Tennessee Protection & Advocacy v. Board of Educ.

• Citation: 24 F.Supp.2d 808
• Decision Date: 20 October 1998
• Docket Number: No. 2-98-0036.,2-98-0036.
• Parties: TENNESSEE PROTECTION AND ADVOCACY, INC. v. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF PUTNAM COUNTY, TENNESSEE.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Tennessee

24 F.Supp.2d 808

TENNESSEE PROTECTION AND ADVOCACY, INC. v. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF PUTNAM COUNTY, TENNESSEE.

No. 2-98-0036.

United States District Court, M.D. Tennessee, Northeastern Division.

October 20, 1998.

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J. Page Garrett, Tennessee Protection and Advocacy, Inc., Nashville, TN, for Plaintiffs.

Daniel Hurley Rader, III, Moore, Rader, Clift & Fitzpatrick, P.C., Cookeville, TN, Melinda H. Maloney, Knoxville, TN, Charles L. Weatherly, The Weatherly Law Firm, Atlanta, GA, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM

WISEMAN, Senior District Judge.

Before the Court is defendant's motion to dismiss complaint for (1) lack of standing, (2) failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, and (3) failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Also before the Court are plaintiff's motion to amend complaint and supplemental brief in opposition to the motion to dismiss, and defendant's responsive motion to strike pleadings. For the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS defendant's motion to dismiss on the basis of lack of standing. The Court has considered plaintiff's proposed amended complaint and concludes that it does not cure plaintiff's lack of standing. Plaintiff's motion to amend its complaint is therefore DENIED. Although the Court considers the cases cited in plaintiff's Supplemental Brief in the discussion below, it finds that filing of that brief was in direct violation of Magistrate Judge Griffin's Order of June 8, 1998 that no other filings in support of or opposition to the motion to dismiss would be permitted without the express permission of the Court. (See Doc. 22 at 1.) Defendant's motion to strike is therefore GRANTED.

I. RELEVANT BACKGROUND

Tennessee Protection and Advocacy (TPA), the plaintiff, has filed suit against the defendant Putnam County Board of Education (Putnam County), claiming that under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400 et seq., Putnam County is obligated to provide physical and occupational therapy "as may be required to assist a child with a disability to benefit from special education and related services." 20 U.S.C. § 1401(22). TPA argues that IDEA establishes professional standards for individuals who provide such therapy, see 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(15), and that Putnam County, as a matter of policy, does not provide physical or occupational therapy to the disabled students in its school system except through "unqualified personnel." (Compl.¶ 6.C.) Presumably, TPA means that the personnel who function as therapists in the Putnam County school system are not actually licensed therapists. As an example, TPA claims that "a gym teacher who illegally provides physical therapy is held out to parents of children with disabilities as a `motor therapist.'" (Compl. ¶ 6.B.) TPA claims standing under 42 U.S.C. § 6042(a), which says in relevant part:

In order for a State to receive [federal funds] under ... this chapter —

(1) the State must have in effect a system to protect and advocate the rights of individuals with developmental disabilities;

(2) such system must —

(A) have the authority to —

(i) pursue legal, administrative, and other appropriate remedies or approaches to ensure the protection of, and advocacy for, the rights of such individuals within the State who are or may be eligible for treatment, services, or habilitation ...;

(B) have the authority to investigate incidents of abuse and neglect of individuals with developmental disabilities if the incidents are reported to the system or if there is probable cause to believe that the incidents occurred....

42 U.S.C. § 6042(a). It is undisputed that TPA is that system designated by Tennessee pursuant to § 6042. In that capacity, TPA seeks unspecified damages under § 1983, and requests a permanent injunction requiring Putnam County to comply with TPA's view of the governing law, and compensatory services for children who have not received occupational and physical therapy as required by federal and state law. In one of TPA's responses to Putnam County's motion, it states that its claim boils down to the "purely legal" question of whether it is legal for Putnam County "to use non-licensed personnel to provide physical therapy to disabled students." (Pl.'s Resp. to Def.'s Rep. to Pl.'s Resp. to Mot. Dismiss at 2.)

