Teeter v. State

Decision Date01 September 1985
Docket NumberNo. 119,119
PartiesRonald D. TEETER v. STATE of Maryland. ,
CourtCourt of Special Appeals of Maryland

John L. Kopolow, Asst. Public Defender, Baltimore (Alan H. Murrell, Public Defender, Baltimore, on the brief), for appellant.

Richard B. Rosenblatt, Asst. Atty. Gen., Baltimore (Stephen H. Sachs, Atty. Gen., Baltimore, Thomas E. Hickman, State's Atty. for Carroll County and Kathi Hill, Asst. State's Atty. for Carroll County on the brief, Westminster), for appellee.

Argued before BISHOP, ROSALYN B. BELL and ROBERT M. BELL, JJ.

ROSALYN B. BELL, Judge.

Ronald D. Teeter was found guilty in a bench trial in the Circuit Court for Carroll County of daytime housebreaking, theft of goods over $300 and malicious destruction of property. Prior to trial the State had advised Teeter that if he was convicted, it would seek a mandatory maximum sentence under Maryland's multiple offender statute 1. At sentencing the court imposed concurrent, mandatory twenty-five year sentences on all three convictions. Teeter appeals both the malicious destruction of property conviction and the sentences imposed raising several issues:

"1. Was the evidence sufficient to support the conviction for malicious destruction of property?

"2. Did the trial judge err by admitting at the sentencing hearing documentary hearsay that was offered by the State to show a prior term of confinement served by Appellant?

"3. Was Appellant illegally sentenced under Art. 27, Sec. 643B(c), because the State failed to prove that his predicate offenses were in fact crimes of violence?

"4. Is Art. 27, § 643B(c), unconstitutional in that it mandates a twenty-five year sentence for statutorily eligible defendants without regard to the presence or absence of mitigating factors? [and]

"5. Do Appellant's mandatory twenty-five year sentences for theft and malicious destruction of property exceed statutory limits?"

We will consider each issue seriatim after a brief discussion of the trial and disposition hearing.

The Trial

Pamela Lynn Calhoun returned home on the afternoon of October 12, 1983 to find her patio door broken and glass scattered across the dining room floor. Three bedrooms had been ransacked and property taken. According to Mrs. Calhoun, the stolen property was valued at $1200 or $1300. Among the missing items were two rings and several weapons, including a Smith and Wesson service revolver belonging to her husband, Officer Glenn Calhoun.

The following week, police seized a ring from the finger of Kathy Watson resembling one of the two stolen. Watson, who testified under a grant of immunity from prosecution, stated that Teeter had given her the ring. Watson also recounted that she observed Jerry Burkett, an acquaintance, take a pistol from Teeter. According to Officer Calhoun, the pistol resembled the service revolver taken from his house. At Watson's residence, the police also recovered a small ring which Mrs. Calhoun claimed belonged to her daughter.

Richard Elligson, a truck driver on a delivery, identified Teeter as the man he saw near the Calhoun house about 1:00 p.m., October 12, 1983. Several neighbors called by the State also placed Teeter in the vicinity the day of the housebreaking.

At the conclusion of the evidence, the court found Teeter guilty and sentenced him on the housebreaking, theft and destruction of property counts.

The Sentencing

At the disposition hearing, the State relied exclusively on documentary evidence to prove the necessary foundation for an enhanced sentence under the mandatory offender statute. State's Exhibits 1 through 4 consisted of docket entries of criminal cases: Baltimore County Case Nos. 66200, 73002 and 73003, and Carroll County Case No. 6231, respectively, showing a "Ronald Teeter" was convicted of eight daytime housebreakings alleged to have been committed between 1979 and 1981.

State's Exhibit 5 was introduced to show Teeter had served a term of confinement. The exhibit included an October 19, 1983 letter from Baltimore County Police Lieutenant William Faul addressed to Merry Coplin, Superintendant of the Maryland Reception, Diagnostic and Classification Center (M.R.D.C.C.), requesting a certified copy of the fingerprint card and commitment record for a § 643B incarceration of a "Ronald Dale Teeter." That exhibit also included the notarized certification, executed October 26, 1983, by Sergeant James Felix, Records Custodian at M.R.D.C.C., attesting that the attached documents were accurate reproductions of original M.R.D.C.C. records of " 'Teeter, Ronald Dale,' # 158795, a person heretofore committed to and who served a term of confinement therein;" the attached fingerprint copies, ostensibly those of a "Ronald Dale Teeter;" and the photographs of an inmate number 158795, also ostensibly those of a "Ronald Dale Teeter." Based upon Teeter's prior convictions, the court sentenced him in accordance with § 643B(c).

I. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE

Appellant alleges as his first point of error that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the conviction for malicious destruction of property under Md.Code Ann., Art. 27 § 111 (1957, 1982 Repl.Vol.). We enumerated the elements of this violation in Duncan v. State, 5 Md.App. 440, 443, 248 A.2d 176 (1968):

"(1) as to the property: it may be real or personal property but must be that of another;

(2) as to the mischief: the property must be destroyed, injured, defaced or molested;

(3) as to the mens-rea: the mischief must be wilful and malicious."

We went on to hold in Duncan, supra, that the requisite intent for this crime is analogous to the concept of malice in the law of homicide.

"We think that the special element of mens-rea in malicious mischief, designated in the statute as 'wilfully and maliciously,' requires either a specific intent to cause the destruction, injury, defacement or molestation of property of another, or an act done in wanton and wilful disregard of the plain and strong likelihood of such harm, without any justification, excuse, or substantial mitigation."

Id. at 445, 248 A.2d 176.

In Duncan, supra, and Spears v. State, 38 Md.App. 700, 382 A.2d 616 (1978), cert. denied, 282 Md. 739 (1978), we applied this intent standard and found the admitted evidence insufficient to prove that the destructive act in question was perpetrated in wanton and wilful disregard of the likelihood of harm. Duncan v. State, supra 5 Md.App. at 448, 248 A.2d 176. In both cases, hazardous driving with a stolen automobile resulted in a collision. The charge of malicious destruction of property could not stand because either intentional destruction of property or mere negligence was equally inferrable from the evidence.

As the only basis to support his contention that this conviction was erroneous, appellant argues that the broken patio door may have occurred as a result of negligent conduct on his part and maintains Duncan and Spears support his claim of evidentiary insufficiency. The evidence does not bear out this contention.

The homeowner testified that his patio door had been completely knocked out with some object and his wife stated that glass from the broken door was strewn across the dining room floor. The record does not support an inference that this door was broken in a negligent manner. Moreover, this is not a single isolated event. The entry and theft which followed further negate the inference propounded by appellant. The evidence was clearly sufficient to support appellant's conviction under Art. 27, § 111.

II. EVIDENCE AT SENTENCING

Appellant was sentenced to a mandatory twenty-five year minimum sentence under Md.Code Ann., Art. 27, § 643B(c) supra. As a prerequisite to imposing that sentence, the State must show that the defendant was convicted on two separate occasions of crimes of violence in which the convictions do not arise from a single incident (that is, the second offense was committed after a charging document was filed in the first, Garrett v. State, 59 Md.App. 97, 474 A.2d 931 (1984), cert. denied, 300 Md. 483, 479 A.2d 372 (1984)), and that the defendant served at least one term of confinement as a result of one of those prior convictions. We held in Sullivan v. State, 29 Md.App. 622, 349 A.2d 663 (1976), that mandatory statutory predicates had to be proved by the State beyond a reasonable doubt before a recidivist punishment could be imposed. Id. at 631, 349 A.2d 663.

Appellant does not argue that the prerequisites were not met by the evidence 2, but centers his complaint on the admission of certain evidence at the disposition hearing. He does not challenge the admission of the docket entries in the prior criminal cases, nor does he challenge most of the records from M.R.D.C.C. Instead, appellant focuses on the certification executed by Sgt. Felix linking him to a term of confinement. He argues that the affidavit was clearly hearsay and not within any recognized exception to the hearsay rule. He posits that this affidavit was not one made in the general course of business of the M.R.D.C.C., but was made solely for litigation purposes and is inadmissible.

It is well settled in this State that a sentencing court may consider a broad range of evidence. Logan v. State, 289 Md. 460, 480-81, 425 A.2d 632 (1981). Notwithstanding precedent, appellant cites Smith v. Jones, 236 Md. 305, 203 A.2d 865 (1963) and Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109, 63 S.Ct. 477, 87 L.Ed. 645 (1943), to support his claim that documents prepared in anticipation of litigation fail the tests of necessity and trustworthiness germane to all recognized hearsay exceptions. Appellant's claim is misplaced in the context of sentencing. At a disposition hearing, unlike a trial on the merits, the quantum of proof required to fix an appropriate sentence is not tantamount to beyond a reasonable doubt. The trustworthiness of the evidence submitted at this stage is not implicated to the same degree as that necessary...

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