Templeton v. Bishop of Charleston
| Decision Date | 05 August 2021 |
| Docket Number | 2:18-cv-02003-DCN |
| Parties | CHRIS TEMPLETON, Plaintiff, v. THE BISHOP OF CHARLESTON, a Corporation Sole, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of South Carolina |
This following matter is before the court on defendant The Bishop of Charleston's (the “Bishop”) motion to exclude or limit expert testimony, ECF No. 71, and plaintiff Chris Templeton's (“Templeton”) motions to exclude or limit expert testimony, ECF Nos. 73 and 74. For the reasons set forth below, the court grants in part and denies in part the Bishop's motion to exclude or limit expert testimony, ECF No. 71, and denies Templeton's motions to exclude or limit expert testimony, ECF Nos. 73 and 74.
Templeton is an adult citizen and resident of Georgia who alleges that he was sexually abused as a child by a priest of the Diocese of Charleston, Raymond DuMouchel (“DuMouchel”) on property owned and operated by the Bishop. According to Templeton, the sexual abuse occurred after he traveled to South Carolina with a priest of the Diocese of Savannah Wayland Yoder Brown (“Brown”), notorious for his molestation of children. On July 20, 2018, Templeton filed the instant action against the Bishop, the corporate entity of the Roman Catholic Church in South Carolina. Templeton alleges negligence and gross negligence causes of actions against the Bishop, including maintaining conditions dangerous to children, negligent supervision of DuMouchel, and breach of assumed duty. The Bishop maintains that Templeton filed the instant action after the expiration of the applicable statute of limitations. Templeton claims that the action was timely filed because the statute of limitations was tolled by his “repressed memory” of DuMouchel's sexual abuse. Specifically, Templeton claims that during a criminal investigation of Brown in 2017, Templeton recovered certain “repressed memories” of abuse by DuMouchel and Brown inside the Bishop's property. Therefore, Templeton brings the instant action under the theory that the statute of limitations did not begin to run until 2017. The parties have both identified experts to testify on the issue of repressed memory.
On March 1, 2021, the Bishop filed a motion to exclude expert testimony. ECF No. 71. On March 12, 2021, Templeton responded, ECF No. 78, and on March 29, 2021, the Bishop replied, ECF No. 86. On March 5, 2021, Templeton filed two motions to exclude expert testimony, ECF Nos. 73 and 74, to which the Bishop responded, ECF Nos. 83 and 84, respectively. Templeton replied with respect to his second motion to exclude. ECF No. 88. On June 13, 2021, the court held a telephonic hearing on the motions. ECF No. 97. As such, the motions are now ripe for review.
The Bishop seeks to exclude from trial the testimony of Templeton's treating psychological therapists, Shelly Ainsworth, MSW (“Ainsworth”), and Deborah Kearney, Ph.D. (“Kearney”), regarding their diagnosis of Templeton with “dissociative amnesia” and the scientific validity of such a diagnosis. Templeton, in turn, seeks to exclude the testimony of Janine Shelby, Ph.D. (“Shelby”), James I. Hudson, M.D. (“Hudson”), and Elizabeth F. Loftus, Ph.D. (“Loftus”), the Bishop's rebuttal expert witnesses on memory repression.
Federal Rule of Evidence 702 provides:
District courts serve as gatekeepers for expert testimony. The court has a “special obligation” to ensure that expert testimony is relevant and reliable. Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 147 (1999). Under Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmas., Inc., the court's gatekeeping role requires that it address two questions: first, whether the expert's testimony is based on “scientific knowledge”; and second, whether the testimony “will assist the trier of fact to understand or determine a fact in issue.” 509 U.S. 579, 592 (1993). The first question is answered by assessing “whether the reasoning or methodology underlying the testimony is scientifically valid.” Id. at 592-93. The court should consider several nondispositive factors in determining the reliability of a particular scientific theory or technique: whether it (1) can be and has been tested; (2) has been subjected to peer review and publication; (3) has a known or potential rate of error; and (4) has attained general acceptance in the pertinent scientific community. See id. at 593-94. In considering these factors, the focus “must be solely on principles and methodology, not on the conclusions that they generate.” Id. at 595. The factors are not exclusive; what factors are relevant to the analysis “depends upon the particular circumstances of the particular case at issue.” Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 150. The second inquiry “goes primarily to relevance.” Daubert, 509 U.S. at 591. Relevance is determined by ascertaining whether the testimony is sufficiently tied to the facts of the case such that it will aid the jury in resolving a factual dispute. Id. at 593.
