Tempest v. State
| Decision Date | 13 July 2015 |
| Docket Number | C. A. PM 04-1896 |
| Parties | RAYMOND D. TEMPEST, JR. v. STATE OF RHODE ISLAND |
| Court | Rhode Island Superior Court |
Providence County Superior Court
For Plaintiff: Michael Kendall, Esq.; Matthew R. Turnell, Esq. Katherine Dyson, Esq.; Lauren E. Jones, Esq.; Betty Anne Waters, Esq.
For Defendant: Aaron L. Weisman, Esq.; Christopher Bush, Esq. Jeanine P. McConaghy, Esq.
DECISION
"The arc of the moral universe is long, but it bends towards justice."
- Martin Luther King, Jr.
Before the Court is the application of Raymond "Beaver" Tempest (Mr. Tempest) for postconviction relief, seeking to vacate his conviction. As this Court considers Mr Tempest's petition, it is mindful that this case has consumed the collective consciousness of northern Rhode Island-especially the City of Woonsocket-for the past thirty-three years. Emblematic of our state's compact size, this is a case about which many hold an opinion; everyone seems to know someone involved or something about the facts surrounding the tragic murder of Doreen Picard and the subsequent conviction of Mr. Tempest for that crime. Notwithstanding this widespread public interest, debate, and opinion, it is the Court's duty to undertake a detached and neutral analysis, conscientiously applying the law of the State of Rhode Island to the expansive factual record that has been developed by the parties.
On April 22, 1992, Mr. Tempest was found guilty of second degree murder for brutally beating Doreen Picard to death with a lead pipe ten years prior. Having maintained his innocence throughout incarceration, Mr. Tempest now contends that his conviction must be overturned in light of newly discovered evidence, governmental misconduct in violation of due process guarantees, ineffective assistance of counsel, as well as clear evidentiary support for his innocence. For the reasons discussed below, Mr. Tempest's petition is hereby granted. Jurisdiction is pursuant to G.L. 1956 §§ 10-9.1-1 et seq.
The following narrative offers a succinct glimpse into the crimes that transpired on February 19, 1982 and the events that unfolded thereafter. To present the entire saga of this case-with all of its baffling twists, turns, and seemingly incongruent particulars-would serve only to confound the reader and muddy the waters of a thirty-three year old case, the factual complexity of which stands unparalleled in the history of Rhode Island postconviction relief.[1]Other relevant details will be provided, where necessary, in the body of this Court's analysis.
At approximately 3:20 on the afternoon of February 19, 1982, fifteen-year-old Lisa Wells[2] (Lisa or Ms. Ladue) came home to the triple-decker apartment at 409 Providence Street in Woonsocket, Rhode Island. She checked the mail, walked around the exterior of the building, and entered the tenement home through the back door. (Trial Tr. 541:24-25, Apr. 1, 1992.) En route, according to her testimony at trial, she noticed an unfamiliar maroon car parked in the driveway. Id. at 541:4-13. When Lisa entered the building, she noticed three-year-old Nicole Laferte (Nicole) sobbing in the hallway, saying that her "mother was downstairs sick."[3] Id. at 542:2. Lisa brushed off Nicole's actions as a cry for attention "because [she] heard some moving around downstairs" and went up to her apartment. Id. at 542:3-4.
Mr. Heath arrived home from work ten minutes later and, like Lisa, entered the apartment building through the back. At the time he arrived, the driveway was empty. (Trial Tr. 147:20-22, Mar. 30, 1992.) When he walked in the rear hallway on the first floor, he saw Nicole, still crying, and "[s]tanding at the door to go down into the cellar." Id. at 148:16. Mr. Heath stopped and asked Nicole what was wrong. Nicole replied that her mother was downstairs, "lying down." Id. at 149:16.
