Tennyson v. State, CR–10–1128.

• Decision Date: 10 August 2012
• Docket Number: CR–10–1128.
• Citation: 101 So.3d 1256
• Parties: Randy Lynn TENNYSON v. STATE of Alabama.
• Court: Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals

101 So.3d 1256

Randy Lynn TENNYSON

v.STATE of Alabama.

CR–10–1128.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama.

May 25, 2012.

Rehearing Denied Aug. 10, 2012.

William S. Poole, Jr., Demopolis; and William A. Short, Jr., Bessemer, for appellant.

Luther Strange, atty. gen., and Robin Denise Scales, asst. atty. gen., for appellee.

BURKE, Judge.

On March 18, 2011, Randy Lynn Tennyson was convicted of soliciting a child by computer, a violation of § 13A–6–110, Ala.Code 1975, and was sentenced to seven years' imprisonment. Section 13A–6–110, Ala.Code 1975, was repealed by Act No. 2009–745, Ala. Acts 2009, effective May 22, 2009. However, “ ‘the law in effect at the time of the commission of the offense controls the prosecution.’ ” Stewart v. State, 990 So.2d 441, 442 (Ala.Crim.App.2008), quoting Davis v. State, 571 So.2d 1287, 1289 (Ala.Crim.App.1990). Tennyson was arrested on August 18, 2006, and the relevant conduct occurred before that date. Therefore, the issue presented should be analyzed under § 13A–6–110.

Tennyson was convicted following a bench trial in which a joint stipulation of facts was presented to the court. The trial court subsequently denied Tennyson's motion for a judgment of acquittal, motion for a new trial, and motion for arrest of judgment. The stipulation incorporated the following items to be considered by the trial court in determining whether Tennyson was guilty: the transcript from Tennyson's preliminary hearing; a copy of the terms and conditions from a Web site used by Tennyson; Tennyson's motion to dismiss the indictment; the Demopolis Police Department's case synopsis and arrest report regarding Tennyson; and the transcript of the chat-room logs documenting the conversations between Tennyson and “Amie Baxter.” (C. 163.)

According to the Demopolis Police Department's case synopsis, Tennyson admitted that he communicated with the online profile of “Amie Baxter,” whom he believed to be a 15–year–old female living in Demopolis. However, Tennyson was actually communicating with Sgt. Tim Soronen, a detective with the Demopolis Police Department, who was posing as 15–year–old “Amie Baxter.” The parties stipulated that Tennyson was never in communication with an actual 15–year–old girl. During the online conversations between Tennyson and “Amie Baxter,” Tennyson made plans to meet her for the purpose of engaging in sadomasochistic acts. Specifically, Tennyson wanted to spank her and have her spank him. (C. 260–72.) On August 18, 2006, Tennyson traveled to Demopolis where he was to meet “Amie Baxter” outside a movie theater. Tennyson was arrested near the theater by Sgt. Soronen.

The sole issue on appeal is whether a person could be convicted of violating § 13A–6–110, Ala.Code 1975, as it provided prior to May 22, 2009, when an actual child was never solicited even though that person believed that he was soliciting an actual child. “Where, as here, an appellate court reviews a trial court's conclusion of law and its application of law to the facts, it applies a de novo standard of review.” Stewart v. State, 990 So.2d 441, 442 (Ala.Crim.App.2008.)

Section 13A–6–110 was repealed after Tennyson was arrested and indicted. Before its repeal, § 13A–6–110 provided:

“In addition to the provisions of Section 13A–6–69[ ¹], a person is guilty of solicitation of a child by a computer if the person is 19 years of age or older and the person knowingly, with the intent to commit an unlawful sex act, entices, induces, persuades, seduces, prevails, advises, coerces, or orders, by means of a computer, a child who is less than 16 years of age and at least three years younger than the defendant, to meet with the defendant or any other person for the purpose of engaging in sexual intercourse, sodomy, or to engage in a sexual performance, obscene sexual performance, or sexual conduct for his or her benefit.”

§ 13A–6–110, Ala.Code 1975 (emphasis added). Tennyson argues that the plain language of § 13A–6–110 required that an actual child be solicited. He also notes that § 13A–6–110 was replaced by § 13A–6–122, Ala.Code 1975, which altered the language of the repealed section and provides:

“In addition to the provisions of Section 13A–6–69[ ²], a person who, knowingly, with the intent to commit an unlawful sex act, entices, induces, persuades, seduces, prevails, advises, coerces, lures, or orders, or attempts to entice, induce, persuade, seduce, prevail, advise, coerce, lure, or order, by means of a computer, on-line service, Internet service, Internet bulletin board service, weblog, cellular phone, video game system, personal data assistant, telephone, facsimile machine, camera, universal serial bus drive, writable compact disc, magnetic storage device, floppy disk, or any other electronic communication or storage device, a child who is at least three years younger than the defendant, or another person believed by the defendant to be a child at least three years younger than the defendant to meet with the defendant or any other person for the purpose of engaging in sexual intercourse, sodomy, or to engage in a sexual performance, obscene sexual performance, or sexual conduct for his or her benefit or for the benefit of another, is guilty of electronic solicitation of a child....”

