Tellez v. Superior Court of Riverside Cnty., E074244

• Court: California Court of Appeals
• Writing for the Court: MENETREZ, J.
• Citation: 270 Cal.Rptr.3d 418,56 Cal.App.5th 439
• Parties: Jeremy TELLEZ, Petitioner, v. The SUPERIOR COURT OF RIVERSIDE COUNTY, Respondent; The People, Real Party in Interest.
• Docket Number: E074244
• Decision Date: 23 October 2020

56 Cal.App.5th 439
270 Cal.Rptr.3d 418

Jeremy TELLEZ, Petitioner,
v.
The SUPERIOR COURT OF RIVERSIDE COUNTY, Respondent;

The People, Real Party in Interest.

E074244

Court of Appeal, Fourth District, Division 2, California.

Filed October 23, 2020

Steven L. Harmon, Public Defender, Andrea A. Rathburn and Jason M. Cox, Deputy Public Defenders, for Petitioner.

No appearance for Respondent.

Michael A. Hestrin, District Attorney and Christopher C. Crall, Deputy District Attorney for Real Party In Interest.

OPINION

MENETREZ, J.

56 Cal.App.5th 442

Penal Code section 1001.36 authorizes trial courts to grant pretrial diversion to defendants who suffer from mental disorders.

270 Cal.Rptr.3d 419

( Pen. Code, § 1001.36, subd. (a).) At the same time, Vehicle Code section 23640 prohibits pretrial diversion in any case charging a driving under the influence (DUI) offense. ( Veh. Code, § 23640, subd. (a).) Jeremy Tellez was charged with DUI offenses and sought pretrial mental health diversion. In this mandate proceeding, we must decide which of the two statutes prevails— Vehicle Code section 23640 or Penal Code section 1001.36. Like the trial court, we conclude that Vehicle Code section 23640 prevails and bars pretrial mental health diversion for defendants charged with DUI offenses. We therefore deny Tellez's petition for a writ of mandate.

BACKGROUND

In a felony complaint, the People charged Tellez with one count of DUI and causing injury ( Veh. Code, § 23153, subd. (a) ), one count of DUI with a blood-alcohol content of 0.08 percent or more and causing injury ( id. , § 23153, subd. (b) ), one count of driving under the combined influence of any alcoholic beverage and drug and causing injury ( id. , § 23153, subd. (g) ), and one count of hit-and-run driving causing injury (id. , § 20001, subd. (a)). The complaint included enhancement allegations for personally inflicting great bodily injury ( Pen. Code, § 12022.7, subd. (a) ) and driving with a blood-alcohol content of 0.15 percent or more ( Veh. Code, § 23578 ). The complaint also alleged that Tellez had suffered two prior strike convictions and two prior serious felony convictions.

Tellez moved for pretrial mental health diversion under Penal Code section 1001.36. The court denied the motion, ruling that DUI offenses are categorically ineligible for mental health diversion. Tellez moved for reconsideration, and the court also denied that motion.

56 Cal.App.5th 443

Tellez then filed the instant petition requesting that we issue a peremptory writ of mandate and/or prohibition directing the superior court to vacate its ruling that Tellez is ineligible for mental health diversion. We issued an order to show cause and stayed proceedings in the trial court.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The sole issue in this case requires us to construe several statutes. Statutory construction is a question of law that we decide de novo. ( People v. Morrison (2019) 34 Cal.App.5th 980, 989, 246 Cal.Rptr.3d 734.)

DISCUSSION

Vehicle Code section 23640 bars diversion in DUI cases. ( People v. Weatherill (1989) 215 Cal.App.3d 1569, 1572, 264 Cal.Rptr. 298 [discussing Veh. Code, former § 23202, the predecessor to § 23640 ].) The statute has been the law since 1981.¹ ( People v. Duncan (1990) 216 Cal.App.3d 1621, 1628, 265 Cal.Rptr. 612.) In relevant part, it states that "[i]n any case in which a person is charged with" violating Vehicle Code section 23152 (for DUI) or 23153 (for DUI causing bodily injury), the court shall not suspend, stay, or dismiss the proceedings "for the purpose of allowing the accused person to attend or participate ... in any one or more education, training, or treatment programs." ( Veh. Code, § 23640, subd. (a).)

Penal Code section 1001.36, enacted in 2018, authorizes trial courts to grant pretrial diversion to defendants suffering from qualifying mental disorders. (

270 Cal.Rptr.3d 420

People v. McShane (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 245, 259, 248 Cal.Rptr.3d 322.) It states that "[o]n an accusatory pleading alleging the commission of a misdemeanor or felony offense, the court may ... grant pretrial diversion to a defendant" if six "minimum requirements of eligibility" are met.² ( Pen. Code, § 1001.36, subds. (a), (b)(3).) Under section 1001.36, the only defendants expressly

56 Cal.App.5th 444

disqualified from mental health diversion are those charged with murder, voluntary manslaughter, rape, certain other sex offenses, or using weapons of mass destruction. ( Id. , § 1001.36, subd. (b)(2).) Section 1001.36 does not expressly disqualify defendants charged with DUI offenses.

Both statutes are unambiguous in their plain language: One clearly prohibits diversion for defendants charged with DUI offenses, and the other just as clearly allows mental health diversion for any defendant who meets the minimum eligibility requirements (and who is not charged with a disqualifying offense). When it comes to DUI offenses, Vehicle Code section 23640 prohibits a court from doing what Penal Code section 1001.36 permits. The two "statutes are in conflict and thus one must be interpreted as providing an exception to the other." ( State Dept. of Public Health v. Superior Court (2015) 60 Cal.4th 940, 956, 184 Cal.Rptr.3d 60, 342 P.3d 1217.) The question is which one. Is Vehicle Code section 23640 an exception to Penal Code section 1001.36 ? Or is Penal Code section 1001.36 an exception to Vehicle Code section 23640 ?

The fundamental goal of construing statutes is to effectuate the intent of the Legislature. ( Mays v. City of Los Angeles (2008) 43 Cal.4th 313, 321, 74 Cal.Rptr.3d 891, 180 P.3d 935.) Courts may rely on canons of construction to reconcile conflicting statutes ( State Dept. of Public Health v. Superior Court, supra , 60 Cal.4th at p. 960, 184 Cal.Rptr.3d 60, 342 P.3d 1217 ), but legislative history is another well-established tool for ascertaining legislative intent and harmonizing statutes. ( Mejia v. Reed (2003) 31 Cal.4th 657, 663, 3 Cal.Rptr.3d 390, 74 P.3d 166 [holding that courts may look to legislative history to harmonize two statutes]; People v. Chenze (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 521, 526-527, 118 Cal.Rptr.2d 362 [using legislative history to harmonize two statutes]; Lewis v. Ryan (1976) 64 Cal.App.3d 330, 334, 134 Cal.Rptr. 355 [holding that legislative history controls over canons of statutory construction where the history provides clues to legislative intent].)

In this case, the legislative history answers the question at hand: Vehicle Code section 23640 is an exception to Penal Code section 1001.36. DUI offenses are therefore categorically ineligible for mental health diversion. To understand the dispositive effect of the legislative history, we must begin not with mental health diversion, but with a similar program—military diversion. We then address the legislative history of mental health diversion.

I. Penal Code Section 1001.80 : Military Diversion

Penal Code section 1001.80 created a diversion program for current and former members of the military. Specifically, the

270 Cal.Rptr.3d 421

statute authorizes the court to grant pretrial diversion in misdemeanor cases if (1) the defendant was or is

56 Cal.App.5th 445

a member of the military, and (2) the defendant is suffering from sexual trauma, traumatic brain injury, posttraumatic stress disorder, substance abuse, or mental health problems as a result of military service. ( Pen. Code, § 1001.80, subds. (a), (b).) The Legislature enacted the military diversion statute in September 2014. ( VanVleck, supra , 2 Cal.App.5th at p. 362, 205 Cal.Rptr.3d 839.)

As originally enacted, the military diversion statute did not expressly address Vehicle Code section 23640. (Stats. 2014, ch. 658, § 1.) It was thus unclear whether defendants charged with DUI offenses were eligible for military diversion. The appellate courts split on the issue. (See VanVleck, supra , 2 Cal.App.5th at p. 358, 205 Cal.Rptr.3d 839 [holding that Veh. Code, § 23640 rendered defendants charged with DUI offenses categorically ineligible for military diversion]; Hopkins, supra , 2 Cal.App.5th at p. 1279, 207 Cal.Rptr.3d 217 [holding that the military diversion statute prevailed and that Veh. Code, § 23640 did not bar military diversion].)

Our Supreme Court granted review of the issue. ( Hopkins, supra , 2 Cal.App.5th 1275, 207 Cal.Rptr.3d 217, review granted Nov. 16, 2016, S237734 [2016 Cal. Lexis 9420]; VanVleck, supra , 2 Cal.App.5th 355, 205 Cal.Rptr.3d 839, review granted Nov. 16, 2016, S237219 [2016 Cal. Lexis 9412].) Before the Supreme Court could resolve the split, the Legislature amended Penal Code section 1001.80 to clarify that military diversion is available to defendants charged with misdemeanor DUI offenses. ( Wade v. Superior Court (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 694, 711, 245 Cal.Rptr.3d 435 ; Hopkins , review dism. as moot, Oct. 18, 2017, S237734 [2017 Cal. Lexis 8220]; VanVleck , review dism. as moot, Nov. 15, 2017, S237219 [2017 Cal. Lexis...