Teigue v. Appleton Co.

Decision Date31 January 1952
Docket NumberNo. 16584,16584
Citation221 S.C. 52,68 S.E.2d 878
PartiesTEIGUE v. APPLETON CO.
CourtSouth Carolina Supreme Court

Doyle & Doyle, Anderson, for appellant.

Robert L. Ballentine, Anderson, for respondent.

TAYLOR, Justice.

This is a Workmen's Compensation case and the question presented is whether or not there was compliance on the part of claimant with Section 7035-25 and Section 7035-26 of the 1942 Code of Laws of South Carolina, the pertinent portions of which are:

's 7035-25. Accidents--injured employee, or representative give notice.--Every injured employee or his representative shall immediately on the occurrence of an accident, or as soon thereafter as practicable, give or cause to be given to the employer a written notice of the accident, and the employee shall not be entitled to physician's fees nor to any compensation which may have accrued under the terms of this article prior to the giving of such notice, unless it can be shown that the employer, his agent or representative, had knowledge of the accident, or that the party required to give such notice had been prevented from doing so by reason of physical or mental incapacity, or the fraud or deceit of some third person; but no compensation shall be payable unless such written notice is given within thirty days after the occurrence of the accident or death, unless reasonable excuse is made to the satisfaction of the industrial commission for not giving such notice, and the commission is satisfied that the employer has not been prejudiced thereby.

's 7035-26. Notice of accident--content--service.--The notice provided in the foregoing section shall state in ordinary language the name and address of the employee, the time, place, nature, and cause of the accident, and of the resulting injury or death; and shall be signed by the employee or by a person on his behalf, or in the event of his death, by any one or more of his dependents, or by a person in their behalf.

'No defect or inaccuracy in the notice shall be a bar to compensation unless the employer shall prove that his interest was prejudiced thereby, and then only to such extent as the prejudice.

'Said notice shall be given personally to the employer or any of his agents upon whom a summons in civil action may be served under the laws of the State, or may be sent by registered letter addressed to the employer at his last known residence or place of business.'

Upon hearing of the cause before the single commissioner claimant testified that he worked only a few hours in 1947, about nineteen or twenty hours in 1948, and two and one-half days in 1949, at which time it is contended he received his injury, and that he had not worked more because he was suffering from a serious heart ailment. He further testified that on March 24, 1949 as a result of his request for employment, he had been assigned very light work which consisted of removing small rolls of cloth, weighing approximately thirty pounds, from a table and placing them on a small hand truck, pushing it about forty feet and unloading on the floor; that while pushing this truck across the floor it became overbalanced because of a depression in the floor and that while attempting to keep the truck from overturning felt a pain in the right side and groin. However, he pushed the truck to the proper place and unloaded it and found that he was suffering from shortness of breath. Mr. Temples, the second hand and his immediate boss, inquired if anything was wrong, to which he replied that he did not think he could make it and wished to go home. At no time did he state that the truck had turned over or that he had strained himself in any way. Mr. Temples then designated one of his fellow workers to return claimant to his home. This was on Thursday. The following Monday, claimant went to see Dr. H. H. Harris who ordered him to bed for several days. No history of any strain or injury was given to Dr. Harris and no claim was filed until July 4, 1949, approximately three and one-half months later. Claimant further testified that he told no one about his injury, not even his fellow employee who carried him to his home at the request of Mr. Temples.

Claimant's wife testified that on about Monday, March 28, 1949, she told Mr. Temples that claimant had injured himself and was having shortness of breath and consequently could not report for work, but even though given many opportunities through leading questions she at no time would say that claimant had received his injury as an employee of appellant.

Appellant denied that claimant had sustained an injury from an accident arising out of and in the course of his employment and moved for a nonsuit and dismissal of claimant's case on the grounds that claimant had failed to prove that there had been a proper reporting of this alleged accident as required under Section 7035-25 and Section 7035-26. The motion for nonsuit and dismissal of the case was granted by the Hearing Commissioner, and on June 25, 1950, the Industrial Commission unanimously affirmed the Hearing Commissioner. An appeal was taken from this order to the Circuit Court and on March 31, 1951, an order was filed reversing the Industrial Commission on the grounds that this State is committed to the policy of liberal construction in Workmen's Compensation matters and claimant had substantially complied with Sectiaon 7035-25 and Section 7035-26 of the 1942 Code of Laws of South Carolina.

The employer now appeals to this Court contending that the Circuit Court erred in that there was no compliance by claimant with the provisions of Section 7035-25 and Section 7035-26 of the 1942 Code of Laws of South Carolina.

It is well...

To continue reading

Request your trial
9 cases
  • Bass v. Isochem, 3996.
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of South Carolina
    • 6 Junio 2005
    ...and can furnish medical care for the employee in order to minimize the disability and his own liability. See Teigue v. Appleton Co., 221 S.C. 52, 68 S.E.2d 878 (1952); Hanks, 286 S.C. at 381, 335 S.E.2d at 93. While the notice requirement must be construed liberally in favor of claimants, i......
  • Hiers v. Brunson Const. Co., 16606
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of South Carolina
    • 26 Marzo 1952
    ...872; Buff v. Columbia Baking Co., 215 S.C. 41, 53 S.E.2d 879; Schrader v. Monarch Mills, 215 S.C. 357, 55 S.E.2d 285; Teigue v. Appleton Company, S.C., 68 S.E.2d 878. Mrs. Hiers, the respondent herein, testified that the deceased was working as a carpenter for the Brunson Construction Compa......
  • Mize v. Sangamo Elec. Co., 18796
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of South Carolina
    • 31 Mayo 1968
    ...disclosed by the written notice had such been given. Strawhorn v. J. A. Chapman Const. Co., 202 S.C. 43, 24 S.E.2d 116; Teigue v. Appleton Co., 221 S.C. 52, 68 S.E.2d 878; Raley v. City of Camden, 222 S.C. 303, 72 S.E.2d 572; Ricker v. Village Management Corp., 231 S.C. 47, 97 S.E.2d It mig......
  • Etheredge v. Monsanto Co., 3470.
    • United States
    • Court of Appeals of South Carolina
    • 1 Abril 2002
    ...for the employee in order to minimize the disability and his own liability." Id. at 381, 335 S.E.2d at 93 (citing Teigue v. Appleton Co., 221 S.C. 52, 68 S.E.2d 878 (1952)). The provisions of § 42-15-20 regarding notice should be liberally construed in favor of claimants. Mintz v. Fiske-Car......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT