Temple v. United States

• Decision Date: 28 September 2022
• Docket Number: 4:19-CV-01758 JAR
• Parties: JACOBI TEMPLE, Movant, v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Respondent.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Missouri

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JACOBI TEMPLE, Movant, v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Respondent.

No. 4:19-CV-01758 JAR

United States District Court, E.D. Missouri, Eastern Division

September 28, 2022

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

JOHN A. ROSS, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.

This matter is before the Court on Movant Jacobi Temple's motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence by a Person in Federal Custody, as amended. (Doc. Nos. 1, 14). The Government responded. (Doc. No. 20). Movant did not file a reply. The motion is therefore, fully briefed and ready for disposition. For the following reasons Movant's motion is denied.^[1]

I. Background

On March 26, 2018, Movant waived indictment and pled guilty to three counts of a three-count Superseding Information charging Conspiracy to Distribute Heroin, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846, 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and 21 U.S.C § 841(b)(1)(C) (Count 1); Possessing, Brandishing and Discharging a Firearm in Furtherance of a Drug Trafficking Crime Resulting in Death, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(j)(1) and 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(iii) (Count 2); and Possessing, Brandishing and Discharging a Firearm in Furtherance of a Drug Trafficking Crime Resulting in Death, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(j)(1) and 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(C)(i) (Count 3). At his plea hearing, Movant acknowledged, under oath, that:

Beginning in approximately the late-summer or early fall of 2014, Movant, along with Demante Syms, Samuel Spires, and others, agreed to engage in the distribution of heroin. Heroin distribution would occur within the City of Saint Louis which is within the federal jurisdiction of the Eastern District of Missouri. Movant acknowledges that, during the course of this drug distribution conspiracy, between 100 grams and 400 grams of heroin was distributed or possessed with the intent to be distributed. On certain occasions, Movant provided heroin to victims Brittney Brown, Paige Schaefer, and Tammie Thurmond. As of March 27, 2015, each victim had failed to pay Movant for certain sales of heroin he previously provided to each.

On March 27, 2015, Movant, along with Demante Syms and Samuel Spires, traveled in a vehicle to the area of 4467 ltaska Street, Saint Louis, Missouri which is within the federal jurisdiction of the Eastern District of Missouri. Movant was able to determine that Brittney Brown and Paige Schaefer could be located at that residence based upon information received by defendant from Tammie Thurmond. Movant travelled to the address for the purpose of obtaining payment for heroin previously distributed by defendant to each of the females that had not yet been paid for. Movant possessed a firearm. During the course of demanding payment for the heroin distributed by Movant, Movant brandished and discharged his firearm. As a result of Movant's firearm discharge, James Lacey and Paige Schaefer were shot and killed. Brittney Brown was shot and gravely injured. Movant shot and killed victims James Lacey and Paige Schaefer with malice aforethought and premeditation and in the perpetration of taking money Movant believed was due to him. Therefore, Movant's killings of victims James Lacey and Paige Schaefer were murders in the first degree.

Movant left the ltaska residence in the vehicle. Demante Syms and Samuel Spires were with Movant. Movant contacted and eventually picked up Tammie Thurmond. Movant eventually drove the vehicle into an alley near 4232 S. 371h Street, Saint Louis, Missouri which is within the federal jurisdiction of the Eastern District of Missouri. Movant stopped the vehicle. Movant demanded payment from Tammie Thurmond. Tammie Thurmond was removed from the vehicle. Movant brandished and discharged his firearm. As a result of Movant's firearm discharge, Tammie Thurmond was shot and died. Movant shot and killed victim Tammie Thurmond with malice aforethought and premeditation and in the perpetration of demanding money defendant believed was due to him. Therefore, Movant's killing of victim Tammie Thurmond was a murder in the first degree.

(Plea Agreement, Case No. 4:15-CR-00230, Doc. No. 372 at 5-6; Plea Transcript, Doc. No. 415 at 19-22).

The transcript of the plea hearing reflects that the Court closely examined Movant regarding the voluntariness of his plea, and found the plea was made “intelligently and voluntarily,” with a full understanding of the charges and the consequences of the plea. (Plea Transcript at 7-8, 30-33, 35). Movant stated that no one had threatened him or pressured him into pleading guilty (id. at 10, 31), and that he was fully satisfied with his attorney's representation (id. at 7-8).

