Teixiera v. New Britain Baseball Club, Inc., No. HHB-CV-05-4004214-S (Conn. Super. 7/18/2006)

Decision Date18 July 2006
Docket NumberNo. HHB-CV-05-4004214-S,HHB-CV-05-4004214-S
CourtConnecticut Superior Court
PartiesMichael Teixiera v. New Britain Baseball Club, Inc. Opinion No.: 94581
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT #108.00

DAN SHABAN, JUDGE.

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On February 28, 2005 the plaintiff, Michael Teixiera, commenced a personal injury action by way of a one-count complaint against the defendant, New Britain Baseball Club, Inc. (NBBC), also known as the New Britain Rock Cats. NBBC operates a baseball field known as New Britain Stadium (the stadium) in New Britain, Connecticut. On July 3, 2004, having received tickets from a co-worker, the plaintiff went there with his minor son to attend a Rock Cats game. While in line to enter the stadium, the plaintiff purchased two tickets for an all-you-can-eat barbeque that was held before the game in the Pepsi Picnic Patio (Patio). The plaintiff was escorted from the line to the Patio which was down the right field line adjacent to the permanent stands. Prior to the start of the game and just before the plaintiff and his son finished eating, two baseball players with the Rock Cats began throwing to one another in the right field area. Thereafter, while in the Patio, the plaintiff was struck in the testicles by an errantly thrown baseball.

The plaintiff claims in his complaint that NBBC caused the plaintiff's injuries and losses in that: it failed to have a fence of sufficient height separating the picnic area from the playing field; one or more baseball players on the field were allowed to throw baseballs perpendicular to the Patio; one or more baseball players on the field threw a baseball in the direction of the Patio despite the presence of the plaintiff and, no warning was given to the plaintiff of the thrown baseball.

On April 15, 2005, the defendant filed an answer and special defenses. On December 8, 2005, the defendant filed a motion for summary judgment,1 accompanied by a memorandum of law with several exhibits including affidavits, depositions, interrogatories, photographs and other documents.2 In support of its motion, the defendant argues that the plaintiff's negligence action against the defendant must fail because: (1) there is insufficient evidence to sustain a favorable verdict for the plaintiff; (2) plaintiff contractually assumed the risk of being struck by a thrown baseball; (3) the defendant owed the plaintiff no duty to warn about the alleged dangerous condition; (4) even if the defendant had a duty to warn the plaintiff of the dangers of being struck by a baseball, the defendant satisfied the duty of care; and (5) under the "limited duty" rule, the defendant fulfilled its duty to the plaintiff.

On February 9, 2006, the plaintiff filed a memorandum of law in opposition to the motion for summary judgment, accompanied by an affidavit of Michael Teixiera as well as the plaintiff's July 25, 2005 deposition.

Oral argument was held before the court on April 10, 2006.

III. STATEMENT OF LAW

"The motion for summary judgment is designed to eliminate the delay and expense of litigating an issue when there is no real issue to be tried." (Citations omitted.) Wilson v. New Haven, 213 Conn. 277, 279, 567 A.2d 829 (1989). "Practice Book [§17-49] provides that summary judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, affidavits and any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law . . . In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the trial court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party . . . The party seeking summary judgment has the burden of showing the absence of any genuine issue [of] material facts which, under applicable principles of substantive law, entitle him to judgment as a matter of law . . . and the party opposing such a motion must provide an evidentiary foundation to demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue of material fact." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Larobina v. McDonald, 274 Conn. 394, 399-400, 876 A.2d 522 (2005). "A party may not rely on mere speculation or conjecture as to the true nature of the facts to overcome a motion for summary judgment." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Anderson v. Schoenhorn, 89 Conn.App. 666, 670, 874 A.2d 798 (2005). "[S]ummary judgment is appropriate only if a fair and reasonable person could conclude only one way." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Dugan v. Mobile Medical Testing Services, Inc., 265 Conn. 791, 815, 830 A.2d 752 (2003).

Also, in this instance "the issue of whether a defendant owes a duty of care is an appropriate matter for summary judgment because the question is one of law." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Mozeleski v. Thomas, 76 Conn.App. 287, 290, 818 A.2d 893, cert. denied, 264 Conn. 904, 823 A.2d 1221 (2003). "The existence of a duty is a question of law and only if such a duty is found to exist does the trier of fact then determine whether the defendant violated that duty in the particular situation at hand." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Murillo v. Seymour Ambulance Ass'n., Inc., 264 Conn. 474, 478-79, 822 A.2d 1202 (2003).

