Teen Ranch v. Udow

• Decision Date: 29 September 2005
• Docket Number: No. 5:04-CV-32.,5:04-CV-32.
• Citation: 389 F.Supp.2d 827
• Parties: TEEN RANCH, et al., Plaintiffs, v. Marianne UDOW, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Michigan

389 F.Supp.2d 827

TEEN RANCH, et al., Plaintiffs, v. Marianne UDOW, et al., Defendants.

No. 5:04-CV-32.

United States District Court, W.D. Michigan, Southern Division.

September 29, 2005.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Gary S. McCaleb, Alliance Defense Fund, Scottsdale, AZ, Joel L. Oster, Alliance Defense Fund, Midwest Regional Service Ctr., Olathe, KS, Robert G. Fleming, E Lansing, MI, for Plaintiffs.

Erica Weiss Marsden, Joel D. McGormley, MI Dept Attorney General (Education/Social Services), Education & Social Services Division, Lansing, MI, for Defendants.

OPINION

BELL, Chief Judge.

This action, which involves the provision of youth residential services by a faith-based organization under contract with the State, is before the Court on the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment. For the reasons that follow judgment will be entered in favor of the State Defendants.

I.

Plaintiffs in this action are Teen Ranch, Matthew J. Koch, its Chief Executive Officer, and Mitchell E. Koster, its Chief Operating Officer (collectively referred to as "Teen Ranch"). Teen Ranch is a non-denominational Christian faith-based organization that has provided residential care for delinquent, neglected, abused, and emotionally troubled youth between the ages of 11 and 17 since 1966.

Defendants are Marianne Udow, Director of the Michigan Family Independence Agency ("FIA"), Musette A. Michael, Interim Director of the FIA, and Debora Buchanan, Manager of the Purchased Care Division of the FIA (collectively referred to as the "FIA" or the "State Defendants"). The FIA is a department of Michigan state government that is responsible for administering Michigan's public assistance, child and family welfare programs. M.C.L. § 400.1. The FIA is responsible for providing care and supervision to abused, neglected and delinquent children who have been committed to or placed in the care of the FIA through the state courts. M.C.L. §§ 400.114-400.115e. The FIA is authorized to place these children in out-of-home care and may contract with private organizations to provide these services. M.C.L. § 400.115(a); M.C.L. § 400.115a(1)(f).

Each year the FIA takes in approximately 3000 children for residential care. (Buchanan Dep. at 9). The FIA contracts with 96 private child care agencies to provide residential services to the youth for stays averaging four to twelve months. At least 35 of the providers are faith-based organizations. (Buchanan Aff. ¶ 6). According to Buchanan, Teen Ranch is the only provider that incorporates its religious beliefs and teaching into the services funded under its contract with the FIA. (Buchanan Aff. ¶ 6).

When a child is made a state ward and placed with the FIA for care and supervision, the FIA does not offer the child a list of placement choices. Instead, the FIA places the child in one of its residential programs according to what the FIA believes is in the best interests of the child. The placement is determined by a computerized grid. The FIA obtains information about the child's history and treatment needs, inputs that information into the computer system, and the computer system finds the best matches between the youth's needs and the services provided by the various programs. Generally, the FIA places the child at the agency that has the best treatment match. If two facilities are equal, then the FIA will place the child at the agency that has waited the longest for a placement. (Slottke Dep. at pp. 5-35). Juvenile wards of the state receive assistance from a caseworker, a lawyer/guardian ad litem and parents or a guardian. (Buchanan Dep. at 112-119; Udow Dep. at 25-26).

The FIA's last contract extension with Teen Ranch expired on October 1, 2003. In November 2003, after an investigation of the Teen Ranch program, the FIA issued a moratorium against further placements at Teen Ranch. The FIA had a number of initial concerns, but the incorporation of religious practices into the programming at Teen Ranch emerged as the FIA's primary concern.

In December 2003, Teen Ranch addressed FIA's concerns regarding its religious practices as follows:

The mission statement of Teen Ranch states, "providing hope to young people and families through life changing relationships and experiences from a Christian perspective." This mission, and our interpretation of this mission, will not change, be sacrificed, nor will it be compromised.

Teen Ranch, as policy, does not "force" youth to attend religious services, although it is encouraged and we believe to be part of an effective treatment program. Alternatives are provided for the children who wish not to attend religious services, such as a personal academic study time (if desired), letter writing home, recreational time in the gymnasium, or watch television until the other youth return home.

However, incorporating religious teachings into on-going daily activities of youth and their treatment plans touches at the core of why we were founded, why we are here today, and why we will continue to include such programming for children in our care.

(Amendment of Corrective Action Plan, Def. Ex. EE at 8) (emphasis in original).

Although there are many disputed facts concerning the specific manner in which religion is incorporated into the Teen Ranch program, Teen Ranch acknowledges that it is overtly and unapologetically a Christian facility with a Christian worldview that hopes to touch and improve the lives of the youth it serves by encouraging their conversion to faith in Christ, or assisting them in deepening their pre-existing Christian faith. (Policy Directive at 6, Def. Ex. DD). Teen Ranch expresses its religious beliefs through voluntary prayer, devotions, church attendance and faith discussions. (Pl. Statement of Undisputed Facts ¶ 5).

By letter dated January 9, 2004, the FIA informed Teen Ranch that while it was supportive of faith-based organizations, "[t]he incorporation of faith specific tenets into treatment is not permitted by state and federal law," and that "if Teen Ranch is unwilling to modify its current practices regarding the imposition of its religious beliefs into the daily treatment and service plan activities, FIA is unable to approve the corrective action plan and rescind the moratorium." (Def.Ex. B).

Teen Ranch independently adopted a procedure that required wards to be informed of the religious nature of Teen Ranch prior to being placed there, and giving the ward an opportunity to object to a Teen Ranch placement both before and after the actual placement. Although the FIA did place a few youth at Teen Ranch after it announced the moratorium in December 2003, the FIA reinstated the full moratorium against placements at Teen Ranch after this Court denied Teen Ranch's motion for preliminary injunction.

Because most of Teen Ranch's residents were state placements, the moratorium has had a profound financial effect on Teen Ranch. Since the moratorium was entered Teen Ranch has had to close several of its programs and to sell half of its residential facilities. (Pl. Br. in Supp. of S.J. at 1).

Teen Ranch filed this action asserting four constitutional claims — violation of free exercise, free speech, due process, and equal protection, and one statutory claim — violation of the right to free exercise under 42 U.S.C. § 604a. This Court previously denied Teen Ranch's motion for a preliminary injunction. This matter is currently before the Court on the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment.

II.

Under Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment is proper if there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. In evaluating a motion for summary judgment the Court must look beyond the pleadings and assess the proof to determine whether there is a genuine need for trial. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). If the moving party carries its burden of showing there is an absence of evidence to support a claim then the non-moving party must demonstrate by affidavits, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, that there is a genuine issue of material fact for trial. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324-25, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the non-moving party's position is not sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). The proper inquiry is "whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law." Id. at 251-52, 106 S.Ct. 2505.

III.

Although a variety of legal theories and factual issues have been raised in the course of this litigation, this case is, at its heart, about the tension between the Free Exercise Clause and the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.¹ These two clauses are frequently in tension. See Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 718-19, 124 S.Ct. 1307, 158 L.Ed.2d 1 (2004). Teen Ranch wants to be free to exercise its religious faith without interference from the State, and the FIA wants to avoid violating the Establishment Clause by subsidizing a particular religious viewpoint.

The Supreme Court articulated a test for determining when state funding violates the Establishment Clause in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 91 S.Ct. 2105, 29 L.Ed.2d 745 (1971), and refined the test in Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 221-23, 117 S.Ct. 1997, 138 L.Ed.2d 391 (1997). Under the resulting Lemon/Agostini test, the Court must consider whether the funding has "the purpose of advancing or inhibiting religion" and whether the funding has "the effect of advancing or inhibiting religion." DeStefano v. Emergency Housing Group, Inc., 247 F.3d 397, 406 (2nd Cir.2001) (quoting Mitchell v....