Teichman v. Loffland Brothers Company

• Decision Date: 15 September 1961
• Docket Number: No. 18844.,18844.
• Citation: 294 F.2d 175
• Parties: Willie J. TEICHMAN and C. D. Calbeck, Deputy Commissioner, and United States of America, Appellants, v. LOFFLAND BROTHERS COMPANY et al., Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

294 F.2d 175 (1961)

Willie J. TEICHMAN and C. D. Calbeck, Deputy Commissioner, and United States of America, Appellants, v. LOFFLAND BROTHERS COMPANY et al., Appellees.

No. 18844.

United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit.

August 16, 1961.

Rehearing Denied September 15, 1961.

David L. Rose, Morton Hollander, Attys., Dept. of Justice, Washington, D.C., Herman Wright, Jack Shepherd, Asst. U.S. Atty., Houston, Tex., William H. Orrick, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., William B. Butler, U. S. Atty., Houston, Tex., for appellants.

Jerry D. Barker, Galveston, Tex., Barker, Barker & Coltzer, Galveston, Tex., of counsel, for appellees.

Before HUTCHESON, RIVES and WISDOM, Circuit Judges.

HUTCHESON, Circuit Judge.

This appeal tests for error the findings and judgment of the district court, holding that an employee was precluded from receiving an award for compensation for an injury brought under the Longshoremen's Act because he had brought an unsuccessful suit against his employer under the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C.A., § 688 as a seaman based upon a different injury.

Appellee-employer and its insurance carrier brought this suit to enjoin, as not in accordance with law, an award to its employee, appellant Teichman, made by the appellant Deputy Commissioner Calbeck under the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C.A. § 901 et seq. District court jurisdiction was based upon 33 U.S.C.A. § 921. The complaint alleged, inter alia, that the award was not supported by substantial evidence, and that the employee was precluded from receiving compensation because of a judgment in a prior civil action. The case was submitted below on the administrative record. The district court found that the award was supported by substantial evidence,¹but enjoined its enforcement on the ground that the employee was precluded from receiving compensation under the Longshoremen's Act because of the election he had made in the civil suit and because of estoppel by judgment arising out of the same suit. The employee and the deputy commissioner appeal.

In addition to filing claim under the Longshoremen's Act, Teichman, on September 27, 1956, gave notice of election to recover damages against a third person pursuant to 33 U.S.C.A. § 933. He then filed a suit against the employer and the Stanolind Oil & Gas Company, later the Pan-American Petroleum Corporation, the owner of the tug and the supply ship, asserting unseaworthiness of the vessel and negligence. The petition in the civil action stated that the suit against the employer was brought under the Jones Act. In the original pleading, Teichman alleged that he was injured when he jumped from the tug to the supply boat (Stanolind 50), and further injured when the metal basket was lowered by the crane onto the tug (Stanolind 20). In an amended petition, however, he alleged injury from the first (the jumping) incident only, and omitted all of the allegations pertaining to the second (the basket lowering) incident. The amended petition alleged that the bumper of the supply ship was unsafe and unsuitable equipment for transferring personnel, and that the supply ship was, therefore, unseaworthy. It further alleged negligence in failing to provide a safe place to work. For its first defense employer asserted that the Longshoremen's Act provided the exclusive remedy for Teichman, since he was a driller, and not a seaman. Numerous other defenses were also asserted.

This civil action against the employer and shipowner was tried to a jury in the District Court for the Southern District of Texas. Teichman testified that his duties were primarily those of a driller on the "monkey board" of the derrick, but that in case of storm or emergency he would help take down the ramp and disconnect mud and water lines, all of which ran from the supply ship to the drilling platform. He testified that he lived on the supply ship and was furnished his meals there. He stated that he had never "signed on" as a member of the crew, that he never held any seaman's papers, and that he belonged to the ironworkers' union, and not to any seaman's union. When asked: "* * * are you a seaman?", he replied, "No, sir, I am not". Teichman testified about his jumping from the tug to the supply ship, but when he started to describe the second (the basket lowering) incident, defense counsel objected, and no testimony about that incident was received. Special interrogatories were propounded to the jury, pursuant to Rule 49(a) F.R.Civ.P., 28 U.S.C.A.

The court instructed the jury that if they answered the first question in the negative, they need not answer the others, and, in response to the first question, "Did the plaintiff, Willie J. Teichman, receive an injury on January 1, 1956, as he was boarding the vessel Stanolind 50?", the jury's verdict was: "The plaintiff did not receive such injury". In accordance with the court's instructions, the jury answered no further questions, and, since the jury had determined that plaintiff did not receive the injury on which the amended pleading was based, judgment was entered for the defendants on June 21, 1958.

Following the employer's controversion (in September, 1958) of Teichman's claim for benefits under the Longshoremen's Act, the Deputy Commissioner held a hearing. The employer and insurance carrier conceded the employer-employee relationship, and admitted that the incidents occurred while Teichman was within the scope of his employment, but denied that he received any injury or was disabled as he claimed. Their "principal contention", however, was that Teichman was precluded by the election of the first suit and by estoppel by verdict and judgment therein from claiming and obtaining a compensation award. To support this contention, they offered the judgment, pleadings, and motions in the civil suit, and the testimony of Teichman, but little or none of the rest of the testimony given in that suit. On the merits of the compensation claim, the parties offered lay and medical testimony pertaining to the second (the basket lowering) incident.

On the question of estoppel by judgment, the deputy commissioner found that the jury had decided only one thing, namely that Teichman was not injured as a result of the first (the jumping) incident. So deciding, he accepted the jury's decision on that question, but concluded that Teichman was injured as a result of the second (the basket lowering) incident, and he based his award on that injury. In the action to review the award brought by the employer and its insurance carrier, the district court ruled that the deputy commissioner's findings were supported by substantial evidence, but held that Teichman was barred from recovering compensation under the Longshoremen's Act as a result of the second injury, because he had based his civil action for the first injury on the premise that he was a seaman, and he could not take before the...