Teemac v. Henderson
| Decision Date | 26 July 2002 |
| Docket Number | 5,01-11471 |
| Parties | Handy M. Teemac, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. William J. Henderson, Postmaster General, Defendant-Appellee.Summary Calendar UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit |
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas
Before Jones, Smith, and Emilio M. Garza, Circuit Judges.
Handy Teemac sued the Postmaster General, claiming the United States Postal Service ("USPS") had fired him because of his religion. The district court dismissed because Teemac had failed to seek informal counseling within forty-five days of the alleged discrimination before filing a formal complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"). The court rejected Teemac's request for equitable tolling. Finding no error, we affirm.
Teemac worked as a casual employee for the USPS. He alleges that the USPS violated the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §a2000e et seq., by discharging him because of his religious beliefs. Teemac claims he informed a supervisor that he could not work on Sundays but that the supervisor nonetheless scheduled him to work on a Sunday. Teemac did not show up, and in November 1996 the USPS fired him for failing to follow instructions.
In March 1997, Teemac filed a formal complaint with the EEOC. In June 1997, the USPS determined that he had failed to make a timely informal complaint to the EEOC counsel as required by 29 C.F.R. § 1614.105. The USPS dismissed Teemac's formal claim. The EEOC affirmed the USPS's decision but remanded for the USPS to conduct a supplemental investigation and determine whether Teemac had constructive or actual notice of the informal complaint requirement.
The USPS then found that Teemac had constructive notice of the informal counseling requirement and rejected Teemac's request for equitable tolling. The EEOC affirmed the agency's ruling and dismissed Teemac's formal complaint.
Teemac sued, explaining that he lacked actual notice of the informal counseling requirement. He worked for the USPS for only thirty-nine days, recently had immigrated to the United States, unsuccessfully sought advice from local attorneys, and could not understand the orientation session. He urges that these circumstances justify equitable tolling.
The district court found that Teemac had failed to seek counseling from an EEO officer within forty-five days of the adverse employment action. The court rejected Teemac's requests for equitable tolling, noting that he bore the burden of proving the need for tolling and relying on this court's strict requirements for tolling. The district court granted the USPS's motion to dismiss the complaint under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
Federal employees must seek informal counseling before they file an EEOC complaint. 29 C.F.R. § 1614.105(a). If the employee fails to do so, his claim is barred. Pancheco v. Rice, 966 F.2d 904, 905 (5th Cir. 1992). The employee must establish waiver, estoppel, or equitable tolling to circumvent this requirement. Id.
We have not precisely defined the standard for reviewing a dismissal on the ground that the federal employee failed timely to seek informal counseling.1 We must consider whether district courts owe deference to the EEOC's conclusion. We also must reconcile the boilerplate abuse of discretion standard for reviewing refusals to toll with the boilerplate deanovo standard for reviewing dismissals on the pleadings.
The district court reviewed the EEOC's refusal to toll de novo. In most cases, federal district courts review deferentially an agency's formal adjudication and review the agency's interpretations of its regulations for arbitrariness and capriciousness. The agency's factfinding need only be supported by substantial evidence.2 The Civil Rights Act of 1964, however, provides federal employees with the same right to a de novo trial that private employees possess. District courts cannot presume the correctness of the EEOC's factual findings.3 Parity trumps the deference normally afforded to administrative agencies.
We conclude that the de novo trial requirement extends to the EEOC's determination about equitable tolling. Section 1614.105 codifies the doctrine of equitable tolling. Although the regulation vests the agency with the responsibility for making the initial decision, the regulation also prescribes guidelines. The agency must waive the requirement if the employee lacked actual and constructive notice of the requirement; likewise, the agency must toll if outside events prevented the employee from seeking informal counseling.4
The regulation plainly limits agency discretion, and courts can interpret these regulatory limits as ably as can agencies. Parity requires that district courts apply the same standards that govern a private employer's civil action. Like every appellate court to consider the issue, we conclude that the district court should make an independent judgment about an employee's tolling request.5 We now must consider our standard for reviewing the district court's decision.
