Tennessee Consolidated Coal Co. v. United Mine Wkrs. of Am.

• Decision Date: 19 September 1969
• Docket Number: No. 18820.,18820.
• Parties: TENNESSEE CONSOLIDATED COAL COMPANY and Grundy Coal Company, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. UNITED MINE WORKERS OF AMERICA, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit

416 F.2d 1192 (1969)

TENNESSEE CONSOLIDATED COAL COMPANY and Grundy Coal Company, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. UNITED MINE WORKERS OF AMERICA, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 18820.

United States Court of Appeals Sixth Circuit.

September 19, 1969.

Harrison Combs, Washington, D. C., (Edward L. Carey, Willard P. Owens, Washington, D. C., E. H. Rayson, Knoxville, Tenn., M. E. Boiarsky, Charleston, W. Va., on the brief), for appellant.

John A. Rowntree, Knoxville, Tenn., (William D. Spears, Chattanooga, Tenn., Judson Harwood, Nashville, Tenn., William M. Ables, Jr., South Pittsburg, Tenn., Paul D. Kelly, Jr., Jasper, Tenn., Fowler, Rowntree, Fowler & Robertson, Knoxville, Tenn., on the brief), for appellees.

Before WEICK, Chief Judge, and PECK and COMBS, Circuit Judges.

WEICK, Chief Judge.

The suit in the District Court was brought by Tennessee Consolidated Coal Company (TCC) and its subsidiary, Grundy Mining Company (Grundy), against United Mine Workers of America (UMW) and West Kentucky Coal Company (West Kentucky), to recover damages for violations of Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1 and 2.

The plaintiffs charged that UMW and large coal companies who form the Bituminous Coal Operators Association (BCOA) engaged in an unlawful conspiracy to eliminate and suppress competition and production in the coal industry and to control the Southern Appalachian and Southeastern Tennessee coal fields. The plan of the conspiracy was that only the coal operators who signed and complied with the National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement of 1950 as amended, including the 1958 Supplement, the Protective Wage Clause (PWC), would be permitted to carry on operations in that territory. It was alleged that the small companies could not operate profitably under the provisions of the National Agreement; that those who did not sign were picketed by UMW with force and violence, were not permitted to operate, and were forced out of business; and that plaintiffs were damaged as a result of the conspiracy. It was further charged that UMW invested $25,000,000 in acquiring control of West Kentucky Coal Company and its subsidiary, Nashville Coal Company, which was one of the largest members of BCOA, and that a portion of the investment was used for operational expenses, including payments into UMW's pension fund. Plaintiffs further contend that bids made to the Tennessee Valley Authority in the late 1950's and subsequent years for coal contracts by the major coal companies, including West Kentucky, were at prices below the prices charged in their other markets and in instances were below cost. As a result of this predatory bidding, the plaintiffs were unable to obtain long term coal contracts.

UMW denied that it engaged in any conspiracy. It asserted that all it did was to engage in traditional union activities to promote uniform wages in the coal industry for the betterment of its members.

West Kentucky was voluntarily dismissed from the case without prejudice. The case was tried before a jury which returned a general verdict in favor of the plaintiffs and made findings on special issues as follows:

                                 "GENERAL VERDICT FORM
                (1) We, the jury, find the United Mine Workers of America
                    did
                ___________ engage in a conspiracy, as alleged by the plaintiffs, to
                (did-did not)
                unreasonably restrain trade or to monopolize commerce in the bituminous
                coal industry outside or beyond the exemption granted by the
                antitrust statutes to a labor organization and in violation of Section
                1 or Section 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act
                (2) If your answer to Issue No. (1) was that the defendant did
                violate the Sherman Act We, the jury, find that the plaintiff
                                                          was
                Tennessee Consolidated Coal Company, _____________ damaged in its
                                                     (was-was not)
                business or property as a proximate result of defendant's violation
                of the Sherman Act
                (3) If your answer to Issue No. (2) was that Tennessee Consolidated
                Coal Company was damaged as a proximate result of defendant's
                violation of the Sherman Act We assess damages for Tennessee
                Consolidated Coal Company in the following amount. $977,500
                (4) If your answer to Issue No. (1) was that defendant did violate
                the Sherman Act We, the jury, find that the plaintiff, Grundy Mining
                             was
                Company _____________ damaged in its business or property as a
                        (was-was not)
                proximate result of defendant's violation of the Sherman Act
                (5) If your answer to Issue No. (4) is that Grundy Mining Company
                was damaged as a proximate result of defendant's violation of
                the Sherman Act We assess damages for Grundy Mining Company
                in the following amount. $22,500
                                                    s/ R. O. DAVIS
                                                             Jury Foreman"
                  

