Tennie v. Farm Bureau Prop. Ins. Co.
| Decision Date | 04 June 2021 |
| Docket Number | NUMBER 2020 CA 1297 |
| Citation | 327 So.3d 1020 |
| Parties | Markeeta TENNIE v. FARM BUREAU PROPERTY INSURANCE COMPANY d/b/a Louisiana Farm Bureau Insurance Company and Kristopher Carter |
| Court | Court of Appeal of Louisiana — District of US |
Christopher Jude Roy, Jr., Alexandria, LA, Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellant, Markeeta Tennie
Stacey Allen Moak, Breann Crane, Baton Rouge, LA, Counsel for Defendant/Appellee, Farm Bureau Property Insurance Company D/B/A Louisiana Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company
Robert H. Savant, Baton Rouge, LA, Counsel for Defendant/Appellee, Kristopher Carter
BEFORE: WHIPPLE, C.J., WELCH, AND CHUTZ, JJ.
This matter is before us on appeal by plaintiff, Markeeta Tennie, from a judgment of the trial court granting defendant Louisiana Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company's (Farm Bureau) motion for summary judgment and dismissing her claims against Farm Bureau. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
On November 29, 2016, Kristopher Carter picked up his four-year-old son, Marcel Tennie, from daycare at the request of Marcel's mother, Markeeta Tennie.1 While some of the facts regarding the events that occurred thereafter and throughout the course of the evening are in dispute, it is undisputed that at some point in the night, Marcel suffered from a medical emergency while in the care of Mr. Carter, which resulted in his death. Marcel's cause of death was classified as a homicide due to complications of multiple blunt force trauma.2
On October 23, 2017, Ms. Tennie filed suit against Louisiana Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company3 and Mr. Carter, alleging that the defendants were liable to her for the wrongful death of her son, Marcel, because Mr. Carter engaged in "horseplay" with Marcel, which caused injuries that ultimately led to his death when Mr. Carter failed to timely seek medical treatment for Marcel. As to Farm Bureau specifically, the petition alleged that Mr. Carter lived at his parents’ home, which was insured under a policy of liability insurance through Farm Bureau, and that the policy extended liability coverage to Mr. Carter, as a relative living in the household with the permission of his parents. Farm Bureau answered and denied liability, asserting, inter alia, that the policy contained two exclusions, namely, one which excludes coverage due to "intentional acts or directions by... any insured," and another, which excludes coverage for bodily injury to any insured and defines "insured" as the named insured and any residents of the household who are also relatives of the named insured.
On September 13, 2018, Ms. Tennie filed a supplemental and amending petition, averring that after she allowed Mr. Carter to keep Marcel for the night, Marcel "became ill for some reason, where he vomited, had diarrhea, became lethargic and had a general sickness," which Mr. Carter did not report to Ms. Tennie. She further alleged that despite Marcel's "serious medical problem," Mr. Carter did not bring Marcel to get medical treatment or call her, and that his failure to act and get medical treatment caused Marcel's death or the loss of a significant chance of Marcel's survival. Farm Bureau filed a general denial to this petition and, after discovery, filed a motion for summary judgment.4
In its motion for summary judgment, Farm Bureau contended that "there is no genuine issue of material fact that the Farm Bureau homeowner's policy...at issue in this matter does not provide coverage for this incident and/or the fault of Kristopher Carter who caused [Marcel's death]." Farm Bureau asserted that two policy exclusions apply to this matter: Section II(1)(a), which excludes coverage for bodily injury resulting from the expected or unexpected results of any intentional acts by any insured ("the intentional acts exclusion"), and Section II(2)(f), which excludes coverage for bodily injury to any insured, including resident relatives of the household ("the resident relative exclusion").
Ms. Tennie opposed the motion, contending that Farm Bureau could not "unequivocally" prove that the two policy exclusions applied to the instant matter. Ms. Tennie asserted that the evidence presented shows that disputed facts remain as to whether Mr. Carter intentionally made contact with Marcel, causing his injuries. According to Ms. Tennie, Mr. Carter's negligence in failing to seek medical care, and not an intentional act, led to Marcel's death. As to the resident relative exclusion, Ms. Tennie contended that because Marcel was only an "occasional visitor" at the residence, the resident relative exclusion did not apply.
Mr. Carter also filed an opposition to the motion, contending that his testimony that he did not touch Marcel was sufficient to preclude summary judgment as his testimony creates "an undeniable genuine issue of material fact" as to whether he intentionally made contact with Marcel. He also contended that because Ms. Tennie exercised "complete control" over Marcel, she and Marcel did not live at his parent's residence.
