Tedder v. Darlington Cnty. Cmty. Action Agency

Decision Date01 August 2018
Docket NumberAppellate Case No. 2016-001003,Unpublished Opinion No. 2018-UP-349
CourtSouth Carolina Court of Appeals
PartiesVerma Tedder, Employee, Claimant, Appellant, v. Darlington County Community Action Agency, Employer, and State Accident Fund, Carrier, Respondents.

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

Appeal From The Workers' Compensation Commission

AFFIRMED

Stephen J. Wukela, of Wukela Law Office, of Florence, for Appellant.

G. Murrell Smith, Jr., of Lee, Erter, Wilson, Holler & Smith, LLC, of Sumter, for Respondents.

PER CURIAM: Appellant Verma Tedder challenges a decision of the Appellate Panel of the South Carolina Workers' Compensation Commission (Appellate Panel) denying her claim for total and permanent disability benefits and future medical treatment. Tedder argues the Appellate Panel erred in (1) declining to consider her vocational report; (2) finding that her functional capacity report was invalid; (3) ignoring her work restrictions and her physical therapist's records; and (4) awarding Respondents over a year of credit for temporary benefits paid to Tedder. We affirm.

I. Vocational Report

Tedder argues the Appellate Panel should have considered her vocational report because Regulation 67-612 "requires the admission of an expert's report if it was provided to the moving party more than ten . . . days before the scheduled hearing." In support of this argument, Tedder cites S.C. Code Ann. Regs. 67-612(B)(2) (2012), which states,

A written expert's report to be admitted as evidence at the hearing must be provided to the opposing party as follows:
. . .
(2) The non-moving party must provide to the moving party any report not provided by the moving party at least ten days before the scheduled hearing.

(emphasis added). This language establishes merely a prerequisite to the admission of an expert's report into evidence and does not take away the single commissioner's authority to exclude such a report for other reasons. See S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-330(1) (2005) ("Irrelevant, immaterial[,] or unduly repetitious evidence shall be excluded."); cf. Michau v. Georgetown Cty. ex rel. S.C. Ctys. Workers Comp. Tr., 396 S.C. 589, 594, 723 S.E.2d 805, 807 (2012) (stating section 1-23-330(1) "establishes a minimum standard that applies generally, but not exclusively").

We acknowledge that Regulation 67-612 states, in pertinent part, that any "report submitted to the opposing party in accord with [S.C. Code Ann. Regs. 67-612(B)(1)] or [(B)(2)] . . . shall be submitted as an APA exhibit at the hearing unless withdrawn with the consent of the other party." S.C. Code Ann. Regs. 67-612(D) (2012). Further, "[g]reat liberality is to be exercised in allowing the introduction of evidence in workers' compensation proceedings." Trotter v. Trane Coil Facility, 384 S.C. 109, 116, 681 S.E.2d 36, 40 (Ct. App. 2009), rev'd on other grounds, 393 S.C.637, 714 S.E.2d 289 (2011). On the other hand, "[a]dministrative agencies are required to meet minimum standards of due process." Smith v. S.C. Dep't of Mental Health, 329 S.C. 485, 500, 494 S.E.2d 630, 638 (Ct. App. 1997) (citing S.C. Const. art. 1, § 3).

Tedder's refusal to submit to an evaluation by Respondents' vocational expert would have placed Respondents at an unfair disadvantage had the single commissioner or the Appellate Panel considered and given any weight to Tedder's vocational report, thus depriving Respondents of due process. See id. ("In cases where important decisions turn on questions of fact, due process at least requires an opportunity to present favorable witnesses."). Further, the single commissioner's and the Appellate Panel's refusal to consider Tedder's vocational report was fair to Tedder because she persisted in her refusal to submit to an evaluation by Respondents' expert even after the single commissioner warned her that if she chose not to submit to the evaluation, the single commissioner would not consider Tedder's own vocational report.

Based on the foregoing, we affirm the exclusion of Tedder's vocational report from consideration in determining permanent disability benefits.

II. Functional Capacity Report

Tedder asserts the Appellate Panel erred by adopting the single commissioner's finding that the conclusion in Tedder's functional capacity evaluation (FCE) report was invalid. Tedder argues that this finding constituted the single commissioner's own personal interpretation of test results, which this court condemned in Burnette v. City of Greenville, 401 S.C. 417, 428, 737 S.E.2d 200, 206 (Ct. App. 2012).

