Telles v. City of El Paso, EP-03-CV-0528-KC.
| Decision Date | 08 March 2007 |
| Docket Number | No. EP-03-CV-0528-KC.,EP-03-CV-0528-KC. |
| Parties | Jacob TELLES, Plaintiff, v. The CITY OF EL PASO, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Texas |
Sam Snoddy, Law Office, El Paso, TX, for Plaintiff.
Jennifer F. Callan, El Paso City Attorney's Office, Mark David Pierce, Office of Mark D. Pierce, Duane A. Baker, Gary B. Weiser, Attorney at Law, John David Gates, Eduardo Miranda, Annabell Perez, El Paso, TX, for Defendants.
On this day, the Court considered Defendants County of El Paso's and District Attorney Jaime Esparza's Motion for Summary Judgment, Defendant City of El Paso's Motion for Summary Judgment, and Defendant Police Chief Carlos Leon's Motion for Summary. Judgment. For the reasons set forth herein, the County's, Jaime Esparza's, the City's, and Carlos Leon's Motions are GRANTED. Trial will be set by separate order of this Court for the claims against the individual police officers, who have no active motion for summary judgment in this matter.
As an initial matter, the Court notes that the County of El Paso's Proposed Undisputed Facts are irrelevant to the instant case. It appears that the County merely recycled the Proposed Undisputed Facts from the case of Terrell v. City of El Paso, No. EP-06-cv-0042, and changed the name of the plaintiff in the caption of the case only. Within the Proposed Undisputed Facts, the County refers only to Terrell, failing to so much as mention Telles. Therefore, the Court has ignored this document and relied upon the proposed undisputed facts filed by the other parties to develop this background section.
Plaintiff Jacob Telles ("Telles") filed this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 seeking damages against a number of individual police officers, Police Chief Carlos Leon ("Leon"), the City of El Paso ("City"), the County of El Paso ("County"), and District Attorney Jaime Esparza ("Esparza"), for violating his rights under the First, Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments as well as for violations of Texas law. He also appears to seeks damages under Texas state law for battery, assault, malicious prosecution, false arrest and imprisonment, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and conspiracy. Telles alleges that all Defendants violated his right to be free from the use of excessive force and unreasonable seizure and his right to due process. He also complains of deliberate indifference by the City, Esparza, and the County to his civil rights in failing to instruct and supervise the police officers and the Assistant District Attorney's involved in this matter.
On December 26, 2001, James Terrell and a number other individuals were attending a Christmas party at the residence of Jacob Telles ("Telles") located at 5925 Via Norte, El Paso, Texas. Starting at approximately 1:48 a.m., various police officers arrived at or near Telles' residence in response to a dispatch indicating that there was a call from a neighbor complaining about a disturbance in the street. The parties dispute whether the police officers were dispatched to or actually arrived at the Telles' residence or instead arrived at a different but nearby address.
Upon arriving at Via Norte, the police officers claim they first approached and searched an individual named Billy Porter. According to the police officers, during this search of Billy Porter, Telles, allegedly intoxicated, approached the police officers in a belligerent and argumentative manner and then, in the course of a discussion, gave the officers permission to enter his residence to check for narcotics and weapons. While holding Telles outside, the officers entered the house and encountered several occupants, some of whom were intoxicated. After, securing the house, the officers brought Telles back into his home.
Upon his re-entry into the home, Telles became more aggressive towards the officers and was observed placing himself in a fighting stance as he approached the officers. Telles refused to comply with the officers' orders that he calm down and stand back. Soon after, Telles charged at one of the officers as if he was going to assault him and continued to ignore the orders of the police. At this point, the officers sprayed Telles with OC "pepper" spray for safety reasons. As one of the officers was placing Telles in custody, Telles struck an officer in the torso. Telles was then arrested for assault and placed inside the patrol car outside. At this point, Telles then began to repeatedly strike the car window. When told to stop this behavior, Telles was able to push open the patrol car door and flee from the vehicle. Telles was chased on foot and apprehended.
Telles was first transported to Thomason hospital by ambulance where he was treated for injuries, which included a wound to the face sustained during his encounter with the officers. Soon after, he was transported to the El Paso Detention Center where he was booked.
Shortly following Telles' arrest, a report regarding the circumstances of the arrest was sent to and reviewed by an assistant district attorney who was on duty, pursuant to the District Attorney's Information Management System ("DIMS"). DIMS has been described as a 24-hour screening process whereby the El Paso District Attorney's office reviews the facts of an arrest with information from the arresting officers and then makes a real-time decision whether to accept or decline a case. That office also sets bond pursuant to a bond schedule approved by the El Paso County Council of Judges.
In the present matter, according to defendants, the DIMS assistant district attorney accepted the case against Telles, recommended a bond of $3,000 pursuant to the bond schedule, and ultimately released Telles after he posted bond later that day.
Telles, along with other witnesses including Terrell, provide a different account of certain portions of the incident. According to Telles, there was no disturbance in the street and the police officers arrived at an address not provided in the dispatch. He claims that he never gave verbal or written permission for the officers to enter his home, despite Officer Mark Telles' contention otherwise. Telles further explains that the police officers were rude and aggressive from the time of their arrival on the scene through the time he was taken to the police station. For example, Telles alleges that he was not aggressive or belligerent towards the officers and denies being intoxicated. He claims that after going back into his home, the officers inside shoved him into the bathroom, slammed his head into the porcelain sink, and sprayed him with pepper spray. After his arrest for assaulting the officer, Telles denies ever striking the patrol car window in an effort to break the window and he denies ever escaping or attempting to escape from the patrol car.
On October 1, 2004, this Court denied Telles' Motion to Recuse as well as his Motion for Declaratory Judgment without prejudice to refiling in compliance with the Court's Standing Orders. On October 8, 2004, Telles filed his Notice of Appeal and on January 25, 2006, the Court of Appeals dismissed Telles' appeal of the motion for declaratory judgment based upon a lack of appellate jurisdiction. They also affirmed this Court's denial of Telles' Motion to Recuse.
A summary judgment movant must show by affidavit or other evidence that there is no genuine issue regarding any material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). To establish that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, the movant must either submit evidence that negates the existence of some material element of the nonmoving party's claim or defense, or, if the crucial issue is one for which the nonmoving party will bear the burden of proof at trial, merely point out that the evidence, in the record is insufficient to support an essential element of the nonmovant's claim or defense. Lavespere v. Niagara Machine & Tool Works, Inc., 910 F.2d 167, 178 (5th Cir.1990). Once the movant carries the initial burden, the burden shifts to the nonmovant to show that summary judgment is inappropriate. See Fields v. City of S. Houston, 922 F.2d 1183, 1187 (5th Cir.1991).
Summary judgment is required if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. FED.R.CIV.P. 56(c); Celotex. Corp., 477 U.S. at 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548. In, order for a court to conclude that there are no genuine issues of material fact, the court must be satisfied that no reasonable trier of fact could have found for the nonmovant, or, in other words, that the evidence favoring the nonmovant is insufficient to enable a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the nonmovant. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 n. 4, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).
The arguments of Telles' attorney, in both his Amended Complaint and Response, are incoherent, disorganized, and nearly indiscernible. The County's Motion is similarly, disorganized and provides only a flimsy, discussion of applicable law, failing to address even the basic elements of the various sorts of § 1983 claims that Telles appears to allege. It is into this murky realm that the Court must enter to sort out questions regarding the constitutionality of the DIMS program. Given the state of the pleadings, the Court has limited its opinion only to the arguments that it has been able to discern from the filings and rules only on the County's and Esparza's Motions for Summary Judgment under the specific facts of this case.
In his Motion, Esparza argues that he is shielded by both qualified immunity...
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Swain v. Hutson
...portion of his due process claim against Corporal Hutson and Officer DeWall in their personal capacities. See Telles v. City of El Paso, 481 F. Supp. 2d 773, 779 (W.D. Tex. 2007) (affirming the finding of qualified immunity because the arrestee was released on bail on the day of his arrest ......