§ 13A–6–122, Ala.Code 1975 (emphasis added). Additionally, at the same time it enacted § 13A–6–122, the legislature enacted § 13A–6–127, Ala.Code 1975, which, among other things, provides: “It shall not be a defense to prosecution under this article ... [t]hat an undercover operative or law enforcement officer was involved in the detection and investigation of an offense....”

Tennyson also points out that the legislation that proposed §§ 13A–6–122 and 13A–6–127 stated that its purpose was, among other things, “to specify that the crime may be committed if the person the defendant believed to be a child was a law enforcement officer, a meeting did not occur, or the actor did not intend for a meeting to occur.” Act No. 2009–745. According to Tennyson, this demonstrates that § 13A–6–110, as it existed when he engaged in the charged conduct, did not intend that a crime was committed under that section if the person being solicited was not actually a child.

The State relies primarily on this Court's decision in Baney v. State, 42 So.3d 170 (Ala.Crim.App.2009). In Baney, the appellant was convicted of transmitting obscene material to a child in violation of § 13A–6–111, Ala.Code 1975. ³ Like Tennyson, the appellant in Baney argued that, to be convicted under § 13A–6–111, a person must transmit obscene material to an actual child and not to an undercover officer posing as a child. However, this Court held:

“Baney's mistaken belief that he was communicating with a child did not negate the culpable mental state as required by § 13A–6–111, Ala.Code 1975. Also, the clear language of the statute contains no requirement that the recipient of the prohibited transmissions actually be a child, only that the perpetrator's purpose be to send such sexual material to initiate or to engage in sexual activities with a child. The only logical conclusion that we can reach based on the legislative intent and the fact that ‘mistake of fact’ is not a defense in Alabamais that § 13A–6–111, Ala.Code 1975, does not require that the perpetrator communicate with an actual child, only that the perpetrator thinks he or she is communicating with a child.”

Baney, 42 So.3d at 174. This Court concluded that “an individual may be guilty of violating § 13A–6–111, when the individual transmits obscene images to someone he/she believes is a child for the purpose of initiating or engaging in sexual acts with a child.” Id.

The State argues that the reasoning supporting this Court's interpretation of § 13A–6–111 in Baney should also apply to § 13A–6–110. However, nothing in Baney specifically says that. In fact, this Court pointed out in Baney that “[s]ection 13A–6–110, is very specific as to the age of the child, while § 13A–6–111, Ala.Code 1975, contains no such limiting provision regarding the definition of ‘child.’ ” Id. at 173. We also held that “the clear language of [§ 13A–6–111] contains no requirement that the recipient of the prohibited transmissions actually be a child, only that the perpetrator's purpose be to send such sexual material to initiate or to engage in sexual activities with a child.” Id. at 174.

Baney focused on the fact that § 13A–6–111 was worded differently than § 13A–6–110. Section 13A–6–110 specifically stated that, to be guilty of solicitation of a child by a computer, a person must, among other things, entice, induce, etc., “a child who is less than 16 years of age and at least three years younger than the defendant....” In contrast, § 13A–6–111(a), Ala.Code 1975, states:

“A person is guilty of transmitting obscene material to a child if the person transmits, by means of any computer communication system ... material which ... depicts actual or simulated nudity, sexual conduct, or sadomasochistic abuse, for the purpose of initiating or engaging in sexual acts with the child.”

Nothing in the plain language of 13A–6–111 requires that the recipient of the obscene material be a child. We held in Baney that a person violates § 13A–6–111 if “the individual transmits obscene images to someone he/she believes is a child for the purpose of initiating or engaging in sexual acts with a child.” Baney, 42 So.3d at 174.

The relevant inquiry for determining a violation of § 13A–6–111 is the defendant's state of mind when he or she transmitted the obscene images. The actual recipient of the obscene material is irrelevant so long as it is proven that the defendant's purpose in sending the material was to ultimately initiate or engage in sexual acts with a child. Although § 13A–6–110 also requires that the purpose of the defendant's solicitation be to engage in sexual acts with a child, that section specifically states that the person solicited must be “a child...