Tefft v. Boston Elevated Ry. Co.

• Court: Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
• Writing for the Court: PIERCE
• Citation: Tefft v. Boston Elevated Ry. Co., 285 Mass. 121, 188 N.E. 507 (Mass. 1934)
• Decision Date: 03 January 1934
• Parties: TEFFT v. BOSTON ELEVATED RY. CO.

285 Mass. 121

188 N.E. 507

TEFFT

v.BOSTON ELEVATED RY. CO.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk.

Jan. 3, 1934.

Exceptions from Superior Court, Suffolk County; Morton, Judge.

Action of contract by Alice Tefft against the Boston Elevated Railway Company. Directed verdict for defendant, and plaintiff brings exceptions.

Exceptions overruled.

A. Gottlieb, of Boston, for plaintiff.

R. L. Mapplebeck, of Boston, for defendant.

PIERCE, Justice.

This is an action of contract to recover for personal injuries to the plaintiff, received by her on December 29, 1931. At the close of all the evidence the judge directed the jury to return a verdict for the defendant. The case is before this court on the plaintiff's exceptions to the allowance of the defendant's motion for a verdict in its favor.

The declaration in the action reads as follows: ‘And the plaintiff says that the defendant is a street railway company engaged as a common carrier, to transport persons for hire; that on or about December 29, 1931, in consideration of the fare paid by the plaintiff to the defendant, the defendant agreed to carry and transport the plaintiff; that in pursuance of said contract, the plaintiff boarded an outbound Franklin Park car at Andrew Square; that the defendant, its agents or servants was bound to exercise the highest degree of care in enabling and permitting the plaintiff, as a passenger, to alight from said car; that in violation of the duty imposed under said contract, the defendant by its agents or servants failed to stop said car at a regular stopping place, but traveled beyond such place, to a place of danger, and that without warning permitted the plaintiff to alight; that because of the dangerous condition of the ground at the stopping place, and because of the breach of duty of the defendant, its agents or servants, towards the plaintiff as aforesaid, the plaintiff broke and sprained her foot, suffered great pain both in body and mind, was confined to bed and at her home, was unable to work for a long period of time, and was otherwise greatly damaged as she alleges in her writ.’

In support of the declaration, the plaintiff at the trial introduced evidence which would warrant the jury in finding that on December 29, 1931, at about 5:30 P. M., the plaintiff, a woman, boarded an outbound Franklin Park car of the defendant at said Andrew Square, Boston; that her destination was the stop at the corner of Stanwood Street and Columbia Road, Dorchester; that when the car reached Devon Street, a block before her destination, she pressed a button near her seat as a signal for the motorman to stop at Stanwood Street, and ‘then walked towards the front of the car to alight’; that she was close to the motorman when the car was about thirty feet from the regular stopping place at Stanwood Street, and said to him ‘Please, next stop’; that the car did not stop when Stanwood Street was reached; that she asked the motorman why he did not stop it and he replied that he did not hear her; that the car travelled about one hundred feet beyond the regular stopping place at Stanwood Street, and then the motorman stopped it, opened the door and the plaintiff started to alight; that when the door was opened a step folded down and there was a space of one foot on the reservation from a point directly beneath the edge of the step to the edge of the reservation on the outbound side; that the distance from the step when folded down...