Tempo Shain Corp. v. Bertek, Inc.

Decision Date21 July 1997
Docket NumberNo. 1460,D,1460
Citation120 F.3d 16
PartiesIn the Matter of the Arbitration Between TEMPO SHAIN CORPORATION; Neptune Plus Corporation, Petitioners-Appellees, v. BERTEK, INC., Respondent-Appellant. ocket 96-9471.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Second Circuit

Michael C. Silberberg, New York City (Edward M. Spiro, Jessica R. Bernanke, Morvillo, Abramowitz, Grand, Iason & Silberberg, P.C., New York City, of counsel), for Respondent-Appellant.

Sheldon Eisenberger, New York City (Daniel J. Cooper, The Law Office of Sheldon Eisenberger, New York City, of counsel), for Petitioners-Appellees.

Before: WALKER, PARKER and HEANEY, * Circuit Judges.

PARKER, Circuit Judge:

Neptune Plus Corporation ("Neptune"), an affiliate of Tempo Shain Corporation ("Tempo Shain"), entered into an agreement with Bertek, Inc. ("Bertek") to purchase a license agreement from Gelman Sciences, Inc. ("Gelman") for a patented process to treat materials to enhance their repellency characteristics. Under the agreement, Bertek was to manufacture the treated material, which Neptune intended to sell to the apparel and footwear industries. Disagreements arose and the parties entered arbitration to resolve claims brought by Neptune against Bertek for fraudulent inducement to contract and breach of contract. Bertek counterclaimed with its own fraudulent inducement and breach of contract charges.

Bertek intended to call Wayne Pollock, former President of Bertek's Laminated Products Division, as a witness to provide what Bertek considered to be crucial testimony concerning the negotiations and dealings between the parties about which it claims only Pollock could testify. Pollock became temporarily unavailable to testify, however, after his wife was diagnosed with a recurrence of cancer. The arbitration panel was advised that Pollock remained willing to testify, but that the expected duration of his unavailability was indeterminate. Bertek urged the panel to keep the record open until Pollock could testify either in person or by deposition.

After deliberation, the panel concluded the hearings without waiting for Pollock's testimony. The arbitrators stated:

We as arbitrators have to decide does Mr. Pollock have any information that if he was here in person and you fellows are banging him with questions that some new information comes out that we haven't heard or is it going to be a rehash of what we've heard from other witnesses.

The panel subsequently rendered an award in favor of Tempo Shain and Neptune, and denied Bertek's counterclaims. Appellees petitioned the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York pursuant to sections 9 and 10 of the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA" or "Act"), 9 U.S.C. §§ 9-10 (West 1970 & Supp.1997), to confirm the arbitration award. Bertek cross-moved to vacate the award, arguing that the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct pursuant to FAA section 10(a)(3), 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(3). Appellees filed an opposition to Bertek's motion to vacate. In response, Bertek filed surreply papers, which included an affidavit from Pollock stating what he would have testified to, if permitted. The district court (Loretta A. Preska, Judge ) granted the petition to confirm the arbitration award and denied the motion to vacate. Tempo Shain Corp. v. Bertek, Inc., No. 96 Civ. 3354 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 24, 1996). In granting a later request by Bertek to add Pollock's affidavit to the record on appeal, the court noted that it had considered Pollock's affidavit when it made its decision. The court's endorsement order was based on its conclusion that the arbitration panel correctly understood that it was required to decide whether Pollock's testimony would add to the panel's knowledge about the case or simply be repetitive, and that the panel made its decision accordingly. Tempo Shain, No. 96 Civ. 3354, at 2. Bertek appealed.

The question on appeal is whether the panel's refusal to continue the hearings to allow Pollock to testify amounts to fundamental unfairness and misconduct sufficient to vacate the arbitration award pursuant to section 10(a)(3) of the Act. We believe that it did, and therefore vacate the court's endorsement of the award.

I. BACKGROUND

On March 11, 1994, Neptune and Bertek entered into an agreement (the "Agreement") whereby Neptune was to acquire a license from Gelman to use the "Repel Process" and Bertek agreed to perform laminating and other processing of materials for Neptune. The Repel Process is a patented methodology used to treat materials to enhance their repellency of water, oil, and other solvents. Understating its complexity, the Repel Process is essentially a two-step process. First, laminated material is coated with repellent chemicals. Then the treated material is cured by using ultraviolet lights, which act as a catalyst for a chemical reaction that creates unique chemical resistance and a higher degree of waterproofness. Neptune intended to sell the processed material to the footwear and apparel industries.

