Tennessee Coal, Iron & R. Co. v. State

• Decision Date: 21 July 1904
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court
• Parties: TENNESSEE COAL, IRON & R. CO. v. STATE.

37 So. 433

141 Ala. 103

TENNESSEE COAL, IRON & R. CO. v. STATE.

Supreme Court of Alabama

July 21, 1904

Appeal from Circuit Court, Shelby County; Albert Roe, Judge.

Proceeding by the state against the Tennessee Coal, Iron & Railroad Company. From a judgment increasing the assessed valuation of defendant's property, it appeals. Reversed.

The proceedings in this case were instituted by the tax commissioner of Shelby county before the court of county commissioners of said county to raise the valuation of 23,818 acres of land owned by the Tennessee Coal, Iron & Railroad Company as assessed to said company by the tax assessor because of an alleged undervaluation of said lands. The lands were assessed at a valuation of $71,455. The tax commissioner sought to raise the valuation of said lands to $95,252, being an increase in valuation of $1 per acre. On the hearing of the cause the court of county commissioners sustained the assessment as fixed by the tax commissioner, and ordered the assessment by the tax assessor increased to the valuation as fixed by the tax commissioner. From this order of the commissioners' court the Tennessee Coal, Iron & Railroad Company appealed to the circuit court of Shelby county. When the cause came on for hearing in the circuit court the state filed a declaration, through its solicitor, asking that the valuation of said lands as assessed by the tax assessor be increased to $142,910. Respondent moved to strike this complaint from the file on the grounds that it was not based on an additional assessment made by the tax commissioner before the court of county commissioners; that it was a departure from the proceedings before the commissioners' court; and because no additional assessment had been filed by the tax commissioner fixing such valuation upon said lands and because it asked for a greater valuation than was fixed by the tax commissioner. The respondent also demurred to the complaint upon the same grounds. The court overruled the motion to strike and the demurrer to the complaint, to each of which rulings the defendant separately excepted.

Upon the trial of the case one W. E. Harrision testified as a witness that he was acquainted with a good portion of the lands of the defendant involved in this suit, which were situated in the Cahaba coal fields. Thereupon the solicitor for the state asked the witness the following question "What, if any, recent sales have you known made of coal lands in the Cahaba coal fields in the immediate vicinity of the lands of defendant involved in this suit?" The defendant objected to this question upon the ground that inquiry can only be made in reference to the lands of the same character, nature, and value, and that the question called for illegal and irrelevant evidence. The court overruled the objection, allowed the question to be asked and to this ruling the defendant duly excepted. Upon the witness answering that he knew of a certain named person selling coal lands to the defendant company for $10 per acre which lands were in the immediate vicinity of the lands in question, the defendant moved to exclude such answer upon the same grounds, and duly excepted to the court's overruling his motion. The same objections and motions and exceptions were made to similar questions asked and answers made by other witnesses introduced for the state. Against the objection and exception of the defendant the state was allowed to prove by the witness R. J. Griffin that he and his brother had purchased land from the defendant company in the Cahaba coal fields at a price exceeding $12.50 per acre. During the examination of one Johnson as a witness he was asked by the state the following question: "Do you know of any recent offers made for coal lands in the immediate vicinity of defendant's lands in the Cahaba coal fields?" The defendant objected to this question upon the ground that it called for irrelevant and immaterial evidence, and duly excepted to the court's overruling this objection. Upon this witness answering that a few months before the trial he had offered the owners of certain coal lands adjacent to defendant's lands $25 an acre therefor the defendant moved the court to exclude such answer upon the ground that it was irrelevant and immaterial. The court overruled the objection, and the defendant duly excepted. Against the objection and exception of the defendant, the court allowed the witness J. B. Griffin to testify that he had recently leased lands adjoining the defendant's coal lands at a royalty of 5 cents per ton for coal taken therefrom, with option to lessee to buy said lands at $20 per acre. Upon the hearing of all the evidence there were verdict and judgment assessing the value of defendant's lands at...