On June 27, 2018, the Court sentenced Movant to a term of imprisonment of 600 months, consisting of consecutive terms of: 180 months on Count 1; 120 months on Count 2; and 300 months on Count 3, to run concurrently with any sentence imposed in Case No. 15SL-CR04067, in Circuit Court, St. Louis County, Missouri, followed by five years of supervised release. No appeal was filed.

On June 20, 2019, Movant filed a Motion Under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence raising the following grounds for post-conviction relief: (1) ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to object to the Government's alleged violation of Department of Justice (“DOJ”) policy by pursuing multiple Section 924(c) charges; (2) ineffective assistance of counsel for coercing Movant into signing the Plea Agreement and for failing to object to the Government's threats to incarcerate Movant's family members; (3) ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to object to inconsistent “conspiracy” dates in the indictment and Plea Agreement; (4) failure by the Court to determine a “factual basis for the plea”; (5) ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to investigate Movant's case; and (6) that Movant is actually innocent of the charge in Count 1, conspiracy to distribute heroin. (Doc. No. 1 at 13-15). The Government filed its response on November 7, 2019. (Doc. No. 12).

On November 18, 2019, Movant filed an amended § 2255 motion adding a seventh claim: that the changes in the type of multiple convictions under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A) that are to run consecutively made by the First Step Act should apply retroactively to Movant. (Doc. No. 14). At the Court's direction, the Government filed an amended response to Movant's amended motion on January 2, 2020. (Doc. No. 20).

II. Standard of review

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255, a federal prisoner may seek relief from a sentence imposed against him on grounds that “the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or law of the United States, or that the court was without jurisdiction to impose such sentence, or that the sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by law, or is otherwise subject to collateral attack.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255. To obtain relief under § 2255, the movant must establish a violation constituting “a fundamental defect which inherently results in a complete miscarriage of justice.” United States v. Gomez, 326 F.3d 971, 974 (8th Cir. 2003) (quoting United States v. Boone, 869 F.2d 1089, 1091 n.4 (8th Cir. 1989)).

Claims brought under § 2255 may be limited by procedural default. A movant “cannot raise a nonconstitutional or nonjurisdictional issue in a § 2255 motion if the issue could have been raised on direct appeal but was not.” Anderson v. United States, 25 F.3d 704, 706 (8th Cir. 1994) (citation omitted). Furthermore, even constitutional or jurisdictional claims not raised on direct appeal cannot be raised in a § 2255 motion unless the movant can establish “(1) cause for the default and actual prejudice or (2) actual innocence.” United States v. Moss, 252 F.3d 993, 1001 (8th Cir. 2001) (citing Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 621 (1998)).

Ineffective assistance of counsel claims, however, generally may be raised for the first time in a § 2255 motion regardless of whether they could have been raised on direct appeal. Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S. 500, 504 (2003); United States v. Davis, 452 F.3d 991, 994 (8th Cir. 2006); United States v. Cordy, 560 F.3d 808, 817 (8th Cir. 2009). Establishing ineffective assistance of counsel is a “heavy burden.” See United States v. Apfel, 97 F.3d 1074, 1076 (8th Cir. 1996). In the context of a guilty plea, Movant must show (1) “that counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness”; and (2) that he was prejudiced by counsel's deficient performance - that is, “that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.” Gumangan v. United States, 254 F.3d 701, 705 (8th Cir. 2001) (citing Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985) (internal quotations omitted)); see also Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).

“In determining whether counsel's conduct was objectively reasonable, there is a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.” Nguyen v. United States, 114 F.3d 699, 704 (8th Cir. 1997) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689) (internal quotations omitted). Both prongs of the test must be satisfied for the claim to succeed; if a movant fails to make a sufficient showing under one prong, the court need not consider the other. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697.

III. Discussion

As a threshold matter, the Government argues that Movant is attempting to circumvent the terms of the Plea Agreement by raising his claims regarding multiple § 924(c) counts inconsistent conspiracy dates, lack of a factual basis for his plea, and the retroactivity of First Step Act changes (Grounds 1, 3, 4, 7) under the guise of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim in a postconviction...