When Mr. Heath descended the stairs into the basement, he was met with a grisly scene. As he stated at trial, "there was blood everywhere[;] . . . it was on everything[, ]. . . splattered . . . on the pipes[, ] . . . on the washer and the dryer [and] on the floor." Id. at 151:4-18. (Trial Tr. 138:25-139:3, Mar. 27, 1992.) Mr. Heath would later learn that this person was his upstairs neighbor, twenty-two-year-old Doreen Picard. Next, he looked around and saw Ms. Laferte on the left side of the basement, "lying face down in a pile of -- puddle of blood." Id. at 139:5-6.[4]Sensing the urgency of the situation, Mr. Heath ran upstairs to call the police to get help for the two women who had been so brutally attacked. Id. at 139:6-7. He also grabbed two towels, presumably hoping to render some first aid. Id. at 140:18. However, when Mr. Heath returned back to the cellar, he "just looked around" and realized "the towels w[ould]n't [be] of any help[.]" Id. at 140:20-22.
Due to the extent of the injuries sustained and the deluge of blood at the scene, first responders believed the attacks were the result of a shooting. It was only later, upon Ms. Laferte's admission to the hospital, that it was learned the wounds were the result of blunt force trauma. (Trial Tr. 193:13-18, Mar. 30, 1992.) Meanwhile, the crime scene was "never properly secured" or "cordoned off" while a swarm of officers packed into the basement. (Trial Tr. 2066:6-7, Apr. 20, 1992.) Nevertheless, the only person available to gather evidence was "totally unfamiliar with B.C.I.[5] procedures and the handling of the evidence." Id. at 2066:13-14. Midway through the night, the police captain arrived, having "spent several hours in a bar" before taking the reins in directing the processing of the scene. Id. at 2068:7.
The investigation at 409 Providence Street was conceded to be "a disaster" by the State. Id. at 2065:5-6. Assistant Attorney General James Ryan (Mr. Ryan) stated at trial that the severe lack of physical evidence was due to the fact that "the job [i.e. the necessary investigatory procedures] didn't get done" and that "[e]very police officer from the Woonsocket Police Department seems to have been there except for the ones who should have been there." Id. at 2066:20-23. Noting the "chaos" and "disorder" surrounding the collection of evidence, Mr. Ryan went on to say that "the end result[] is that the crime scene was contaminated." Id. at 2067:14-17. Nevertheless, four days after the murder, the police were able to locate a lead pipe that Mr. Ryan would later identify as the murder weapon at trial. Despite the efforts of the Woonsocket Police Department, for nine long years no one was charged in connection with this heinous act until, on June 5, 1991, a Grand Jury indicted Mr. Tempest for the murder of Doreen Picard.
Then, in April 1992, he was put on trial. The State put forward a parade of witnesses- Ronald Vaz, John Guarino, Donna Carrier, and Loretta Rivard-each claiming that Mr. Tempest had confessed to Doreen Picard's murder in his or her presence years earlier. In spite of a dearth of physical evidence tying Mr. Tempest to the scene and at least partial impeachment of these inculpatory witnesses, Mr. Tempest was found guilty. His conviction was affirmed by our Supreme Court on January 11, 1995. State v. Tempest, 651 A.2d 1198 (R.I. 1995). Twenty years later, the Court now considers Mr. Tempest's petition for postconviction relief.
Standard of Review
In pursuing such claims, a petitioner "bears the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that he is entitled to postconviction relief." Burke v. State, 925 A.2d 890, 893 (R.I. 2007) (citing Larngar v. Wall, 918 A.2d 850, 855 (R.I. 2007)). The proceedings for such relief are "civil in nature." Ouimette v. Moran, 541 A.2d 855, 856 (R.I. 1988) (citing State v. Tassone, 417 A.2d 323 (R.I. 1980)). In accordance with the statute, "[t]he court shall make specific findings of fact, and state expressly its conclusions of law, relating to each issue presented." Sec. 10-9.1-7.
Before diving headlong into the substance of Mr. Tempest's claims, the Court must first address the threshold matter of the State's affirmative defense, which it claims is a complete bar to the instant action. The State asserts the equitable doctrine of laches, claiming that Mr. Tempest's twenty-year slumber before bringing this petition bars any path to relief. [6]
The doctrine of laches is embodied in the maxim that "those who sleep on their rights must awaken to the consequence that they have disappeared." Jackson v. Thomson, 53 A. 506 (Pa. 1902). In Raso v. Wall, our Supreme Court held that laches is applicable in the context of...
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