A district court may refuse to toll limitations because it interprets a statute or regulation to prohibit tolling or because it refuses to exercise its equitable discretion to toll. Where the district court interprets a statute or regulation, appellate courts review de novo.6 Where, however, the district court declines to exercise its equitable powers, we review decisions on the pleadings only for abuse of discretion.7 As when deciding any other motion on the pleadings, we assume the pleaded facts as true, and we will remand if the plaintiff has pleaded facts that justify equitable tolling.8 "[R]aising the limitations defense in a motion to dismiss may easily be premature because facts tolling the running of the statute do not necessarily appear in the complaint." Dawson, 4 F.3d at 130 (citing 5 Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1277 (West 2d ed. 1990)).
The regulation requires extension of the time limit where the employee was neither "notified" nor "otherwise aware" of the informal counseling requirement. 29 C.F.R. §a1614.105(a)(2); Oaxaca, 641 F.2d at 391. We review this interpretive question de novo. Supra note 6.
Providing adequate notification to employees generally is sufficient; the employer need not prove that an individual employee understood the notice.9 Teemac does not argue that the USPS failed generally to notify its employees of the counseling requirement. For example, he acknowledges that the USPS distributed information about the informal counseling requirement during new employee orientation; posters also displayed the information. Teemac, instead, relies on his specific circumstances to prove that he excusably failed to learn about the informal counseling requirement. This argument sounds more like a traditional equitable tolling argument, or a request for tolling based on "other reasons."
We review for abuse of discretion a district court's decision not to exercise equitable tolling or extend the time limit for "other reasons." Supra note 7. The party who invokes equitable tolling bears the burden of proof.10 Equitable tolling applies only in "rare and exceptional circumstances." Davis v. Johnson, 158 F.3d 806, 811 (5th Cir. 1998). Courts grant requests for equitable tolling most frequently where "the plaintiff is actively misled by the defendant about the cause of action or is prevented in some extraordinary way from asserting his rights." United States v. Patterson, 211 F.3d 927, 930 (5th Cir. 2000). In dictum, we have stated that equitable tolling may apply when an employee's "lack of sophistication" prevents him from understanding title VII's procedures. Rowe v. Sullivan, 967 F.2d 186, 192 (5th Cir. 1992).
Teemac's strongest argument for equitable tolling is his inability to speak fluent English; he claims the language barrier prevented him from understanding the instructions provided during new employee orientation. We previously have refused to toll statute of limitations based on an employee's lack of familiarity with English. In Nat'l Ass'n of Gov't Employees v. City Pub. Serv. Bd., 40 F.3d 698, 709 (5th Cir. 1994), however, the employees' English-speaking attorney could interpret title VII's administrative requirements. Because Teemac did not have legal representation available at the new employee orientation, National Association does not resolve the question.
More persuasively, courts in a long line of cases have held that employees' ignorance of the law, even when stemming from illiteracy, cannot justify tolling.11 Section 1614.105 departs from this well-established principle by making the federal employee's knowledge of the informal counseling requirement relevant. The regulation, however, cabins the reasons that a district court may be required to toll. The regulation mandates tolling only where the employee lacks actual and constructive notice of the informal complaint requirement.
We read this regulation as a narrow exception, situated against the well-established background rule that employees are charged with knowing the law. Once the USPS notified its employees about the informal counseling requirement, Teemac had the obligation to investigate terms and conditions of employment left ambiguous because of his language deficiencies. We will not toll the time limit because of Teemac's lack of English fluency.
Teemac spoke to local lawyers and visited libraries in an attempt to understand his employment rights; he argues that he zealously pursued his rights and merely made a careless and understandable mistake. Although the employee's diligent pursuit of remedies is relevant, Teemac admits that, standing alone, it does not justify tolling. Outside the title VII context, courts have excused missed deadlines where plaintiffs filed a defective pleading.12 Teemac, however, neverbrought an informal complaint before...
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