Prior to the Agreement, Gelman had been successfully applying the Repel Process to produce material for Neptune. However, the material must be laminated before the Repel Process is applied, and Gelman could not perform laminating on-site. More importantly, Neptune desired sixty-inch wide material, and Gelman could only perform the Repel Process on material up to forty inches in width because of the physical limitations of its ultraviolet curing system. Curing is an essential stage of the Repel Process.

According to its marketing brochure, Bertek is a multi-service production company offering research and development and manufacturing capabilities, with particular expertise in producing drug-delivery systems, wound care products, and other health care products and materials. The company provides facilities for customers to run their own production, or provides production services for customers who do not wish to do so. Additionally, and relevant to Neptune's needs, Bertek has expertise in lamination, curing, and machinery design and building. Under the Agreement, Bertek was to perform both the lamination and the Repel Process on the material to be sold to Neptune's customers (together, these processes were referred to as the "Neptune Plus Process"). The Agreement also specified that Bertek was responsible for purchasing and moving the necessary equipment for the Repel Process from the Gelman facility to its own location.

The Agreement provided that the equipment and related material for the Repel Process would be moved from Gelman at a later date, on or about March 15, 1994, and should be ready for production runs by May 1, 1994, but allowed for a reasonable time variance to "iron out operational problems relating to start up of the Equipment." Under the Agreement, Neptune also agreed to provide one of its employees to Bertek through May 31, 1994 to assist in set-up and training on the equipment. The equipment was, in fact, not up and running at Bertek until July 1994. However, Bertek performed laminating for Neptune prior to the time that the Repel equipment was ready to be utilized.

Several disagreements arose relating to moving and setting up the Repel equipment, and to Bertek's inability to meet purchase order specifications for the material. In fact, Bertek was never able to produce either laminated or repelled material to Neptune's satisfaction. On March 9, 1995, the parties entered into an agreement intended to resolve their disputes ("1995 Agreement"). The new agreement allowed for transfer of the lamination process to another laminator, although the parties reserved the claims resulting from the dispute under the initial Agreement. Under the 1995 Agreement, the laminated material was still shipped to Bertek for application of the Repel Process. The problems continued, and on July 11, 1995, Tempo Shain and Neptune filed a formal demand for arbitration alleging that Bertek had fraudulently induced them to enter into the agreements and then breached them, causing Neptune at least $2,000,000 in damages. Bertek counterclaimed that it had been fraudulently induced to enter into the agreements which Neptune then breached.

II. DISCUSSION

The district court confirmed the arbitration award based on its conclusion that the arbitration panel correctly understood that it was required to decide whether Pollock's testimony would add to the panel's knowledge or merely be a cumulative "rehash" of what the panel had already heard from other witnesses. Tempo Shain, No. 96 Civ. 3354, at 2-3. The court noted:

"The granting or denying of an adjournment falls within the broad discretion of appointed arbitrators." Storey v. Searle Blatt, Ltd., 685 F.Supp. 80, 82 (S.D.N.Y.1988); see Concourse Beauty School, Inc. [v. Polakov Design and Construct. of South Florida, Inc.], 685 F.Supp. [1311,] 1318 [ (S.D.N.Y.1988) ]. It has long been recognized that "Arbitrators must be given discretion to determine whether additional evidence is necessary or would simply prolong the proceedings." Catz American Co., Inc. v. Pearl Grange Fruit Exchange, Inc., 292 F.Supp. 549, 553 (S.D.N.Y.1968).

Tempo Shain, No. 96-3354, at 2.

The district court was correct that arbitration panel determinations are generally accorded great deference under the FAA. Judicial review of arbitration awards is necessarily narrowly limited. Ethyl Corp. v. United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO-CLC, 768 F.2d 180, 183 (7th Cir.1985). Undue judicial intervention would inevitably judicialize the arbitration process, thus defeating the objective of providing an alternative to judicial dispute resolution. See id. at 183-84.

Federal courts may vacate an arbitration award only in limited circumstances as proscribed by section 10(a) of the...

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