In Burnette, the single commissioner, who also conducted the initial hearing in the present case, found that an MRI "showed 'only a "minimal" protrusion with no nerve root displacement or impingement, and comparatively, no greater pathology of any significance (if any) than'" an MRI conducted four years previously. 401 S.C. at 428, 737 S.E.2d at 206. This court concluded the single commissioner's finding was unsupported by substantial evidence and was "[p]articularly disturbing." Id. The court stated, "Because no evidence indicates this opinion originated from a medical provider, yet it appears in the single commissioner's order, we are forced to conclude it is the medical opinion of the single commissioner, adopted by the Commission." Id.

Here, the FCE was performed by a non-treating physical therapist, Tracy Hill. After performing the FCE, Hill concluded that Tedder could "meet the demands of limited sedentary to limited light work" and listed several work restrictions. Hill also noted the limitations of the FCE itself. For example, Hill stated the results of the handgrip test indicated "submaximal effort" and "[t]readmill testing was attempted but not completed."

On the other hand, Hill noted that she conducted several tests to determine whether Tedder was magnifying or exaggerating her symptoms (identified as "the Waddell Signs") and the results on all of them were negative. The results of several other tests indicated that Tedder would perform part of the assigned task but would request termination of the test when she felt increased pain. However, she was able to complete the "Dynamic Reaching" test despite her complaint of increased left knee pain. Further, Hill noted the results of the Lumber Range of Motion testing were "AMA Valid."

In her order, the single commissioner addressed the FCE in the following manner:

[Tedder] obtained her own FCE from Tracy Hill, the conclusion of which is not persuasive[] and which is in fact invalid: even Hill notes that (a) [Tedder's] handgrip testing did not result in a bell-shaped curve (which is particularly compelling since this is a knee and back case), indicating sub-maximal effort; and (b) [Tedder] repeatedly self-limited throughout/actually terminated testing . . . .

(single commissioner's emphasis). The Appellate Panel adopted this language in its order. Because there was no expert evidence supporting the finding that the FCE report's conclusion was invalid, this precise language was inappropriate. Cf. Burnette, 401 S.C. at 428, 737 S.E.2d at 206 (holding that this same commissioner's interpretation of an MRI, which was adopted by the Appellate Panel, was "unsupported by substantial evidence in the record" because "no evidence indicate[d] this opinion originated from a medical provider").

Nonetheless, as "the ultimate fact finder," the Appellate Panel is entitled to weigh the evidence as it sees fit. See Shealy v. Aiken Cty., 341 S.C. 448, 455, 535 S.E.2d 438, 442 (2000) (holding the Appellate Panel "is the ultimate fact finder," and "[t]he final determination of witness credibility and the weight to be accordedevidence is reserved to the [Appellate Panel]"); id. ("It is not the task of this [c]ourt to weigh the evidence as found by the [Appellate Panel]."). Aside from characterizing the FCE report's conclusion as invalid, the Appellate Panel found the report's conclusion unpersuasive, which was within their authority, and the panel members could have attributed little or no weight to the report in favor of the evidence generated by Tedder's treating physicians. Cf. Burnette, 401 S.C. at 427, 737 S.E.2d at 206 ("Although medical evidence 'is entitled to great respect,' the Commission is not bound by the opinions of medical experts and may disregard medical evidence in favor of other competent evidence in the record."). Therefore, the inappropriate characterization of the FCE report's conclusion as invalid is not reversible. Judy v. Judy, 384 S.C. 634, 646, 682 S.E.2d 836, 842 (Ct. App. 2009) ("Generally, appellate courts will not set aside judgments due to insubstantial errors not affecting the result.").

III. Work Restrictions

Tedder contends the Appellate Panel erred by ignoring her work restrictions and her physical therapist's records. Specifically, Tedder argues that (1) Dr. Elvington's imposition of work restrictions on September 12, 2013, "never changed," (2) the FCE report indicated Tedder was unable to walk at a normal pace, and (3) her records from Lowe's Physical Therapy referenced her "difficulty with left lower extremity range of motion, stability[,] and ambulation." Tedder complains that the Appellate Panel's inappropriate focus on her credibility caused the panel members to ignore all of this evidence.

As to the work restrictions imposed by Dr. Elvington, we will not assume he intended to attribute these restrictions to Tedder's left knee only by the time this knee reached maximum medical improvement (MMI). He conducted his initial post-operative examination of Tedder's left knee on September 12, 2013, and noted that she was scheduled for physical therapy at Lowe's two times a week for four weeks. He imposed work restrictions of no lifting or carrying over 10 pounds, no prolonged standing or walking, no climbing, stooping, or crawling. He imposed the same...

To continue reading

Request your trial

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT