the collective bargaining agreement between the union and the sheriff because of their involvement in the earlier negotiations.

While we agree with the union that "absent contrary legislative direction, we cast a cold eye on rules that would multiply the number of entities involved in the collective bargaining process,"Keane v. City Auditor of Boston, 380 Mass. 201, 209(1980), the Legislature has given the Governor effective veto power over any collective bargaining agreement that is, for whatever reason, not satisfactory.G. L. c. 150E, § 7 (c).SeeAlliance, AFSCME/SEIU, AFL-CIO v. Secretary of Admin., 413 Mass. 377, 382(1992)("The Governor . . . has the power to disapprove an appropriation entirely").Cf.Boston Teachers Union, Local 66 v. Boston, supra at 560(mayor's role in submitting requests for supplemental appropriations to fund collective bargaining agreement is merely "ministerial").While the Governor does not negotiate any agreement, he has a critical role in the ultimate outcome of that process.It serves no purpose, and would needlessly prolong the collective bargaining process, to insist that the Governor remain silent as to his position.How the parties reach an agreement that is acceptable to the Governor, and how they convince the Governor that their agreement should be approved, is entirely up to the parties.However, the Governor is free to communicate his position without committing unlawful interference in the collective bargaining process.

Here the communications in question were not with the Governor, but were instigated by officials in his administration.We conclude that the Governor, as the "supreme executive magistrate,"Opinion of the Justices, 302 Mass. 605, 618(1939), quotingPart II,c. 2, § 1, art. 1, of the Massachusetts Constitution, may enlist aid from appropriate officials within the executive branch in connection with performing the duties conferred on him.SeeOpinion of the Justices, 368 Mass. 866, 875(1974)(allowing Governor to create judicial nominating commission and assign it task of generating names of candidates for appointments to judiciary even though constitutional provision in question conferred nominating and appointment authority solely on Governor).This principle applies to the duty involved in this case.Thus, it is appropriate for the Governor to consult with and seek assistance from members of the EOAF in deciding whether to recommend that the Legislature fund the agreement, and it is appropriate for those members to communicate to the bargaining parties the position that the Governor will or is likely to take.

Indeed, "the [EOAF] is an executive department of the government of the Commonwealth and it serves directly under the Governor."Massachusetts Probation Ass'n v. Commissioner of Admin., supra at 660.Its duties are delineated in G. L. c. 7, § 3, set forth below.7Additionally, "the Commissioner of Administration, who serves at the pleasure of the Governor, acts as the executive officer of the Governor in matters 'pertaining to the financial, administrative, planning and policy co-ordinating functions and affairs of the departments, commissions, offices, boards, divisions, institutions and other agencies within the executive department of the government of the commonwealth.'"Massachusetts Probation Ass'n v. Commissioner of Admin., supra, quotingG. L. c. 7, § 4.Moreover, the division's office of employee relations specifically "oversees...

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