Tejeda v. Dubois

• Decision Date: 07 January 1998
• Docket Number: No. 97-1777,97-1777
• Citation: 142 F.3d 18
• Parties: Miguel TEJEDA, Jr., Petitioner, v. Larry E. DUBOIS, Respondent. . Heard
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — First Circuit

Page 18

142 F.3d 18

Miguel TEJEDA, Jr., Petitioner, v. Larry E. DUBOIS, Respondent.

No. 97-1777.

United States Court of Appeals First Circuit.

Heard Jan. 7, 1998.

Decided April 24, 1998.

John M. Thompson, for petitioner.

Susanne G. Levsen, Assistant Attorney General, with whom Scott Harshbarger, Attorney General, was on brief for respondent.

Before STAHL, Circuit Judge, CYR, Senior Circuit Judge, and SHADUR, ^* Senior District Judge.

SHADUR, Senior District Judge.

Miguel Tejeda Jr. ("Tejeda") has filed a 28 U.S.C. § 2254 ("Section 2254") petition for a writ of habeas corpus ("Petition") that challenges his state court conviction on three related criminal charges. Tejeda contends that his conviction must be overturned because he did not receive constitutionally effective counsel at trial as required by the Sixth Amendment. ¹ That claim was rejected by the district court, but for the reasons set forth below we reverse that decision, vacate Tejeda's conviction and remand the case for entry of an appropriate order.

Background

Tejeda was arrested on July 11, 1991 and charged with trafficking in cocaine, unlawful possession of a firearm and unlawful possession of a firearm or ammunition without an identification card. Shortly thereafter he was indicted by a Hampden County, Massachusetts grand jury on those charges and was brought to trial in Hampden Superior Court. After Tejeda lost two motions to suppress evidence, the trial commenced on December 9, 1991.

At trial the prosecution relied on five police witnesses to build its case against Tejeda. What follows in the next three paragraphs is the officers' account of events, set out as factual narrative without stating the qualification that it reflects their testimony as the jury could be entitled to credit it.

On the date of Tejeda's arrest Sergeant Charles Cook ("Cook") had supervised police surveillance of a house at 37 James Street in Springfield, Massachusetts. Tejeda lived in an apartment on the first floor of the house. After Cook learned that the police had obtained a search warrant for the house (a warrant based on a tip provided by a confidential informant), Cook observed Tejeda leave the house, open the trunk of a car parked outside and lean inside the trunk. Tejeda then drove away in the car.

Cook followed Tejeda for a short distance and then radioed Detective John O'Mara ("O'Mara") to stop the car. O'Mara stopped Tejeda several blocks away and searched the car. O'Mara's partner, Detective Dennis Kirby ("Kirby"), found a plastic bag in the trunk that contained about 30 grams of white powder, which proved to be cocaine, and $366 on Tejeda's person. Kirby took Tejeda to the police station after conducting the search.

Shortly after the arrest, Cook and several other officers searched Tejeda's apartment. They found a loaded .38 caliber revolver under a mattress, ammunition for the gun, personal papers indicating that Tejeda lived in the apartment and a "drug ledger" containing names and addresses of prospective drug clients. Tejeda did not have the requisite identification card for the firearm and ammunition.

In the face of such testimony, Tejeda's defense lawyer Edelmiro Martnez, Jr. ("Martnez") concluded that Tejeda's only defense was to argue that the police had fabricated the case against Tejeda. Martnez began his defense by trying to expose inconsistencies in the police testimony during his cross-examinations, but his efforts were completely unavailing because the trial judge sustained numerous objections to Martnez' questions suggesting potential police fraud. Those rulings hampered Martnez' pursuit of that line of inquiry.

Martnez complained bitterly about the adverse rulings, arguing that they prevented him from presenting his defense. In response the judge harshly warned Martnez not to present a police fabrication defense supported only by Tejeda's word. Those contentious encounters generated an obvious hostility between Martnez and the judge that poisoned their relationship for the remainder of the trial. Martnez, incensed by the judge's consistently unfavorable rulings, acted out his frustration by attacking the integrity of the judge. Martnez' petulance in turn antagonized the judge to the point that he fined Martnez $300 for contempt of court after one outburst.

That ongoing conflict discouraged Martnez' pursuit of the police-fabrication line of defense. He stopped trying to cross-examine prosecution witnesses on that subject and consequently failed to uncover significant inconsistencies that did exist in Cook's and O'Mara's testimony.

