Temple v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 91-139

• Decision Date: 30 July 1992
• Docket Number: No. 91-139,91-139
• Citation: 254 Mont. 455,840 P.2d 561
• Parties: , 37 A.L.R.5th 875 Joe TEMPLE, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. CHEVRON U.S.A. INC., a corporation, Chevron Industries, Inc., a corporation and Manville Sales Corporation, a Delaware corporation, Defendants and Respondents.
• Court: Montana Supreme Court

Page 561

840 P.2d 561

254 Mont. 455, 37 A.L.R.5th 875

Joe TEMPLE, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. CHEVRON U.S.A. INC., a corporation, Chevron Industries Inc., a corporation and Manville Sales Corporation, a Delaware corporation Defendants and Respondents.

No. 91-139.

Supreme Court of Montana.

Submitted April 30, 1992.

Decided July 30, 1992.

Gene R. Jarussi, Jarussi & Bishop, Billings, for plaintiff-appellant.

Jeanne M. Bender and Kyle A. Gray, Holland & Hart, Billings, for defendants-respondents.

GRAY, Justice.

Appellant Joe Temple appeals the order and judgment of the Thirteenth Judicial District Court, Stillwater County, dismissing his complaint styled as an Equitable Bill of Discovery. We affirm.

We restate the issues on appeal as follows:

1. Is a cause of action known as an equitable bill of discovery cognizable under Montana law?

2. Did the District Court err in dismissing appellant's complaint for an equitable bill of discovery pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), M.R.Civ.P.?

Joe Temple was employed by Chevron Resources Company as an equipment operator and was working in the Stillwater Mine on April 4, 1990, when an underground train backed into and ran over him. He sustained physical injuries as a result of the incident and is being paid workers' compensation disability benefits by his employer.

On June 21, 1990, Mr. Temple filed a complaint for an Equitable Bill of Discovery in the Thirteenth Judicial District Court, Stillwater County, Montana; an amended complaint was filed on August 15, 1990. The named defendants, respondents herein, were Chevron U.S.A., Inc. (Chevron), Chevron Industries, Inc. (Industries) and Manville Sales Corporation (Manville). Chevron and Manville are partners in the Stillwater Mining Company which owns the Stillwater Mine; Chevron is the managing partner. Chevron engaged Industries to perform the actual management functions at the mine. Those functions are carried out by Chevron Resources Company (Resources), Mr. Temple's employer, which is a division or subsidiary of Industries.

Mr. Temple's complaint described the nature of the accident and alleged that, as a result of that accident, Mr. Temple may have a cause of action against one or more of the defendants. He claimed that there was relevant evidence within defendants' control, to which he did not have access, which would identify the causes of the accident and the entities against which he may have a claim. These documents, the complaint alleges, include investigation reports, records describing the legal relationships between defendants and information about the underground train. Mr. Temple further alleged that the information he sought by the equitable bill of discovery was necessary in order for him to thoroughly investigate the circumstances surrounding his accident, as mandated by Rule 11, M.R.Civ.P.

In his prayer for relief, Mr. Temple sought copies of any investigative reports prepared by defendants as a result of his accident and records which would describe the relationship of the various defendants with regard to the operation of the Stillwater Mine. He also sought any information in defendants' possession which would identify the manufacturer, distributor, and owners of the cars and engine of the train that ran over him.

Defendants objected to the discovery sought and moved to dismiss the complaint because it failed to state a cause of action cognizable under Montana law. Defendants asserted that the discovery sought was not authorized by Montana's Rules of Civil Procedure.

The District Court granted defendants' motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim for which relief could be granted. The court rejected Mr. Temple's argument that Rule 11 prevented him from filing a complaint against any of the defendants without the requested discovery. The District Court concluded that, "while there may be some set of circumstances where an action that might be denominated an equitable bill of discovery would be proper, the pleadings here do not constitute such a bill, nor do they conform to the Rules of Civil Procedure." Mr. Temple appealed.

1. Is a cause of action known as an equitable bill of discovery cognizable under Montana law?

Appellant argues that, while he may have a claim based on his injuries of April 4, 1990, he does not know the theory upon which the claim would be based or the party against which any claim should be asserted because all of the information necessary to make those determinations is in the exclusive possession of the corporate respondents. He further alleges that if he does file a claim against respondents without knowing all of the underlying facts, he risks sanction under Rule 11 for filing a claim which is not well grounded in fact. It is appellant's position that Montana's courts should exercise their equitable jurisdiction under Article VII, § 4 of the Montana Constitution to recognize an independent action known as an equitable bill of discovery such as has been recognized in a few other jurisdictions.

Respondents assert that the equitable bill of discovery is precluded by the Montana Rules of Civil Procedure. They rely specifically on Rule 8(a) which requires that a complaint contain a statement showing entitlement to relief, and Rule 34(c) which permits independent actions for discovery but, according to the respondents, contemplates an action in existence to which an independent action for discovery under the Rule must be related. Respondents also argue that Mr. Temple could conduct his discovery by simply suing them for damages or by proceeding under Rule 27(a), M.R.Civ.P., which they assert allows depositions to be taken for perpetuation prior to the commencement of an action. Finally, it is respondents' position that an independent action for discovery is impermissible under this Court's decisions.

The equitable bill of discovery was the primary means of discovery prior to the adoption of modern rules of civil procedure. Courts which have addressed the issue of whether modern rules of civil procedure totally supersede the equitable bill of discovery are divided.

Some courts have held that the equitable bill has been rendered obsolete by current systems of pleading and practice. See Guertin v. Guertin (1990), 204 Ill.App.3d 527, 149 Ill.Dec. 643, 561 N.E.2d 1339; Rothery Storage and Van Co. v. Atlas Van Lines (N.D.Ill.1985), 609 F.Supp. 554; News and Observer Publishing Co. v. North Carolina (1984), 312 N.C. 276, 322 S.E.2d 133. The conclusion in these cases is that the need for the equitable bill of discovery was eliminated by adoption of modern rules of civil procedure which include liberal discovery rules.

Other courts have recognized that there may be limited circumstances and situations, not covered by the modern rules, in which equity may require the availability of the equitable bill of discovery. As stated by the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine:

Although modern discovery rules and liberal pleading requirements virtually eliminate the need to resort to an independent action in the form of an equitable bill of discovery, they do not totally displace the traditional equitable jurisdiction of the ... [courts] to issue appropriate orders for independent discovery when effective discovery cannot otherwise be obtained and the ends of justice are served. See, e.g., Reilly Tar Corp. v. Burlington N. R.R., 589 F.Supp. 275, 282 (D.Minn.1984); Folsom v. Western Elec. Co., 85 F.R.D. 651, 653 (W.D.Okla.1980); Arcell v. Ashland Chemical Co., 152 N.J.Super. 471, 378 A.2d 53, 70-71 (1977); see also Wimes v. Eaton Corp., 573 F.Supp. 331, 335-37 (E.D.Wisc.1983); Pomeroy, § 207(b), at 345 (equity court has inherent power to permit inspection in appropriate circumstances).

Shorey v. Lincoln Pulp & Paper Co., Inc. (Me.1986), 511 A.2d 1076, 1078 (emphasis added; footnote omitted). We agree with the reasoning of the Maine court.

Respondents' arguments that the Montana Rules of Civil Procedure preclude an equitable bill of discovery altogether are not persuasive. First, nothing in the Rules specifically prohibits such an action. Rules 3 and 8(a) require the filing of a complaint showing entitlement to relief and demand for judgment. Those requirements can be met by filing a complaint for an equitable bill of discovery which meets the requirements discussed herein.

Respondents' reliance on Rule 34 is similarly misplaced. It is true that Rule 34 applies only to parties in existing litigation and Rule 34(c), while not precluding an independent action against a non-party, does not by itself authorize a court to order discovery from a non-party. On the other hand, nothing in Rule 34(c) prohibits recognition of an equitable bill of discovery in circumstances where the discovery is necessary, is not otherwise obtainable, and serves the interest of justice. We conclude that the Montana Rules of Civil Procedure do not preclude the equitable bill of discovery.

Respondents also assert that the equitable bill of discovery is impermissible under this Court's decisions in Jaap v. District Court of Eighth Judicial Dist. (1981), 191 Mont. 319, 623 P.2d 1389, and State, ex rel. Pitcher v. District Court (1943), 114 Mont. 128, 133 P.2d 350. This argument is without merit.

In Jaap, the district court allowed discovery not provided for by the Rules, namely a private interview. We granted a writ of supervisory control and vacated the district court's allowance of such an interview:

We conclude therefore, that a District Court, in allowing and enforcing discovery in litigation before it, must relate the discovery to one of the methods provided in Rule 26(a), M.R.Civ.P. Any attempt to enforce a method of discovery not provided by the Montana Rules of Civil Procedure is outside the power of the District Court.

Jaap, 191 Mont. at 324, 623 P.2d at 1392 (emphasis added). As is clear from our stated conclusion, the District Court had litigation before it and, in that context, went outside the...