Tell v. Trustees of Dartmouth College, 97-2098
| Court | United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (1st Circuit) |
| Writing for the Court | Before TORRUELLA, Chief Judge, BOUDIN and LYNCH; BOUDIN |
| Citation | 145 F.3d 417 |
| Parties | 127 Ed. Law Rep. 48 William K. TELL, et al., Plaintiffs, Appellants, v. TRUSTEES OF DARTMOUTH COLLEGE, Defendant, Appellee. . Heard |
| Docket Number | No. 97-2098,97-2098 |
| Decision Date | 06 February 1998 |
Page 417
v.
TRUSTEES OF DARTMOUTH COLLEGE, Defendant, Appellee.
First Circuit.
Decided May 29, 1998.
W. Wright Danenbarger with whom Thomas W. Aylesworth and Wiggin & Nourie, P.A. were on brief, for appellants.
Page 418
Sean M. Gorman, Associate College Counsel, Dartmouth College, for appellee.
Before TORRUELLA, Chief Judge, BOUDIN and LYNCH, Circuit Judges.
BOUDIN, Circuit Judge.
This suit was brought in the federal district court by William Tell and six other alumni of Dartmouth College against the Trustees of Dartmouth College (the corporate name of Dartmouth College). Appellants claimed to represent Dartmouth's alumni as a class and challenged certain changes in the arrangements for the election of trustees. The district court dismissed the case for lack of an indispensable party, and this appeal followed.
Because the district court did not reach the merits, a condensed version of the dispute will suffice. Under an 1891 understanding between Dartmouth and its alumni--which appellants claim to have been a contract--the alumni effectively choose a certain number of the trustees; the Dartmouth College Alumni Association, an unincorporated association comprising all Dartmouth alumni, conducts an election if there is any contest among nominees. Prior to 1990, this process was used to fill both a trustee's initial term and any subsequent terms.
In or about 1990, Dartmouth's Board of Trustees and the Alumni Association modified this arrangement in one respect: it was agreed that the Board of Trustees would have the power to reseat a trustee, originally chosen by the alumni, for an additional term without obtaining the alumni's further approval. The Alumni Association amended its constitution in September 1990 to reflect this change. Some of the alumni, of whom the appellants are examples, fiercely oppose the change as a surrender of the alumni's power.
Appellants brought suit in state court, arguing that the change in the Alumni Association's constitution was unlawful. The case was dismissed, and the appeal was declined by the New Hampshire Supreme Court. Appellants then brought the present suit against the Trustees in federal district court. The suit alleges that the Board of Trustees violated its fiduciary duties and its contractual obligations under the 1891 agreement by modifying alumni rights as to the election of trustees. There were additional claims of breach of fiduciary duty largely ancillary to the main challenge.
On motion by the Board of Trustees, the district court dismissed the case, without prejudice, under Fed.R.Civ.P. 19. It held that the Alumni Association was a necessary party under Rule 19(a); that it could not be joined without undermining diversity (the original basis for federal jurisdiction); and that without the Alumni Association, the action could not proceed "in equity and good conscience ... among the parties before [the court]" and should therefore be dismissed, "the absent person being thus regarded as indispensable." Fed.R.Civ.P. 19(b).
There is apparently some difference among the circuits as to standard of review of decisions as to necessary joinder under Rule 19(a). Compare, e.g., Keweenaw Bay Indian Community v. Michigan, 11 F.3d 1341, 1346 (6th Cir.1993), with Hellebust v. Brownback, 42 F.3d 1331, 1335 (10th Cir.1994). Normally, abstract issues of law are reviewed de novo, and judicial findings of fact for clear error. See Sacramona v. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 106 F.3d 444, 446 (1st Cir.1997). The dispute, if any, is usually about the extent to which the reviewing court should defer to the district judge's...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Perrier-Bilbo v. United States, 18-2085
...judgment issued.'" (quoting ACA Fin. Guar. Corp. v. Advest, Inc., 512 F.3d 46, 55 (1st Cir. 2008) )); Tell v. Trs. of Dartmouth Coll., 145 F.3d 417, 419-20 (1st Cir. 1998) (finding that a new theory raised in a motion for reconsideration had been waived because it "should have been proffere......
-
Daynard v. Ness, Motley, Loadholt, Rich. & Poole, CIV.A.01-10099-WGY.
...inclined to apply an abuse of discretion standard to such application-of-law decisions under Rule 19(a)." Tell v. Trs. of Dartmouth Coll., 145 F.3d 417, 418-19 (1st As the moving party, the South Carolina defendants bear the burden of showing why the Mississippi defendants are indispensable......
-
Massachusetts v. Wampanoag Tribe of Gay Head, Civil Action No. 13–13286–FDS.
...bears on whether the absent party's interest will be impaired by its absence from the litigation.” Tell v. Trustees of Dartmouth College, 145 F.3d 417, 419 (1998). However, “without a perfect identi[t]y of interests, a court must be very cautious in concluding that a litigant will serve as ......
-
Pennsylvania v. Think Fin., Inc., CIVIL ACTION NO. 14-cv-7139
...The First Circuit indicates that there should be something close to a "perfect identity of interests." Tell v. Trs. of Dartmouth Coll., 145 F.3d 417, 419 (1st Cir. 1998). The Ninth Circuit employs a three-factor test. See Shermoen v. U.S., 982 F.2d 1312, 1318 (9th Cir. 1992). The Sixth Circ......