Telegraph Herald, Inc. v. City of Dubuque

• Decision Date: 15 October 1980
• Docket Number: No. 64279,64279
• Citation: 297 N.W.2d 529
• Parties: TELEGRAPH HERALD, INC., Appellant, v. CITY OF DUBUQUE, Iowa, and City Council, consisting of Richard Wertzberger, James Brady, Thomas Tully, D. Michael King, and Sister Carolyn Farrell, Appellees.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

Page 529

297 N.W.2d 529

TELEGRAPH HERALD, INC., Appellant, v. CITY OF DUBUQUE, Iowa, and City Council, consisting of Richard Wertzberger, James Brady, Thomas Tully, D. Michael King, and Sister Carolyn Farrell, Appellees.

No. 64279.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

Oct. 15, 1980.

Rehearing Denied Nov. 6, 1980.

Allan J. Carew of Fuerste, Carew, Coyle, Juergens and Sudmeier, Dubuque, for appellant.

Barry A. Lindahl, City Sol., Dubuque, for appellees.

Considered en banc.

REYNOLDSON, Chief Justice.

This appeal arises out of the same circumstances we addressed in a related opinion filed today, City of Dubuque v. Telegraph Herald, Inc., 297 N.W.2d 523 (Iowa 1980). The issues here involve the Herald's attempts to secure information about applicants for the position of Dubuque city manager through Iowa's open meetings law, chapter 28A, The Code 1979.

Plaintiff newspaper has appealed, and defendants city and council members have cross-appealed, from trial court's rulings in the Herald's suit alleging violations of chapter 28A. We affirm on plaintiff's appeal, affirm in part and reverse in part on defendants' cross-appeal, and remand with directions.

July 10, 1979, plaintiff Telegraph Herald, Inc., publisher of a Dubuque newspaper, brought a section 28A.6 law action against the city of Dubuque and the individual council members, seeking judicial enforcement of chapter 28A, The Code 1979. The petition alleged that in interviewing and selecting candidates for the position of city manager the council held meetings and closed sessions in violation of the open meetings law. The Herald prayed that the court determine the city had acted illegally, order payment of costs and attorney fees, and enjoin defendants from future chapter 28A violations for one year.

October 25, 1979, the cause came on for trial. The evidence disclosed that the council members and mayor agreed informally, in open meeting, that if some applicants requested confidentiality all applications would be considered in closed session, otherwise all would be considered in open session.

As a result of advertisements approximately forty-one applications were received. Five applicants requested confidentiality despite a warning in the advertisement that the applications were subject to the open meetings law. A later survey conducted by the city after this suit was commenced revealed approximately thirteen applicants objected to release of their names.

The evidence shows the council went into closed sessions at several meetings in May, June and July of 1979 to consider and screen these applicants. When the field of candidates had been narrowed to seven, city council members, usually individually but on at least four occasions in pairs, interviewed the finalists personally at various times and places. Council member Farrell testified council members were more likely to become acquainted with an applicant in that type of setting. She further testified the council members did not wish to violate the open meetings law and that corporate counsel had advised the council such "one-on-one" interviews would not violate chapter 28A provisions.

During trial the Herald sought to introduce into evidence tape recordings of the closed sessions to determine whether the council legally closed the sessions to discuss matters that might cause irreparable damage to some persons, or merely to discuss qualifications, which would not justify such action. Defendants objected on relevancy grounds, asserting the substance of the closed session was not at issue; rather, the issue was whether they legally could go into closed session to screen applicants. Trial court eventually sustained the objection and ordered the envelope containing the tape sealed.

Trial court filed its ruling October 26, 1979. It held the interviews conducted between final candidates and individual council members did not constitute "meetings" as defined in section 28A.2(2) because less than a majority of the council were present. It held the executive (closed) sessions occurring May 16 and 22, June 12 and 18, and July 6, 9 and 11 were all held contrary to one or more chapter 28A requirements, including reference to a specific exemption for closing the meeting, section 28A.5(2); taking final action in open session, section 28A.5(3); and obtaining an affirmative closure vote of two-thirds of the members or, alternatively, of all the members present at the meeting, section 28A.5(1).

Costs, including attorney fees and expenses totaling $3,257.13, were taxed to the city. Contrary to Dubuque's contention, the taxed fees were not prorated and confined to those incurred with respect to the issue upon which the Herald had been successful. Council members were enjoined "from any further violations of Chapter 28A ... from October 26, 1979 to October 25, 1980." Trial court overruled the Herald's Motion for Enlargement of Findings and Amendment of Decree, designed to secure a holding that the tapes and minutes of the illegally closed council sessions were public records.

