Templeton v. Bateman
| Decision Date | 14 April 1960 |
| Docket Number | No. 10067,10067 |
| Citation | 90 R.I. 481,159 A.2d 609 |
| Parties | Loretta TEMPLETON v. Ralph A. BATEMAN, City Treasurer, et al. Ex. |
| Court | Rhode Island Supreme Court |
Robert Afflick, West Warwick, Francis I. McCanna, Providence, for plaintiff.
Ralph T. Lewis, Jr., City Sol., Warwick, Boss, Conlan, Keenan, Bulman & Rice, James C. Bulman, Providence, for defendants.
This is an action of trespass on the case for negligence joining therein as defendants Ralph A. Bateman, city treasurer of the city of Warwick, the members of the school committee, and Gilbert A. Howard, the operator of a school bus which collided with a motor vehicle in which the plaintiff was riding as a guest passenger. The case was tried before a superior court justice sitting with a jury and at the conclusion of the testimony he granted defendants' motion for a directed verdict as to all defendants except Gilbert A. Howard. Thereafter the jury returned a verdict for him. The case is now before us on the plaintiff's bill of exceptions. In her bill she sets forth eight exceptions. However, only those to the denial of her motion for a new trial and to the refusal of the trial justice to charge as requested have been briefed and argued. All other exceptions are deemed to be waived.
It appears from the evidence that Howard, a police officer in the city of Warwick, was the operator of a city-owned school bus which in the afternoon of May 12, 1955 was proceeding easterly along Strawberry Field Road; that there were approximately twenty children in the bus who were returning to their homes; that plaintiff was a passenger in a car operated by her son which was following the bus; that it was a part of defendant Howard's regular run to travel on said highway to Evans street where he was required to make a left turn; and that on the day in question while making such turn the bus collided with the car in which plaintiff was riding. It is undisputed that plaintiff suffered injuries.
The plaintiff contends that the trial justice erred in denying her motion for a new trial on the ground that he misconceived certain portions of the testimony bearing on the issue of defendant Howard's negligence. She argues it is uncontradicted that when said defendant was told the operator of the automobile had sounded his horn twice as he started to pass the bus, he replied if the horn had been blown he was unable to hear it above the noise of the children. She therefore contends that his response was an admission of negligence.
Whether the failure of the operator to successfully restrain his charges constitutes negligence in all the circumstances was a question of fact and, as such, was strictly within the province of the jury. It is not unreasonable to understand that the operator of a school bus returning a group of children to their homes at the close of a school day would experience some difficulty in controlling the normal, uninhibited conversation and laughter of his passengers, and the jury may have so decided. We find no merit in this contention.
The plaintiff concedes in her brief that there is a conflict of evidence on the issue of whether the directional light of the bus were on before the driver made the turn, and this was also a question of fact for the jury. Consequently she relies strongly on what she refers to as defendant Howard's admission 'that he did not look before he started to make the turn to his left into Evans Street to see if there was any other automobile travelling alongside the bus to pass it.' She further contends 'that defendant by his own testimony has established the fact that his omission to take the precaution before starting to make the left turn to see if there was any other automobile travelling alongside him for the purpose of passing the bus was guilty of carelessness and negligence in the operator of the bus.'
This argument rests on plaintiff's interpretation of the following testimony during the cross-examination of defendant Howard:
'Q. Well, you just said you answered your attorney, 'Before I started making the turn I looked in the rear-view mirror.' You also answered--answered in the affirmative that you made this statement to Lieutenant Lynch: 'When I started to make the turn, I looked in the rear-view mirror.' A. Well, part of starting to make the...
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State v. Cohen
...repeatedly held that phrases taken out of context must be considered in the light of the instructions in their entirety. See Templeton v. Bateman, R.I., 159 A.2d 609. The defendant particularly presses a contention that since his motion for a direction of not guilty of murder in the first d......