Tekoh v. Cnty. of L. A.
| Decision Date | 15 January 2021 |
| Docket Number | No. 18-56414,18-56414 |
| Citation | 985 F.3d 713 |
| Parties | Terence B. TEKOH, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES; Dennis Stangeland, Sergeant; Carlos Vega, Deputy, Defendants-Appellees, and Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department; Does, 1 to 10, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit |
Paul Hoffman (argued) and John Washington, Schonbrun Seplow Harris & Hoffman LLP, Hermosa Beach, California; John Burton and Matt Sahak, Law Offices of John Burton, Pasadena, California; for Plaintiff-Appellant.
Antonio K. Kizzie (argued) and Rickey Ivie, Ivie McNeill & Wyatt, Los Angeles, California, for Defendants-Appellees.
Before: Kim McLane Wardlaw, Mary H. Murguia, and Eric D. Miller, Circuit Judges.
We must decide whether the use of an un-Mirandized statement against a defendant in a criminal case is alone sufficient to support a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action based on the Fifth Amendment violation. The district court concluded that the use of the statement alone was insufficient to demonstrate a violation of the right against self-incrimination and, instead, instructed the jury that the plaintiff had to show that the interrogation that procured the statement was unconstitutionally coercive under the totality of the circumstances, with the Miranda violation only one factor to be considered. Neither the Supreme Court nor our court has directly addressed this precise question. However, in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Dickerson v. United States , 530 U.S. 428, 120 S.Ct. 2326, 147 L.Ed.2d 405 (2000), which held that Miranda is a rule of constitutional law that could not be overruled by congressional action, we conclude that where the un-Mirandized statement has been used against the defendant in the prosecution's case in chief in a prior criminal proceeding, the defendant has been deprived of his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination, and he may assert a claim against the state official who deprived him of that right under § 1983.
Terence Tekoh was working at a Los Angeles medical center when a patient accused him of sexual assault. According to the patient, Tekoh lifted her coversheets and made sexual contact while transporting her within the hospital. Hospital staff reported the allegation to the Los Angeles Sheriff's Department. Deputy Carlos Vega responded to investigate.
Deputy Vega found Tekoh in the MRI section, where he worked transporting patients to and from their MRIs and their rooms, and the two went into a nearby, private room to talk. Though Deputy Vega questioned Tekoh, he did not advise him of his Miranda rights. By the end of the questioning, Tekoh had written the following statement:
How Tekoh came to write this statement is hotly disputed and was the focus of the 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim against Deputy Vega that gave rise to this appeal.
In Tekoh's telling, when Deputy Vega first approached him, Vega asked if there was somewhere they could speak in private. Tekoh's co-workers suggested the MRI "reading room,"—a small, windowless, and soundproof room used by doctors to read MRIs. When one of Tekoh's co-workers tried to accompany Tekoh into the reading room, Deputy Vega stopped her and told her the interview was private.
Deputy Vega shut the door and stood in front of it, blocking Tekoh's path to the exit. He then accused Tekoh of touching the patient's vagina. Tekoh adamantly denied the allegation. After about 35 to 40 minutes of questioning during which Tekoh refused to confess, Deputy Vega told him (falsely) that the assault had been captured on video so he might as well admit to it. Still, Tekoh did not confess.
Tekoh then asked to speak to a lawyer, but Deputy Vega ignored the request. At that point, Tekoh grew frustrated and tried to get up and leave the room. Tekoh testified:
I made one or two steps, and [Deputy Vega] rushed at me and stepped on my toes, put his hand on his gun and said,
According to Tekoh, this outburst left him "shaking" and triggered flashbacks to his experiences with police brutality in Cameroon, where he was from.
Deputy Vega then grabbed a pen and paper, put them in front of Tekoh, and told him to "write what the patient said [he] did." When Tekoh hesitated, Vega put his hand on his gun and said he was not joking. According to Tekoh, Vega then dictated the content of the written confession and Tekoh, who was scared and "ready to write whatever [Vega] wanted," acquiesced and wrote the statement down.
Deputy Vega testified to a much different version of events. According to Vega, when he first arrived at the MRI section, he asked Tekoh what had happened with the patient, and Tekoh said, "I made a mistake." Tekoh asked if he could "talk to [Vega] away from [his] co-workers and get a little privacy."
After the two went into the MRI reading room, Vega handed Tekoh a sheet of paper and said, "Can you write what happened while I get my sergeant and we can ask you a couple of questions[?]" According to Vega, Tekoh then wrote out the confession himself without further prompting.
Another officer, Sergeant Stangeland, arrived soon after, joining Deputy Vega in the room with Tekoh. According to Stangeland, Tekoh indicated that he was willing to talk to the officers. Deputy Vega then questioned Tekoh in "a very conversational tone," and Tekoh verbally admitted to touching the patient's vagina. Sergeant Stangeland testified that Tekoh's demeanor was "that of a man who was contrite, who truly, you know, regretted what he had done."
Tekoh was arrested and charged in California state court with unlawful sexual penetration in violation of California Penal Code § 289(d). Early on in Tekoh's first criminal trial (before his confession was introduced), a witness for the prosecution revealed evidence that had not been disclosed to the defense, and, with Tekoh's assent, a mistrial was declared. During Tekoh's retrial, the prosecution introduced Tekoh's confession as evidence of his guilt. Also during the retrial, Dr. Iris Blandon-Gitlin, an expert on coerced confessions, testified on Tekoh's behalf. The jury returned a verdict of not guilty.
After his acquittal on the criminal charge, Tekoh filed this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 seeking damages for alleged violations of his constitutional rights. The case began with several claims against multiple defendants, but only one is at issue in this appeal: the claim that Deputy Vega violated Tekoh's Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination.
Before the first trial in this case, Tekoh asked the district court to instruct the jury that it should find in his favor on the Fifth Amendment claim if it determined that Deputy Vega obtained statements from him in violation of Miranda that were used in the criminal case against him. And because the only issue in dispute on this theory was whether Tekoh was "in custody" during the questioning in the MRI reading room such that Miranda warnings were required, Tekoh submitted a proposed jury instruction that would have informed jurors of factors to consider on that point. See Oregon v. Mathiason , 429 U.S. 492, 495, 97 S.Ct. 711, 50 L.Ed.2d 714 (1977) (per curiam) ().
The district court refused to instruct the jury on Tekoh's theory, reasoning that the Supreme Court's plurality decision in Chavez v. Martinez , 538 U.S. 760, 123 S.Ct. 1994, 155 L.Ed.2d 984 (2003), held that Miranda was a mere "prophylactic rule," rather than a "constitutional requirement," and that a § 1983 plaintiff like Tekoh "[could not] use a prophylactic rule to create a constitutional right." Instead, the district court instructed the jury to evaluate Tekoh's claim that Deputy Vega had coerced a confession as if it were a Fourteenth Amendment claim based on fabrication of evidence.1 So instructed, the jury returned a verdict in favor of Deputy Vega.
After the trial, however, the district court concluded that it had erred by instructing the jury to evaluate Tekoh's claim as if it were brought under the Fourteenth Amendment instead of as a violation of the Fifth Amendment. See Hall v. City of Los Angeles , 697 F.3d 1059, 1068–69 (9th Cir. 2012) (). It therefore ordered a new trial on the coerced confession claim.
The jury instructions were again contested. Ultimately, the district court gave the jury the following instruction on coerced confessions:
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