                                       "SPECIAL ISSUES
                (1) We, the jury, find that the United Mine Workers of America
                    did
                _____________ so act as to forfeit its exemption under the antitrust
                (did-did not)
                laws.
                (2) We, the jury, find that prior to and apart from the National Bituminous
                Coal Wage Agreement as amended in 1958, the defendant,
                                                   did not
                United Mine Workers of America, _____________ conspire, combine
                                                (did-did not)
                or conspire, combine or contract with the coal operators who signed
                the National Agreement that it would contract with non-signatory
                operators only upon the terms and conditions of the National Bituminous
                Coal Wage Agreement as amended from time to time.
                (3) We, the jury, find that the United Mine Workers of America
                and signatories of the National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement
                                        did
                as amended in 1958 _____________ intend that by the terms of the
                                   (did-did not)
                Protective Wage Clause the United Mine Workers of America agreed
                that it would contract with non-signatory operators only upon the
                terms and conditions of the National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement
                as amended from time to time.
                                                      s/ R. O. DAVIS
                                                               Jury Foreman"
                

UMW then filed a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and in the alternative for a new trial which the court carefully considered in an opinion appearing on 41 pages of the printed record. 102a-143a.

The District Court found that the damages in the amount of $977,500 awarded to TCC by the jury were excessive and suggested a remittitur of $500,000, which was accepted by TCC. The court then denied the motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and the motion for a new trial, and entered judgment in favor of TCC against UMW in the amount of $1,432,500 and in favor of Grundy in the amount of $67,500, being three times the amount of actual damages sustained by them. The Court allowed $150,000 attorneys fees to counsel for plaintiffs.

UMW has appealed. The parties have filed extensive well written briefs, a record consisting of four large volumes of a Joint Appendix and two supplements thereto, in addition to an appendix attached to one of the briefs.

Sufficiency of the Evidence

TCC was organized as a corporation in 1905 and owned about 50,000 acres of land in southeastern Tennessee on a portion of which prior to 1959 it was engaged in mining coal. TCC had leased a substantial portion of its coal-bearing land for mining properties to small truck mine operators.

UMW, an international labor union organized in 1905, had represented a majority of mine workers in the southeastern Tennessee coal fields for many years.

The facts of the case appear in the opinion of the District Court, previously mentioned, and in his reported opinion in Ramsey v. United Mine Workers, 265 F.Supp. 388 (E.D.Tenn.1967). Ramsey was an anti-trust action tried by the same Judge, but without a jury, and resulted in a judgment in favor of UMW which was affirmed by an equally divided court in Ramsey v. United Mine Workers, 416 F.2d 655 (6th Cir. 1969). The only significant difference between the evidence as introduced in Ramsey and as fully set forth in that opinion and the evidence in the present case was evidence of violence in the southeastern Tennessee coal fields discussed on pages 428-429 in the Ramsey opinion and omitted in the case at bar. Additional evidence was introduced relating to the Protective Wage Clause, consisting of minutes of the Joint Industry Contract Committee which functioned as a joint enforcement effort on the part of UMW and the signatory operators following the 1958 Amendment to the National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement. We will therefore not restate the facts except when necessary for purposes of clarity.

UMW points out that the court in Ramsey, on almost identical evidence as in the present case, and another District Court in Lewis v. Pennington, 257 F. Supp. 815 (E.D.Tenn.1966), with quite similar evidence, resolved the issues of liability in favor of UMW, and that we affirmed the judgment in Pennington. 400 F.2d 806 (6th Cir. 1968). UMW argues that it was therefore wrong for the jury to resolve the factual issues differently and that the verdict and judgment should be set aside and the complaint dismissed.

The doctrine of res judicata has no application as the present case involves different plaintiffs, who were not parties or privies to Ramsey or Pennington. Lawlor v. National Screen Serv. Corp., 349 U.S. 322, 329, 75 S.Ct. 865, 99 L.Ed. 1122 (1955).

The judge who heard Ramsey without a jury also presided at the jury trial in the present case. The evidence was conflicting. The judge did not think that the jury in the present case was bound by his factual findings in Ramsey. Neither do we.

In Fox West Coast Theatres Corp. v. Paradise Theatre Bldg. Corp., 264 F.2d 602, 605 (9th Cir. 1958), the court said:

"But it must be kept in mind that this is a question of fact which the jury has decided against appellants. It makes no

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