The Herald contends on appeal that trial court should have (1) ruled the interviews with applicants, conducted by one or two city council members at a time, were "meetings" subject to chapter 28A provisions, (2) found that the closed sessions of the city council violated chapter 28A on four grounds in addition to those found, (3) held the minutes and tapes of the illegally closed council sessions were public records, and (4) admitted these minutes and tapes into evidence. Finally, the Herald requests that it be awarded costs and attorney fees on this appeal.

Dubuque and the council members assert on cross-appeal that because the Herald was only partially successful in establishing chapter 28A violations, costs and attorney fees should not have been awarded for the entire case.

I. Were the applicant interviews, conducted by one or two city council members, "meetings" under chapter 28A provisions?

Trial court ruled the above-described "one-on-one" interviews with applicants did not constitute section 28A.2(2) "meetings" because less than the majority of the council were present at each interview. The Herald contends the statutory definition of "meeting" is ambiguous. It suggests various alternative constructions in an attempt to establish that the legislature could not have intended the instant interviews to fall outside the statutory definition.

Section 28A.2(2) provides:

"Meeting" means a gathering in person or by electronic means, formal or informal, of a majority of the members of a governmental body where there is deliberation or action upon any matter within the scope of the governmental body's policy-making duties. Meetings shall not include a gathering of members of a governmental body for purely ministerial or social purposes when there is no discussion of policy or no intent to avoid the purposes of this chapter.

In construing this statute we take note of the legislative intention expressed in section 28A.1 that "(a)mbiguity in the construction or application of this chapter should be resolved in favor of openness." See Greene v. Athletic Council of Iowa State University, 251 N.W.2d 559, 560 (Iowa 1977); Annot., 38 A.L.R.3d 1070, 1073 (1971). However, a statute must be read as a whole and given its plain and obvious meaning, a sensible and logical construction. Hamilton v. City of Urbandale, 291 N.W.2d 15, 17 (Iowa 1980) (citing cases). We seek to avoid interpretations that would produce strained, impractical or absurd results. Id. at 19 (citing Loras College v. Iowa Civil Rights Commission, 285 N.W.2d 143, 147 (Iowa 1979)).

It is obvious that the legislature's definition of "meeting" is confined to the first sentence of section 28A.2(2). It requires a gathering (in person or by electronic means) of a majority of the members of a governmental body. It also requires deliberation or action upon a matter within the scope of the body's policy-making duties. Thus, this definition is applicable whenever the term "meeting" is used in chapter 28A, including the second sentence of section 28A.2(2). ¹ In our view, the second sentence of section 28A.2(2), quoted above, merely reaffirms the right of a majority of a governmental body's members to meet for a purely ministerial function, or in a social setting (as is often the case in a small community), without being required to follow chapter 28A provisions, so long as there is no discussion of policy and no intent to avoid the purposes of the act. See City of Miami Beach v. Berns, 245 So.2d 38, 41 (Fla.1971).

The Herald, centering upon the section 28A.2(2) clause "or no intent to avoid the purposes of this chapter," argues the individual interviews were "meetings" because the council intended to evade the act. A threshold difficulty with this position is that the proof fails to establish this was the council's "intention."

The "sunshine laws" are creatures of recent statutes unknown to the common law. Knight v. Iowa District Court, 269 N.W.2d 430, 433 (Iowa 1978). Because the statute does not specify whether actions to enforce chapter 28A are ordinary or equitable, this case should have been, and was, brought and tried as an ordinary action. See In re Oseing, 296 N.W.2d 797, 800 (Iowa 1980). It follows that trial court's findings are binding here if supported by substantial evidence. Iowa R.App.P. 14(f)(1).

Trial court did not find an intent to violate the act. It concluded the council members were, at all times, acting reasonably on their corporation counsel's advice. There obviously is a difference between an intention to violate chapter 28A and a good-faith reliance on corporate counsel's opinion that the provisions of chapter 28A are not implicated in a proposed course of action. See also § 28A.6(3)(a)(3) (reasonable reliance on corporate counsel) and § 28A.6(4) (ignorance of legal requirements no defense to enforcement proceeding). This case does not require us to interpret further the...