Templin v. Fobes
| Decision Date | 19 July 1993 |
| Docket Number | No. 52S02-9307-CV-762,52S02-9307-CV-762 |
| Citation | 617 N.E.2d 541 |
| Parties | Carrie L. TEMPLIN, Noalus. A. Templin, Autumn A. Binnion b/n/f Carrie L. Templin, Appellants (Plaintiffs Below), v. Karl R. FOBES, Appellee (Defendant Below). |
| Court | Indiana Supreme Court |
We grant transfer to decide whether a defendant is required to identify a nonparty by name even where a plaintiff has actual knowledge of the nonparty's identity.
Karl Fobes (Defendant-Appellee below) seeks transfer after the Court of Appeals reversed a judgment entered on a jury verdict in favor of Carrie Templin, Noalus Templin, and Autumn Binnion (Plaintiffs-Appellants below) (collectively the "Templins") because of trial court error in connection with Fobes' nonparty defense. Templin v. Fobes (1992), Ind.App., 602 N.E.2d 523. We address the following issues:
(1) Whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying the Templins leave to amend their complaint to add Rockwood, Inc., as a party; and
(2) Whether the trial court erred in denying the Templins' motion for judgment on the pleadings concerning Fobes' nonparty defense because the nonparty was not named within the time provided by statute.
On May 10, 1989, a conversion van driven by Carrie Templin and an automobile driven by Karl Fobes collided at an intersection in Miami County, Indiana. The evidence most favorable to the verdict shows that Fobes, believing that Templin intended to make a right-hand turn in the van because her right turn signal was blinking, entered the intersection in front of the van and collided with it. The impact broke the bolt which anchored the driver's seat to the floor of the van, causing the seat to fall on its side. Templin and her daughter, Autumn Binnion, a passenger in the van, sustained personal injury. Templin's husband, Noalus Templin, suffered loss of consortium as a result of his wife's injuries.
On August 28, 1989, the Templins filed their complaint against Fobes alleging negligence. As an affirmative defense, Fobes alleged that the accident was caused by the fault of an unnamed third party who had negligently designed, manufactured, and installed the driver's seat in the Templins' conversion van.
On February 1, 1991, the Templins sought leave to amend their complaint to add as a defendant, Rockwood, Inc., the van conversion company, alleging that Rockwood had negligently designed, manufactured, or installed the driver's seat in the van. Fobes objected. After argument, the trial court denied the motion on the grounds that an amendment would cause additional delay and expense. Thereafter, on May 2, 1991, the Templins filed a separate action against Rockwood seeking a recovery for the allegedly-defective driver's seat on theories of negligence and strict liability in tort.
On May 24, 1991, the Templins filed a motion for partial judgment on the pleadings, pursuant to Indiana Trial Rule 12(C), with respect to Fobes' nonparty defense. The basis of the Templins' motion was Fobes' failure to name Rockwood as the nonparty at least 45 days before expiration of the applicable statute of limitations, as specified in Ind.Code Ann. Sec. 34-4-33-10(c) (West Supp.1992). The trial court denied the motion, and permitted Fobes to amend his pre-trial contentions to name Rockwood as the nonparty.
The Templins' case against Fobes was tried in July, 1991. The jury found damages for each plaintiff in the following amounts: Carrie Templin $15,000; Noalus Templin $1,500; and Autumn Binnion $1,500. The jury allocated fault as follows:
1) Carrie Templin = 5%; Rockwood = 85%; Fobes = 10%
2) Noalus Templin = 0%; Rockwood = 99%; Fobes = 1%
3) Autumn Binnion = 0%; Rockwood = 75%; Fobes = 25%
Judgment was entered on the verdict, and the Templins appealed.
The Court of Appeals held that the trial court abused its discretion in denying the motion to amend the complaint because any prejudice to Fobes caused by the delay and expense was insufficient to contradict the clear intent of the Comparative Fault Act. 602 N.E.2d at 527. A majority of the court also held that the trial court erred in denying the Templins' motion for judgment on the pleadings. Id. at 529. Considering the trial court's ruling on both motions, a majority of the court held that the Templins were prejudiced by those rulings because the Templins "were denied the use of the procedures of the [Comparative Fault] Act which allow nonparties to be added as defendants whenever possible in order to avoid the possibility of inconsistent verdicts in separate trials while Fobes was improperly permitted to use the Act to shift the blame to Rockwood, an empty chair the Templins were not permitted to fill." Id. at 529. In dissent to whether Fobes was entitled to present his nonparty defense, Judge Sullivan wrote that a defendant should not be required to identify a nonparty where a plaintiff had equal knowledge of the nonparty's identity. Id. at 530.
Fobes argues that the trial court acted within its discretion in denying the Templins leave to amend their complaint to add Rockwood as a defendant. We agree.
The trial court has broad discretion when deciding whether to permit amendments to pleadings. Criss v. Bitzegaio (1981), Ind., 420 N.E.2d 1221, 1223; Huff v. Travelers Indem. Co. (1977), 266 Ind. 414, 419, 363 N.E.2d 985, 989. Although amendments should be liberally allowed under Indiana Trial Rule 15(A), proper regard for prejudice to the non-moving party should be given. Compare Criss, 420 N.E.2d at 1223 (), with B & D Corp. v. Anderson, Clayton & Co. (1979), 180 Ind.App. 115, 124, 387 N.E.2d 476, 482 ().
Discretion is afforded a trial court to act in accord with what is fair and equitable in each case. McCullough v. Archbold Ladder Co. (1993), Ind., 605 N.E.2d 175, 180. An abuse of discretion may occur if the trial court's decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court or if the trial court has misinterpreted the law. Id. "An abuse of discretion is an erroneous conclusion in judgment when clearly against the logic and effect of the facts or the reasonable, probable deductions to be drawn therefrom." Boles v. Weidner (1983), Ind., 449 N.E.2d 288, 291.
The trial in the Templins' case against Fobes was five months away at the time they sought to add Rockwood. Fobes argued that the addition of a new party on a new theory would unfairly delay the trial and result in additional expense to Fobes. The trial court's order reflects that it agreed with Fobes. Inasmuch as the scheduling of civil trials is largely within the discretion of the court and the Templins' claims against Rockwood were not foreclosed by the trial court's denial of their motion, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion. 1
Fobes also asserts that the trial court properly denied the Templins' motion for partial judgment on the pleadings. We conclude that the Court of Appeals correctly held that the Templins were entitled to judgment because Fobes failed to name the non-party within the statutory limits.
Indiana's Comparative Fault Act, Ind.Code Ann. Sec. 34-4-33-1 through Sec. 34-4-33-13 (West Supp.1992), provides a scheme for allocating liability among persons whose negligence has contributed to an injury. Under the Act, the total fault for an accident is divided among the plaintiff, defendant, and any other negligent person who is referred to as a "nonparty." Ind.Code Sec. 34-4-33-5. The burden of pleading and proving a nonparty defense is upon the defendant. Ind.Code Sec. 34-4-33-10(b). One premise underlying the assignment of fault to a culpable nonparty is that the nonparty must be subject to civil liability. Cornell Harbison Excavating, Inc. v. May (1989), Ind., 546 N.E.2d 1186, 1187. An unidentified nonparty is not subject to civil liability. Id.
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