Tempest v. State, 2015–257–M.P.

Decision Date14 July 2016
Docket NumberNo. 2015–257–M.P.,2015–257–M.P.
Citation141 A.3d 677
PartiesRaymond D. TEMPEST, Jr. v. STATE of Rhode Island.
CourtRhode Island Supreme Court

Michael Kendall, Pro Hac Vice, Lauren E. Jones, Esq., Matthew R. Turnell, Pro Hac Vice, Katherine Dyson, Pro Hac Vice, Betty Ann Waters, Esq., for Plaintiff.

Aaron L. Weisman, Department of Attorney General, for State.

Present: SUTTELL, C.J., GOLDBERG, FLAHERTY, ROBINSON, and INDEGLIA, JJ.

OPINION

Justice INDEGLIA

, for the Court.

On July 13, 2015, the Providence County Superior Court vacated the conviction of Raymond “Beaver” Tempest Jr. (Tempest) for the 1982 homicide of Doreen Picard (Picard). On September 22, 2015, this Court granted the state's petition for a writ of certiorari. Before us, the state argues that the Superior Court erred in vacating Tempest's conviction on the basis of two Brady1 violations founded on the state's suppression of favorable evidence and a due process violation based on improper witness coaching by the Woonsocket Police Department. After careful review of the record and of the parties' written submissions and oral arguments, we affirm the judgment of the Superior Court and quash the writ of certiorari heretofore issued.

IFacts and Travel

The facts of this case are altogether tragic, and the travel is anything but lackluster. We recite only those facts that are relevant to the instant appeal, and so invite the reader to consult our opinion in State v. Tempest, 651 A.2d 1198 (R.I.1995)

for a more detailed discussion.

On February 19, 1982, at approximately 3:20 p.m., fifteen-year-old Lisa LaDue (LaDue)2 came home to the triple-decker apartment at 409 Providence Street in Woonsocket, Rhode Island, which she lived in with her mother and step-father, Douglas Heath (Heath). LaDue testified that, upon arriving home, she walked around to the back of the house, where she noticed a “big maroon car” parked adjacent to the bulkhead leading into the cellar. When she entered through the back door of the house, she saw three-year-old Nicole Laferte (Nicole) crying, “saying her mother was downstairs sick.” LaDue disregarded Nicole's behavior as simply a cry for attention because LaDue heard “some moving around downstairs[,] so she went upstairs to wait for Heath to come home. Within a few minutes, she saw Heath pull into the driveway. Shortly thereafter, she heard Heath frantically call for her.

Heath testified that he arrived home approximately ten minutes after LaDue. When he walked into the back hallway on the first floor of the multifamily home, he also encountered young Nicole, who was standing at the cellar door crying. Heath asked Nicole what was wrong, and Nicole replied that her mother was downstairs “lying down.” Heath went down to the cellar, unprepared for the gruesome scene he was about to encounter—a body “basically sitting” between the washer and dryer, and a second body lying face down in a “puddle of blood.” Both bodies had been beaten beyond recognition. The bodies would later be identified as those of Picard and Nicole's mother, Susan Laferte (Laferte). Picard was pronounced dead at approximately 4:30 p.m. the same day. Laferte miraculously survived the brutal attack; but, due to the injuries she sustained, her memory was significantly impaired.

Following what even the state described as a “chao[tic],” “disorder[ly],” and “disast[rous] nine-year investigation by the Woonsocket Police Department, on June 5, 1991, a grand jury indicted Tempest for Picard's murder.3 The case went to trial in April 1992, during which Heath, LaDue, and a number of other witnesses testified. Of these witnesses, four testified that Tempest had confessed to killing Picard.

Two such witnesses were John Guarino (Guarino) and his former girlfriend, Donna Carrier (Carrier).4 Tempest and Guarino ran in the same circle of friends, and at one time they lived in the same apartment complex on Winter Street in Woonsocket. Guarino testified that, while they were out one night having drinks in late 1982 or early 1983, Tempest confessed to killing Picard. Although Guarino testified that at the time he did not take Tempest's confession “seriously,” he nevertheless went home and told Carrier what Tempest had said. Guarino further testified that, several weeks later, Tempest—who Guarino said appeared “very, very nervous”—came to his apartment and told him he “better keep [his] mouth shut and not say anything to anybody.” Tempest again told Guarino “that he did it” but that they don't have any proof that he did it.”

Carrier testified that she overheard this exchange between Guarino and Tempest. She stated that Tempest said that Picard “came down the stairs at the wrong time, saw him hitting [Laferte] and that [h]e couldn't let her get away and had to do her, too.” Carrier also testified that Tempest said he was “very upset because [Laferte] was going to tell [his wife] something and that he and [his wife] had just gotten back together.” Prior to trial, Carrier had been adamant that, at the time of the murder, the Tempest family lived in the same apartment complex on Winter Street as she and Guarino.

Two other witnesses testified that Tempest had confessed to killing Picard. The first was Ronald Vaz (Vaz), an acquaintance of Tempest, who had a long criminal record and who occasionally “snorted” cocaine with him.5 Loretta Rivard, a prostitute with whom Tempest “part[ied] one night in January 1988, also testified that Tempest took responsibility for the murder. To be sure, many of the state's witnesses were not model citizens. Indeed, the trial justice said the following about them:

We didn't have a parade of MDs or [s]umma [c]um [l]audes here. We had people who deal in drugs, we have people who snort drugs and matters of that nature. * * * So we don't expect total intelligence here.” Tempest, 651 A.2d at 1218

.

Yet, the trial justice also noted that the court “must take the witnesses as they come.” Id.

On April 22, 1992, a jury found Tempest guilty of murder in the second degree, and he was subsequently sentenced to eighty-five years in prison.6 This Court affirmed his conviction on January 11, 1995. Tempest, 651 A.2d at 1220

.

Nearly a decade later, on April 8, 2004, Tempest filed an application for postconviction relief pursuant to Rhode Island's Innocence Protection Act, G.L.1956 §§ 10–9.1–11

and 10–9.1–127 and sought the release of certain physical evidence (including, among other items, hair recovered from both victims of the attack, as well as fingernail clippings from Picard) for forensic testing. Over the next eleven years, many motions and memoranda were filed, various orders were entered, and discovery ensued. Finally, in April 2015, Tempest filed a second amended application for postconviction relief, which is the operative application in the present appeal.

Following a lengthy hearing spanning the course of several weeks, the hearing justice issued a seventy-eight-page decision, in which he granted Tempest's application for postconviction relief and vacated his conviction. The hearing justice identified three grounds upon which Tempest was entitled to postconviction relief: two Brady violations based on the state's suppression of favorable evidence and a due process violation resulting from the Woonsocket Police Department's “unduly suggestive interviewing of witnesses [.]8 The state then petitioned this Court for a writ of certiorari, which was granted on September 22, 2015.9

IIStandard of Review

[P]ost[ ]conviction relief is available to a defendant convicted of a crime who contends that his original conviction * * * violated rights that the state or federal constitutions secured to him.” Torres v. State, 19 A.3d 71, 77 (R.I.2011)

(quoting Otero v. State, 996 A.2d 667, 670 (R.I.2010) ). “An applicant who files an application for postconviction relief bears the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that such relief is warranted.” Rivera v. State, 58 A.3d 171, 179 (R.I.2013)

(quoting Anderson v. State, 45 A.3d 594, 601 (R.I.2012) ).

“In reviewing an application for postconviction relief, [t]his Court will not impinge upon the fact-finding function of a hearing justice * * * absent clear error or a showing that the [hearing] justice overlooked or misconceived material evidence in arriving at those findings.’ State v. Thornton, 68 A.3d 533, 539 (R.I.2013)

(quoting Anderson, 45 A.3d at 601 ). However, [w]e employ a de novo standard of review with regard to ‘questions of fact or mixed questions of law and fact pertaining to an alleged violation of an applicant's constitutional rights * * *.’ Id. (quoting Anderson, 45 A.3d at 601 ). Nevertheless, even when conducting such a de novo review, we still accord a hearing justice's findings of historical fact, and inferences drawn from those facts, great deference * * *.” Id. at 540 (quoting Anderson, 45 A.3d at 601 ).

IIIAnalysis

On appeal, the state attacks each of the three grounds the Superior Court relied on in vacating Tempest's conviction. First, the state contends that the hearing justice erred in granting relief on Tempest's “maroon car” Brady claim because his claim was barred by laches and the evidence was not material. Next, the state argues that the hearing justice erred in vacating Tempest's conviction on the basis of the former prosecutor's failure to disclose pretrial statements made by Carrier. Last, the state asserts that the hearing justice erred in determining that Tempest's due process rights were violated as a result of improper police practices. Because we can affirm the Superior Court's decision on any or all of these grounds, we start with the state's second claim of error, which we conclude is dispositive of the state's appeal.

A. Carrier's Pretrial Statements10

Seventeen days before trial, Carrier provided the state's former prosecutor with two novel statements: (1) that Tempest's brother, Gordon Tempest (Gordon)—who was a detective with the Woonsocket Police Department at the time of the murder—hid the...

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