Putnam County argues that TPA's complaint fails for three reasons. First, it denies that TPA has standing under 42 U.S.C. § 6042 to bring this claim. Its position is that because TPA neither claims a direct injury-in-fact to the organization itself nor brings suit on behalf of named individuals with specific injuries, then it does not have standing, and therefore this Court should dismiss the complaint under Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.¹ Second, Putnam County argues that TPA's complaint should be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, in that the complaint "does not allege any factual or legal basis to support its allegations that the school system has deviated from the requirements of the IDEA or state law." (Def's Mem. Supp. Mot. Dismiss at 7.) Third, Putnam County argues that TPA's claim should be dismissed because it has failed to exhaust administrative remedies as required by the IDEA. Because the Court determines that the complaint must be dismissed for lack of standing, it does not reach the issue of exhaustion of administrative remedies or the request for dismissal on Rule 12(b)(6) grounds.

TPA has also filed a motion to amend its complaint and a "Supplemental Brief" in opposition to the motion to dismiss. These documents were filed more than three months after the last permitted response to the motion to dismiss. In its proposed amended complaint, TPA seeks to comply with "any pleading requirements allegedly imposed on [TPA] by the Supreme Court's decision in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-63, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992)." (Pl.'s Supp. Br. at 1.) Accordingly, in its proposed amended complaint, TPA alleges that "[c]hallenging Defendants' [sic] conduct in this case has caused Tennessee Protection and Advocacy, Inc. to take money away from its vital, ongoing, federally mandated information and referral services and put that money instead into funding direct litigation services in this particular case." (Proposed Compl. ¶ 30.) In other words, because it has devoted resources to litigation, TPA alleges that it has suffered injury-in-fact directly resulting from the allegedly illegal activities of the Putnam County Board of Education. In its supplementary brief, TPA cites some additional authority for its position that devotion of resources to litigation is sufficient to give it Article III standing. The Court will address those cases in the discussion of standing, below.

II. LEGAL STANDARDS

A. Rule 12(b)(1) Motion to Dismiss

The Sixth Circuit has adopted two standards of dismissal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Ohio Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. United States, 922 F.2d 320, 325 (6th Cir.1990). A facial attack merely questions the sufficiency of the pleading. In reviewing a facial attack, the Court applies the same standard applicable to Rule 12(b)(6) motions. On the other hand, where a court reviews a complaint under a factual attack, no presumptive truthfulness applies to the factual allegations. In such cases, the Court has wide discretion to allow affidavits, documents, and even a limited evidentiary hearing to resolve disputed jurisdictional facts. Id. The case at bar involves a facial attack rather than a factual attack, so the applicable standard is the same one applied in a Rule 12(b)(6) context.

Under Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint may be dismissed "only if it is clear that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with the allegations." Michigan Bell Telephone Co. v. MFS Intelenet of Mich., Inc., 16 F.Supp.2d 817, 822-23 (W.D.Mich.1998). The complaint must be construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and its well-pleaded facts must be accepted as true. The Court, however, need not accept as true legal conclusions or unwarranted factual inferences. Id. (citing Lewis v. ACB Business Serv., Inc., 135 F.3d 389, 405 (6th Cir.1998)). The purpose of a 12(b)(6) motion is to determine whether the plaintiff has stated a claim upon which relief may be granted. If the plaintiff lacks standing to bring the claim in the first place, then it has not stated a claim for which relief may be granted.

B. Article III Requirements

Federal jurisdiction is limited by the restrictions embodied in Article III of the United States Constitution. Plastic Engineered Components, Inc. v. Titan Indemnity Co., 974 F.Supp. 1106, 1109 (W.D.Mich.1997) (citing Bender v. Williamsport Area Sch. Dist., 475 U.S. 534, 541, 106 S.Ct. 1326, 89 L.Ed.2d 501 (1986)). Consequently, whenever it appears that the Court lacks jurisdiction over the subject-matter, the Court is required to dismiss the action. Moreover, subject-matter is presumed lacking until the pleader proves otherwise. Plastic Engineered Components, Inc., 974 F.Supp. at 1109; see Fed. R. Civ. P 8(a)(1).

Article III § 2 of the Constitution confers jurisdiction in the federal courts over "cases" and "controversies." "One element of the case or controversy requirement is that [the plaintiff], based on [its] complaint, must establish that [it] has standing to sue. The standing inquiry focuses on whether the plaintiff is the proper party to bring this suit." Raines v. Byrd, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 117 S.Ct. 2312, 2317, 138 L.Ed.2d 849 (1997). The Supreme Court has described the case or controversy requirement as "immutable," Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 117 S.Ct. 1154, 1163, 137 L.Ed.2d 281 (1997), and as the "irreducible constitutional minimum." Lujan v....