After a hearing on the motion on July 13, 2020, the trial court granted Farm Bureau's motion for summary judgment and dismissed all of Ms. Tennie's claims against Farm Bureau, with prejudice, on July 20, 2020.
Ms. Tennie now appeals, contending that the trial court erred in granting Farm Bureau's motion for summary judgment. Specifically, she contends the evidence shows a "disputed issue of material fact" regarding:
The summary judgment procedure is designed to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action, except those disallowed by LSA-C.C.P. art. 969 ; the procedure is favored and shall be construed to accomplish these ends. LSA-C.C.P. art 966(A)(2). After an opportunity for adequate discovery, summary judgment shall be granted if the motion, memorandum, and supporting documents show that there is no genuine issue as to material fact and that the mover is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. LSA-C.C.P. art. 966(A)(3). Appellate courts review summary judgments de novo, using the same criteria that govern the trial court's consideration of whether summary judgment is appropriate. Smith v. Northshore Regional Medical Center. Inc., 2014-0628, (La. App. 1st Cir. 1/26/15), 170 So. 3d 173, 176.
In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the court's role is not to evaluate the weight of the evidence or to make a credibility determination, but instead to determine whether or not there is a genuine issue of material fact. Hines v. Garrett, 2004-0806 (La. 6/25/04), 876 So. 2d 764, 765 (per curiam ); Penn v. CarePoint Partners of Louisiana, L.L.C., 2014-1621 (La. App. 1st Cir. 7/30/15), 181 So. 3d 26, 30. A genuine issue is one as to which reasonable persons could disagree; if reasonable persons could reach only one conclusion, summary judgment is appropriate. Hines, 876 So. 2d at 765-66. A fact is "material" when its existence or nonexistence may be essential to plaintiff's cause of action under the applicable theory of recovery. Collins v. Franciscan Missionaries of Our Lady Health Sys., Inc., 2019-0577 (La. App. 1st Cir. 2/21/20), 298 So. 3d 191, 195, writ denied, 2020-00480 (La. 6/22/20), 297 So. 3d 773. Simply put, a "material" fact is one that would matter at a trial on the merits. Any doubt as to a dispute regarding a material issue of fact must be resolved against granting the motion and in favor of a trial on the merits. Collins, 297 So. 3d at 773.
The burden of proof rests with the mover. LSA-C.C.P. art. 966(D)(1). Nevertheless, if the mover will not bear the burden of proof at trial on the issue that is before the court on the motion for summary judgment, the mover's burden on the motion does not require him to negate all essential elements of the adverse party's claim, action, or defense, but rather to point out to the court the absence of factual support for one or more elements essential to the adverse party's claim, action, or defense. The burden is then on the adverse party to produce factual support sufficient to establish the existence of a genuine issue of material fact or that the mover is not entitled to judgment as a matter of law. LSA-C.C.P. art. 966(D)(1). In deciding a summary judgment motion, it must first be determined whether the supporting documents presented by the mover are sufficient to resolve all material fact issues. Savannah v. Smithy's Supply/Big 4 Trucking, 2018-1033 (La. App. 1st Cir. 5/31/19), 280 So. 3d 615, 619, writ denied, 2019-01286 (La. 10/21/19), 280 So. 3d 1168.
In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the trial court's role is not to evaluate the weight of the evidence or to determine the truth of the matter, but instead to determine whether there is a genuine issue of triable fact. Janney v. Pearce, 2009-2103 (La. App. 1st Cir. 5/7/10), 40 So. 3d 285, 289, writ denied , 2010-1356 (La. 9/24/10), 45 So. 3d 1078. Because it is the applicable substantive law that determines materiality, whether a particular fact in dispute is material can be seen only in light of the substantive law applicable to the case. Georgia-Pacific Consumer Operations, LLC v. City of Baton Rouge, 2017-1553 (La. App. 1st Cir. 7/18/18), 255 So. 3d 16, 22, writ denied, 2018-1397 (La. 12/3/18), 257 So. 3d 194.
The interpretation of an insurance policy usually involves a legal question that can be resolved properly in the framework of a motion for summary judgment. An insurance policy is a contract between the parties and should be construed using the general rules of interpretation of contracts set forth in the Civil Code. Womack v. Mar Jay Productions, L.L.C., 2019-0712 (La. App. 1st...
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Maxie v. Bates
...used or occupied by you for residential purposes." See , Tennie v. Farm Bureau Property Ins. Co. , 2020-1297 (La. App. 1 Cir. 6/4/21), 327 So. 3d 1020, writ denied , 2021-00949 (La. 10/19/21), 326 So. 3d 231.CONCLUSIONFor the reasons set forth above, we affirm the trial court's judgment gra......