Tedesco v. City of Stamford

• Decision Date: 26 June 1990
• Docket Number: No. 13813,13813
• Citation: 576 A.2d 1273,215 Conn. 450
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: Benjamin I. TEDESCO v. CITY OF STAMFORD et al.

Page 1273

576 A.2d 1273

215 Conn. 450

Benjamin I. TEDESCO v. CITY OF STAMFORD et al.

No. 13813.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued April 10, 1990.

Decided June 26, 1990.

Christopher R. Bello, with whom were Robert S. Bello and, on the brief, Lawrence M. Lapine and Thomas M. Cassone, Stamford, for appellant (plaintiff).

James V. Minor, Asst. Corp. Counsel, with whom, on the brief, was Mary E. Sommer, Stamford, for appellees (named defendant et al.).

Before PETERS, C.J., and SHEA, CALLAHAN, COVELLO and HULL, JJ.

SHEA, Associate Justice.

The plaintiff, Benjamin Tedesco, brought a complaint that included a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ¹ claim for damages against the defendant, ² the city of Stamford, for violation of the plaintiff's procedural due process rights in terminating him from his employment. The trial court found in favor of the plaintiff and awarded him damages and attorney's fees pursuant to § 1983. The defendant appealed the judgment to the Appellate Court, claiming that the trial court erred in concluding that the plaintiff's amended complaint stated a cause of action under § 1983. The Appellate Court, in Tedesco v. Stamford, 20 Conn.App. 51, 563 A.2d 1046 (1989), held that the complaint did not support a § 1983 cause of action because it failed to allege that any deprivation that had occurred was attributable to a municipal governmental policy and, therefore, ordered the judgment to be set aside and the case remanded with direction to render judgment for the defendant. We granted certification limited to the issue of whether "the Appellate Court erred in setting aside the judgment for the plaintiff and in directing judgment for the defendants because the complaint failed to allege that the violation of his constitutional right relied upon was attributable to the operation of a municipal government policy, ordinance, regulation or officially adopted and promulgated decision." We reverse the judgment of the Appellate Court, and remand the case for further proceedings.

Although the facts are sufficiently stated in the Appellate Court's opinion, we will summarize those facts pertinent to the disposition of this appeal. On September 11, 1980, while working as a "Laborer 1" in the sanitation department of the city of Stamford, the plaintiff suffered a torn rotator cuff injury to his right shoulder and underwent two surgical operations. While recovering from the second operation, the plaintiff was notified by the city of Stamford that his employment was terminated. On December 7, 1981, the plaintiff filed a grievance with the Teamsters Local Union No. 145 (union). City officials and members of the union, representing the plaintiff's interests, held meetings on December 7 and 10, 1981, to discuss the plaintiff's grievance. At both meetings, the city officials denied the plaintiff any relief. Dominic Lamberti, temporary business agent of the union, was among those present at the meetings, and he represented the plaintiff's interest. Lamberti recommended to the union that it not pursue the plaintiff's grievance to the Connecticut board of mediation and arbitration because it was his opinion that the plaintiff would not be successful.

Thereafter, the plaintiff, through private counsel, made a number of attempts to arrange a hearing with the city regarding his discharge. The city denied the plaintiff's request on the ground that the union was the exclusive bargaining agent for the plaintiff. On January 19, 1982, the plaintiff, pursuant to § 740.1 ³ of the charter of the city of Stamford, sent a written appeal to the Stamford director of personnel, requesting a hearing before the personnel appeals board (board). The plaintiff's request was denied.

The plaintiff brought the present action against the city of Stamford and the union by a complaint dated August 31, 1982. The first count of the amended complaint was directed against the city for the alleged failure of the board to afford the plaintiff a hearing. ⁴ On January 21, 1987, the union filed a motion to stay the proceedings to allow the union and the city to arbitrate the plaintiff's grievance before the board of mediation and arbitration, which the trial court, Lewis, J., granted on January 26, 1987. ⁵ Following a hearing on May 14, 1987, the board of mediation and arbitration issued its award, which converted the plaintiff's termination to a suspension without pay and ordered the plaintiff to be reinstated to the position of a laborer "on the condition that prior to his reinstatement he be examined by a mutually agreed upon physician who certifies that the grievant is physically able to perform the job." Prior to trial in the present case, in a separate proceeding, the union sought to confirm the arbitration award, but the trial court, Cioffi, J., denied the motion on the ground that the arbitration proceeding was untimely.