As to the issue of duty of care, "[i]n general, there is an ascending degree of duty owed by the possessor of land to persons on the land based on their entrant status, i.e., trespasser, licensee or invitee . . . A business invitee is a person who is invited to enter or remain on land for a purpose directly or indirectly connected with business dealings with the possessor of the land . . ." Sevigny v. Dibble Hollow Condo. Ass'n., 76 Conn.App. 306, 320, 819 A.2d 844 (2003). In order for "the plaintiff to recover for breach of a duty owed to [him] as a[n] invitee, the plaintiff [must] allege and prove that the [defendant] had either actual or constructive knowledge of the specific defective condition which caused the injury and not merely of conditions naturally productive of that defect . . ." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Boretti v. Panacea Co., 67 Conn.App. 223, 228, 786 A.2d 1164 (2001), cert. denied, 259 Conn. 918, 91 A.2d 565 (2002).

"A possessor of land has a duty to an invitee to reasonably inspect and maintain the premises in order to render them reasonably safe . . . In addition, the possessor of land must warn an invitee of dangers that the invitee could not reasonably be expected to discover." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Sevigny v. Dibble Hollow Condominium Assn., Inc., supra, 6 Conn.App. 306. However, "a possessor of land has no duty to warn an invitee of a dangerous condition when the invitee has actual knowledge of the condition . . . Warning an invitee against dangers which are either known to him or are so obvious to him that he may be expected to discover them is unnecessary." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Kurti v. Becker, 54 Conn.App. 335, 344-45, 733 A.2d 916, cert. denied, 251 Conn. 909, 739 A.2d 1248 (1999).

III. DISCUSSION

The plaintiff and the defendant both agree that the plaintiff was a business invitee and the court finds there is no question that he was such. The plaintiff used a ticket given to him by a co-worker to enter the stadium and then purchased a ticket for himself and his son to enter the Patio for a barbeque offered by NBBC. Although Connecticut courts have not decided an issue relating to what type of duty a baseball stadium owner owes a spectator, the issue has been addressed in other jurisdictions. Collectively, those jurisdictions are split on the issue. While some jurisdictions believe that an owner of stadium should be held to the standard of reasonable care in maintaining a stadium relative to its invitees, it appears an approximately equal number of jurisdictions have adopted the reasoning of a "limited duty" rule.3 That rule holds that the owner is only responsible for screening the most dangerous section of the field (the area behind home plate). See Akins v. Glen Falls City School District,4 424 N.E.2d 531, 533 (1981). The purpose and reasoning of such a rule is thoroughly set forth in Benejam v. Detroit Tigers, Inc.,5 635 N.W.2d 219, 223 (Mich.App. 2001) wherein the Court of Appeals of Michigan stated:

[T]he limited duty rule does not ignore or abrogate usual premises liability principles. Instead, it identifies the duty of baseball stadium proprietors with greater specificity than the usual "ordinary care/reasonably safe" standard provides. The limited duty precedents do not eliminate the stadium owner's duty to exercise reasonable care under the circumstances to protect patrons against injury . . . Rather, these precedents define that duty so that once the stadium owner has provided adequately screened seats for all those desiring them, the stadium owner has fulfilled his duty of care as a matter of law. The limited duty doctrine establishes the outer limits of liability and thereby prevents a jury from requiring a stadium owner to take precautions that are clearly unreasonable . . . By providing greater specificity with regard to the duty imposed on stadium owners, the rule prevents burgeoning litigation that might signal the demise or substantial alteration of the game of baseball as a spectator sport.

(Internal quotation marks and citations omitted.)

Having reviewed the cases from other jurisdictions on the issue, this court adopts the reasoning of the limited duty rule finding it to be applicable to owners and operators of baseball stadiums such as NBBC. In this case, NBBC had placed screen netting behind home plate which was approximately 30 feet in height and approximately 155 feet in length. (Defendant's Exhibit C.) The screened area behind home plate is available to those spectators who may desire seating safe from any thrown or batted balls which might otherwise enter the stands. It is also common...

To continue reading

Request your trial

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT