Tefft v. State
| Decision Date | 04 May 1995 |
| Docket Number | No. 94-229,94-229 |
| Citation | 894 P.2d 317,271 Mont. 82 |
| Court | Montana Supreme Court |
| Parties | , 2 Wage & Hour Cas.2d (BNA) 1329 Michael A. TEFFT, Edward C. Peters, Joseph E. Gaspar, Nanci Ellen Green, Randy J. Archery, Joseph M. McKamey, George L. Domme, Michael D. Cross, Michael E. Heisler, and Jack C. Stimac, Plaintiffs and Respondents, v. The STATE of Montana, Defendant and Appellant. |
Lawrence A. Anderson, Great Falls, for respondents.
The plaintiffs, who are firefighters employed by the Montana Air National Guard in Great Falls, filed this action in the District Court for the Eighth Judicial District in Cascade County to recover wages due from the defendant, State of Montana, and liquidated damages for violation of the Federal Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). The District Court granted plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment and held that the State violated the FLSA when it reduced plaintiffs' wages and that its actions were not taken in good faith. After a nonjury trial, the District We restate the issues on appeal as follows:
Court found the amount of wages and damages due, and entered judgment in favor of plaintiffs for that amount. The State appeals from the District Court's order granting summary judgment and the amount of damages awarded. We affirm the judgment of the District Court
1. Did the District Court err when it granted plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment?
2. Did the District Court abuse its discretion when it awarded liquidated damages under 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (1988) of the Fair Labor Standards Act?
3. Were the District Court's findings regarding the amount of plaintiffs' damages clearly erroneous?
Plaintiffs are firefighters who provide protection for civilian aircraft and a unit of the Montana Air National Guard at the Great Falls International Airport. Prior to 1975, they were employed by the federal government. In 1975, when the federal firefighting jobs were discontinued, plaintiffs were employed by the Montana Department of Military Affairs. However, through a cooperative arrangement, the federal government still paid for most of the costs associated with their jobs.
After the State established the fire crew jobs in 1975, plaintiffs' salaries were based on the State's statutory pay matrix. Section 2-18-312, MCA. The State initially paid plaintiffs biweekly for 80 hours of work during each two week period. However, plaintiffs' actual schedules had them working 24 hour shifts, followed by 48 hours off duty. Therefore, they worked substantially more hours during each two week period than the 80 hours for which they were paid. They actually worked between 96 and 120 hours during a two week period, and 2912 hours per year, but were paid on the basis of a 2080 hour year. The State failed to pay them for the actual time worked, or to keep accurate records of their time at work.
In 1982, the State began to reflect actual hours worked on plaintiffs' time cards, but plaintiffs were still paid for only 80 hours of work biweekly. During a brief period from 1985 to 1986, the State began to pay plaintiffs for the actual hours they worked. However, to avoid overtime requirements, the State added an additional day off, or "Kelly day," for each pay period. One count of plaintiffs' complaint, the "straight time" claim, was a claim for wages for those hours worked, but for which they were not paid, between 1979 and 1985. In separate litigation, plaintiffs settled claims for overtime compensation during this period.
In 1985, the United States Supreme Court reversed previous case law which excluded state jobs from coverage under the federal Fair Labor Standards Act. See Garcia v. Metropolitan Transit Authority (1985), 469 U.S. 528, 105 S.Ct. 1005, 83 L.Ed.2d 1016. As a result, FLSA provisions became binding on state and local governments.
The FLSA provides that a firefighter must be paid at the overtime rate if the firefighter's tour of duty exceeds 212 hours in 28 days. 29 U.S.C. § 207 (1988); 29 C.F.R. § 553.201 (1993). Plaintiffs' hours consistently exceeded this number, with the exception of the period from September 1985 to July 1986.
Following Garcia, Congress passed two amendments to the FLSA. The first amendment eased the financial burden on state and local governments by exempting them from liability for FLSA violations that occurred before April 15, 1986. Pub.L. No. 99-150, 99 Stat. 787, § 2(c) (); see Hill v. City of Greenville (N.D.Tex.1988), 696 F.Supp. 1123, 1126. A second amendment enacted an anti-discrimination provision to deter state and local governments from decreasing employees' wages to offset the increased overtime compensation requirement. Pub.L. No. 99-150, § 8, 99 Stat. 791 ().
In response to Garcia, the Department of Military Affairs proposed changes in the manner in which firefighters were paid. However, the proposal was rejected by the State's Personnel Division on the basis that it deviated from the State pay matrix. The Department, therefore, requested an exclusion from the State's pay plan under § 2-18-103(6), MCA, which excludes officers or members of the militia. The State granted the exclusion by July 1986. Plaintiffs were required to be members of the National Guard and became part of a new class known as the Militia Protective Services, an exempt classification. We recently held that the requirement of National Guard membership was unconstitutional because the State could not establish a rational basis for it. McKamey v. State (1994), --- Mont. ----, 885 P.2d 515, 51 St.Rep. 1218.
Following this reclassification, the State reduced plaintiffs' hourly wages. The Kelly day was eliminated and plaintiffs were paid biweekly based on a reduced hourly wage multiplied by the number of hours actually worked. The new hourly wages were effectively determined by dividing each plaintiff's set annual salary by 2912 hours instead of 2080 hours.
Plaintiffs filed a complaint, and later an amended complaint, that demanded lost compensation for (1) unpaid "straight time," and (2) discrimination in violation of the FLSA based on the State's reclassification. Plaintiffs contended they were entitled to unpaid wages and were entitled to liquidated damages pursuant to the FLSA, based on the State's reduction of their wages in response to the Garcia decision. The plaintiffs moved for and received summary judgment on the FLSA claim. In its order, the District Court held that the State had failed to raise a factual issue regarding its violation of the Act, or whether it acted in good faith when it reduced plaintiffs' wages. Accordingly, the court held that plaintiffs were entitled to liquidated damages.
The District Court ordered a hearing on the remaining issues, including the amount of damages, and the State was allowed to submit additional proof of good faith and reasonable grounds for its actions. Both parties offered expert testimony regarding damage calculations. The State failed to offer evidence satisfactory to the District Court that it had acted in good faith when it reduced plaintiffs' wages. The District Court found plaintiffs' damage calculations more reliable than the State's, and adopted plaintiffs' damage figures. On January 31, 1994, the District Court entered judgment against the State for $485,434.60.
Did the District Court err when it granted plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment?
The nature of our inquiry when we review a district court's summary judgment decision is identical to the trial court's. Cooper v. Sisters of Charity (1994), 265 Mont. 205, 207, 875 P.2d 352, 353 (citing Minnie v. City of Roundup (1993), 257 Mont. 429, 431, 849 P.2d 212, 214). Summary judgment is proper only when no genuine issue of material fact exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Rule 56(c), M.R.Civ.P.; Spain-Morrow Ranch, Inc. v. West (1994), 264 Mont. 441, 444, 872 P.2d 330, 331-32.
In 1985, the United States Supreme Court decided Garcia, which applied the minimum-wage and overtime provisions of the FLSA to state employees. In order to minimize financial impact on state and local governments, Congress enacted amendments to the FLSA. Hill, 696 F.Supp. at 1125. Congress also enacted what is referred to as § 8 to prohibit governmental discrimination against employees who are entitled to financial benefits as a result of Garcia. 29 U.S.C. § 215 note (1988), Pub.L. No. 99-150, § 8, 99 Stat. 791. Section 8 provided:
A public agency which is a State, political subdivision of a State, or an interstate governmental agency and which discriminates or has discriminated against an employee with respect to the employee's wages or other terms or conditions of employment because on or after February 19, 1985, the employee asserted coverage under section 7 of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 [29 U.S.C. § 207] shall be held to have violated section 15(a)(3) of such Act [29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3) ]. The protection against discrimination afforded by the preceding sentence shall be available after August 1, 1986, only for an employee who takes an action described in section 15(a)(3) of such Act.
Section 7 sets forth the number of hours after which firefighters must be paid overtime. 29 U.S.C. § 207 (1988). Section 215(a)(3) makes it unlawful for any person to discriminate against an employee because the employee has filed a complaint or instituted a proceeding under the FLSA. 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3) (1988).
The District Court's order correctly noted that the State...
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