Tecumseh Iron Co. v. Camp

• Decision Date: 21 May 1891
• Citation: 9 So. 343,93 Ala. 572
• Parties: TECUMSEH IRON CO. v. CAMP ET AL.
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

9 So. 343

93 Ala. 572

TECUMSEH IRON CO. v. CAMP ET AL.

Supreme Court of Alabama

May 21, 1891

Appeal from chancery court, Cherokee county; S. K. MCSPADDEN Chancellor.

Bill by Carrie Camp and others against Tecumseh Iron Company. Defendant demurred, and moved to dismiss the bill. Both the motion and demurrer were overruled, and defendant appeals.

Tompkins & Troy, for appellant.

COLEMAN J.

The purpose of the bill is to have an account stated between plaintiffs and defendant, and to charge defendant with one-half the iron ore mined and moved, from the 40 acres of land described in the bill, to defendant's furnace. Plaintiffs claim to own an undivided half interest in the land under the will of their father, which is made an exhibit to the bill, and aver that their father owned a half interest in the land at the time of his death. The bill also avers that defendant has mined and moved 400,000 tons of ore, of the value of $40,000. The bill avers "that said Tecumseh Iron Company has been in possession of said land, as complainants are informed, believe, state, and charge, under and by a purchase from Geo. W. Alexander, and complainants insist, state, and charge that Geo. W. Alexander had no interest in said land, and therefore had no authority, right or power to sell or convey said land to the said Tecumseh Iron Co., as he never did have any right or interest in said land; and, if any sale of said land was ever made by Geo. W or him and his wife, it was wholly void, so far as such sale affected complainants." The prayer of the bill is for an account and general relief, and does not ask for any special relief as to title; neither is the bill one seeking participation of the land. McEvoy v. Leonard, 89 Ala. 457, 460, 8 South. Rep. 40; McMath v. De Bardelaben, 75 Ala. 68. If the averments of the bill are true, the defendant is in possession as a trespasser claiming the right to the land under a purchase from one George W. Alexander, whom the bill avers had no title or interest in the same. Leaving out of consideration for the present all other questions, before the court could proceed to order an account, and hold defendant responsible for the iron ore, it must necessarily determine the disputed question of titles to the land. A party cannot accomplish indirectly by bill in chancery that which cannot be done directly. The rule that courts of equity having jurisdiction for one purpose will proceed to settle all matters germane to the disputed question cannot be invoked in cases where the equitable jurisdiction of the court cannot be exercised until it judicially determines a question of which it has no equitable jurisdiction. To hold otherwise would be to declare that the illegal assumption of jurisdiction by the court legalizes the assumption. Many cases arise where parties are entitled to equitable relief, and for complete justice, and to prevent multiplicity of suits, the court, having jurisdiction to administer the equitable relief, will adjudicate many questions purely legal. In all such cases the equitable jurisdiction was independent of the questions which were of a purely legal character. A court of chancery has no original jurisdiction to try suits in ejectment, or settle questions of adverse titles resting upon different and dispute facts. Fielder v. Childs, 73 Ala. 574; Randle v. Boyd, Id. 287; McMath v. De Bardelaben, 75 Ala. 68; Tyson v. Brown, 64 Ala. 244; Curry v. Peebles, 83 Ala. 225, 3 South. Rep. 622; Hambrick v. Russell, 86 Ala. 201, 5 South. Rep. 298; Foster v. Winchester, (Ala.) 9 South. Rep. 83; McEvoy v. Leonard, supra; Mining Co. v. Hale, (Ala.) 9 South. Rep. 256. One tenant in common under...