In the end, the only evidence of police fabrication that Martnez presented coherently came from Tejeda and one other defense witness. Tejeda vigorously denied having either drugs or a gun in his car or apartment. On the contrary, he testified that he was going in his car to pay some bills when he was stopped at gunpoint by the police. Tejeda contradicted O'Mara, stating that the car was not searched in Tejeda's presence. Instead Tejeda said that the police took him to the police station immediately and did not inform him of the charges against him until the next day. Tejeda stuck to his story during the prosecution's cross-examination, repeatedly insisting that the officers were lying.

Tejeda's only substantive defense witness, Alejandro Bonilla ("Bonilla"), claimed that he was Tejeda's roommate and that he never saw drug trafficking or the gun in their apartment. ² But Bonilla's credibility was undermined when he admitted that he had provided a different home address to the police (in the course of a separate incident) two weeks before Tejeda's arrest.

Despite Martnez' frenetic attempts to elicit evidence of police fabrication, the trial judge concluded that there was no evidence to support the inference that the police were lying. Accordingly, he explicitly prohibited Martnez from arguing that theory in his closing statement. While Martnez did not adhere to that order with total strictness, his oblique references to potential police fabrication were scattered and unsupported by objective evidence of police misconduct.

Not surprisingly, Martnez' failure to argue fully what he had candidly admitted to be Tejeda's only line of defense resulted in guilty verdicts against his client. Tejeda was convicted on all three charges and sentenced to a state prison term of not less than five nor more than seven years.

After filing a timely notice of appeal, Tejeda moved for a new trial--a motion that was denied without a hearing. When he then appealed both his conviction and the denial of a new trial, new counsel was appointed to handle the appeals. Both his appeals were consolidated for hearing before the Massachusetts Appeals Court, and on February 18, 1994 the consolidated appeal was rejected (Commonwealth v. Tejeda, 36 Mass.App.Ct.1105, 629 N.E.2d 370 (1994)). Tejeda's application to the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court for further appellate review was denied on March 29, 1994 (Commonwealth v. Tejeda, 417 Mass.1104, 634 N.E.2d 121 (1994)).

Undeterred, Tejeda filed a petition for federal habeas corpus relief on December 5, 1994. Then he alleged in an amended petition that he had received constitutionally ineffective assistance at trial from Martnez and that the trial judge had violated his right to counsel and due process by prohibiting Martnez from arguing the police fabrication theory in his closing argument. ³ On May 12, 1997 the district court issued a memorandum opinion denying both claims.

Tejeda then filed a Motion for Certificate of Appealability as to both claims. On July 23, 1997 the district court issued a certificate of appealability for Tejeda's ineffective assistance of counsel claim, but refused to grant a certificate for the restricted summation claim. This appeal resulted from the issuance of the certificate. ⁴

Standard of Review

As n.4 has indicated, Tejeda filed his federal habeas petition on December 5, 1994, well before the April 24, 1996 effective date of the Act's amendments to Section 2254. Lindh v. Murphy, --- U.S. ----, ----, 117 S.Ct. 2059, 2063, 138 L.Ed.2d 481 (1997) holds that the Act's more stringent limitations on the federal courts' review of state court determinations via habeas proceedings do not apply to petitions pending before the Act became law. Hence Tejeda is entitled to de novo review of his ineffective assistance of counsel claim (Curtis v. Duval, 124 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir.1997)).

Ineffective-Assistance-of-Counsel Standards

Tejeda claims that Martnez' performance at trial was so deficient that it violated Tejeda's Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel. To establish such a violation, Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-96, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064-69, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984) requires that Tejeda show (1) that Martnez' performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and (2) that prejudice resulted.

In evaluating Strickland 's first component, we review Martnez' actions with the strong presumption "that, under the circumstances, the challenged action 'might be considered sound trial strategy' " (id. at 689, 104 S.Ct. at 2065, quoting Michel v. Louisiana, 350 U.S. 91, 101, 76 S.Ct. 158, 164, 100 L.Ed. 83 (1955)). Accordingly, Tejeda must show that "in light of all the circumstances, the identified acts or omissions were outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance" (id. at 690, 104 S.Ct. at 2066).

As for the second element--prejudice flowing from Martnez' substandard performance--Tejeda must demonstrate that there was a reasonable probability that but for Martnez' errors the outcome of the trial would have been different (id. at 694, 104 S.Ct. at 2068). For that purpose a reasonable probability is defined as "a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome" (id.). And in that respect our analysis is not limited to outcome determination--we must also contemplate "whether the result...