The proponent of expert testimony must demonstrate that the testimony satisfies these requirements. Cooper v. Smith & Nephew, Inc., 259 F.3d 194, 199 (4th Cir. 2001) (“The proponent of the testimony must establish its admissibility by a preponderance of proof.”). “[T]he trial court's role as a gatekeeper is not intended to serve as a replacement for the adversary system, and consequently, the rejection of expert testimony is the exception rather than the rule.” United States v. Stanley, 533 Fed.Appx. 325, 327 (4th Cir. 2013) (). While Rule 702 was intended to liberalize the introduction of relevant expert evidence, courts “must recognize that due to the difficulty of evaluating their testimony, expert witnesses have the potential to ‘be both powerful and quite misleading.'” Westberry v. Gislaved Gummi AB, 178 F.3d 257, 261 (4th Cir. 1999) (quoting Daubert, 509 U.S. at 595). With this law firmly in mind, the court proceeds to determine whether each expert's proposed testimony is admissible.
The Bishop moves to exclude the expert testimony of Templeton's witnesses, Ainsworth and Kearney, regarding the theory of repressed memory syndrome. The Bishop challenges Ainsworth's qualifications because she does not have a degree in psychology and “is a licensed clinical social worker only.” ECF No. 86 at 2. During the hearing, counsel for the Bishop also challenged Kearney's qualifications, explaining that Kearney has not conducted research or studies on repressed memory. When determining if an expert's qualifications are sufficient under Daubert, the court should “‘consider the proposed expert's full range of experience and training,' not just his professional qualifications.” Belk, Inc. v. Meyer Corp., U.S., 679 F.3d 146, 162 (4th Cir. 2012) (quoting United States v. Pansier, 576 F.3d 726, 737 (7th Cir. 2009)). “Generally, the test for exclusion is a strict one, ” and “[o]ne knowledgeable about a particular subject need not be precisely informed about all details of the issues raised in order to offer an opinion.” Thomas J. Kline, Inc. v. Lorillard, Inc., 878 F.2d 791, 799 (4th Cir. 1989) (citing Martin v. Fleissner GMBH, 741 F.2d 61, 64 (4th Cir. 1984)). Courts have generally found experts to lack the requisite qualifications only when the proposed expert clearly has no relevant qualifications. See Thomas J. Kline, Inc., 878 F.2d at 799 (); Zellers v. NexTech Ne., LLC, 533 Fed.Appx. 192, 197 (4th Cir. 2013) ( a proposed expert seeking to testify to the cause of plaintiff's medical symptoms as being exposure to toxic gas not qualified because she was a neurologist with no training in the field of toxicology and her knowledge of gas toxicity simply came from articles downloaded from the Internet).
Upon review of both expert witness's curriculum vitae and expert reports, the court finds that Ainsworth and Kearney are qualified to testify as experts on the topic of repressed memory in light of their education and years of experience and training, particularly in the areas of childhood trauma and mental health. There is no requirement that an expert have independently conducted research or published articles on a topic to be qualified to testify on that topic. The court instead must consider the “full range” of the experts' qualifications. Belk, 679 F.3d at 162. Likewise, a degree specifically in psychology is not necessary. “A proffered witness who does not hold a specific academic degree may be qualified as an expert if he has some degree of specialized knowledge regarding the subject or a similar topic.” Arias v. DynCorp, 928 F.Supp.2d 10, 15 (D.D.C. 2013); Deutsch v. Novartis Pharm. Corp., 768 F.Supp.2d 420, 425 (E.D.N.Y. 2011) (“If the expert has educational and experiential qualifications in a general field closely related to the subject matter in question, the court will not exclude the testimony...
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