The jury was sworn and evidence began in this case on April 22, 1988. After several days of legal argument, the court, Cioffi, J., declared a mistrial. Both the defendant and the plaintiff filed motions for summary judgment, which were denied. On July 14, 1988, at a second trial, testimony began on the first count of the plaintiff's amended complaint before the court, Cioffi, J., without a jury. The court rendered its oral decision on the first count, awarding the plaintiff damages and attorney's fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Later, the court filed its written decision, declaring that the first count of the plaintiff's complaint stated a cause of action for "violations of both federal and state constitutional rights as well as rights embodied in 42 U.S.C. § 1983." The court further held that the plaintiff was entitled to a pretermination as well as a posttermination hearing with respect to his discharge and awarded him compensatory damages and attorney's fees pursuant to § 1983.

From this judgment, the defendant appealed to the Appellate Court, challenging, inter alia, the trial court's conclusion that the first count of the complaint stated a cause of action against the city under § 1983. ⁶ The Appellate Court held that the complaint did not "support a § 1983 cause of action because it failed even to imply, let alone affirmatively allege, that any deprivation that occurred was attributable to the operation of a municipal governmental policy, ordinance, regulation, or officially adopted and promulgated decision." Tedesco v. Stamford, supra, at 57, 563 A.2d 1046. The court further concluded that the complaint was devoid of any facts that would support a recovery on the alternative ground that the plaintiff had suffered a constitutional deprivation pursuant to governmental custom, even though such custom had not received formal approval.

The plaintiff contends that the Appellate Court should have considered whether the city was misled or prejudiced by the plaintiff's failure to allege that his constitutional rights were violated as the result of a municipal policy or custom. The plaintiff maintains that the Appellate Court did not consider that the city had failed to object to the evidence introduced at trial establishing the existence in Stamford of the policy regarding employee terminations that had resulted in a violation of his constitutional rights. He contends also that the city was not prejudiced or misled by any evidence introduced on that subject. The plaintiff argues, therefore, that any variance between the complaint and the proof was immaterial.

To state a cause of action under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that a deprivation of federal rights has occurred under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. "[T]he touchstone of [a] § 1983 action against a government body is an allegation that official policy is responsible for a deprivation of rights protected by the Constitution...." Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 690, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 2035, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978); Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 109 S.Ct. 1197, 1203, 103 L.Ed.2d 412 (1989); St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 121, 108 S.Ct. 915, 922, 99 L.Ed.2d 107 (1988). "[M]unicipal liability under § 1983 attaches where--and only where--a deliberate choice to follow a course of action is made from among various alternatives" by city policymakers. Pembaur v. Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 483, 106 S.Ct. 1292, 1299, 89 L.Ed.2d 452 (1986). In addition, § 1983 also authorizes suit "for constitutional deprivations visited pursuant to governmental 'custom' even though such a custom has not received formal approval through the body's official decisionmaking channels." Monell v. Department of Social Services, supra, 436 U.S. at 690-91, 98 S.Ct. at 2035-36. Therefore, the Appellate Court properly held that to state a valid cause of action under § 1983, the plaintiff's complaint must allege a policy or custom that resulted in a deprivation of a constitutional right.

The absence of a requisite allegation in a complaint that would have justified the granting of a motion to strike, however, is not a sufficient basis for vacating a judgment unless the pleading defect has resulted in prejudice. "[I]f parties will insist on going to trial on issues framed in a slovenly manner, they must abide the verdict; judgment will not be arrested for faults in statement when facts sufficient to support the judgment have been substantially put in issue and found." Morehouse v. Throckmorton, 72 Conn. 449, 453, 44 A. 747 (1899). "Want of precision in alleging the cause of an injury for which an action is brought, is waived by contesting the case upon its merits without questioning such defect." Gargan v. Harris, 90 Conn. 188, 191, 96 A. 940 (1916). We have previously applied this principle of aider by verdict or judgment to cure the absence of an essential allegation in a complaint. Wall v. Toomey, 52 Conn. 35, 39 (1884); see Gargan v. Harris, supra.

Our rules of practice are designed "to have all formal and technical...