Tenpenny v. Prime Now, LLC
| Decision Date | 29 April 2020 |
| Docket Number | No. 3:19-0420,3:19-0420 |
| Parties | TINA TENPENNY v. PRIME NOW, LLC |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Tennessee |
Pending before the Court is Plaintiff's motion to expand the case management deadline and to amend her complaint (Docket Entry ("DE") 39), to which Defendant has filed a response in opposition. (DE 43.) Also pending is Defendant's renewed motion for sanctions (DE 44), to which Plaintiff has filed a response. (DE 49.) Defendant has also filed a subsequent reply to Plaintiff's response. (DE 50.)
For the reasons stated herein, Plaintiff's motion (DE 39) is DENIED and Defendant's motion (DE 44) is RESERVED. The Clerk is directed to terminate Defendant's motion as pending without prejudice for Defendant to renew in its entirety or in part. Plaintiff must comply with the additional discovery production detailed in the conclusion of this Order.
The two motions at issue stem from Plaintiff's indifference to procedural requirements and her refusal to turn over relevant evidence. On August 8, 2019, the Court issued an initial case management order that required any motions to amend or to add parties be filed by January 10, 2020. (DE 14 at ¶ H.) On December 31, 2019, Plaintiff filed a motion requesting an extension of this deadline. (DE 28.) The Court granted this motion and extended the deadline for any motions to amend to February 21, 2020. (DE 29 at 1-2.) In granting the motion, the Court admonished Plaintiff's counsel for failing to confer with opposing counsel prior to filing the motion, as required under Local Rule 7.01(a)(1). (Id. at 1, n.1.) The Court expressly stated that any noncompliance by Plaintiff in the future would not likely be excused. (Id.)
On February 17, 2020, Plaintiff filed a motion for leave to file an amended complaint. (DE 32.) In addition to again disregarding the requirement of Local Rule 7.01(a) and 15.02(a)(2) that Plaintiff's counsel confer with opposing counsel and state in the motion whether the requested relief was likely to be opposed, no accompanying memorandum of law was filed with Plaintiff's motion in compliance with Local Rule 7.01(a)(2).1 The Court therefore denied Plaintiff's motion without prejudice and advised that "any later filed motion to amend must also demonstrate good cause for relief from the February 21 deadline for filing motions to amend." (DE 38 at 1.)
Instead of filing a new motion for leave to amend, Plaintiff filed the instant motion to expand the case management deadline that includes as attachments an accompanying memorandum (see DE 39-1), a revised motion for leave to amend the complaint (see DE 39-4), and an additional memorandum of law in support of the motion for leave to amend (see DE 39-5). Thereafter the Court ordered Defendant to file a response that addressed both the timeliness of Plaintiff's motion and the substance of her request for leave to amend (DE 40 at 1-2), which Defendant has done. (See DE 43.)
The second matter before the Court is a discovery dispute involving a claim of spoliation of evidence. On November 12, 2019, Plaintiff filed a motion for a protective order to preventDefendant from implementing a forensic examination of her cell phone. (DE 28.) The Court granted the motion in part but permitted the forensic examination of the cell phone and "any other electronic devices with which she communicated with Jared Ryan," subject to certain restrictions. (DE 29 at 9.) The ensuing forensic examination revealed that Plaintiff had deleted all text messages to and from Mr. Ryan and had additionally deleted the corresponding backup data on iCloud, which rendered the text messages irretrievable. (DE 45 at 2.) During Plaintiff's subsequent deposition on January 30, 2020, however, Plaintiff revealed for the first time that one of her friends, Rebecca Jones, had taken screenshots of some of Plaintiff's text messages with Mr. Ryan and sent these screenshots to a cell phone belonging to Plaintiff's son, Justin Tenpenny, before the text messages were deleted from Plaintiff's phone. (Id. and 45-5) Defendant notes that Plaintiff failed to previously identify Ms. Jones as a potential witness in either her Rule 26 initial disclosures or an interrogatory in which Plaintiff was asked to identify any individual who might have information relating to the allegations set forth in the complaint. (Id. at 7.)2
Upon learning of this information, Defendant requested that Plaintiff supplement her previous discovery responses, and both reimburse Defendant for the "unnecessary examination" of Plaintiff's cell phone and provide her son's cell phone for forensic examination. (Id. at 3 and 45-6.) Defendant asserts that Plaintiff has not complied with either of these requests andtherefore seeks sanctions pursuant to Rule 37 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (See DE 44.)3
Leave to amend a pleading generally should be "freely given when justice so requires," Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a), which "reinforce[s] the principle that cases 'should be tried on their merits rather than the technicalities of pleadings.'" Moore v. City of Paducah, 790 F.2d 557, 559 (6th Cir. 1986) (quoting Tefft v. Seward, 689 F.2d 637, 639 (6th Cir. 1982)). However, the Supreme Court has indicated that although the moving party "ought to be afforded an opportunity to test [her] claim on the merits," one or more of the following conditions may negate this directive: undue delay, bad faith, dilatory motive, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by previous amendments, undue prejudice to the opposing party, or futility of the proposed amendment. Thiokol Corp. v. Dep't of Treasury, State of Mich., Revenue Div., 987 F.2d 376, 383 (6th Cir. 1993) (quoting Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962)). In addition, when a party seeks to amend in the late stages of a case, the moving party bears "an increased burden to show justification for failing to move earlier." Wade v. Knoxville Utilities Bd., 259 F.3d 452, 459 (6th Cir. 2001); see also Duggins v Steak 'N Shake, Inc., 195 F.3d 828, 834 (6th Cir. 1999). Ultimately, the determination of whether to permit a requested amendment is within the trial court's "sound discretion." Moore, 790 F.2d at 559 (internal citations omitted).4
Because Plaintiff's motion also involves a request to extend the scheduling deadline for motions to amend, the Court must consider Rule 15 in conjunction with Rule 16, which restricts the timing of amendments to a pleading. Specifically, Rule 16 directs that a scheduling or case management order must include the time within which a party may amend the pleadings. Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(3)(A). This requirement is designed to ensure that "at some point both the parties and the pleadings will be fixed." Fed. R. Civ. P. 16, 1983 Advisory Committee's Notes.
349 F.3d at 909 (internal citation omitted). See also Amoco Pipeline Co. v. Herman Drainage Sys., 212 F. Supp. 2d 710, 730-31 (W.D. Mich. 2002) ( ).
Stewart v. King, 2011 WL 237678, at *5 (M.D. Tenn. Jan. 24, 2011) (Trauger, J.) (internal citations omitted).
The Court will deny Plaintiff's motion on both procedural and substantive grounds. As to the procedural considerations, Plaintiff fails to provide any justification that could reasonably constitute "good cause" for failing to adhere to the scheduling order deadlines with a properly filed motion. Her argument instead amounts to little more than a mea culpa:
[Plaintiff], via counsel, was diligent in her effort to meet the case management deadline for amending the complaint. She filed the original motion for leave within the deadline showing she was both mindful of the deadline, and making every attempt comply [sic]. The sole reason for a second motion after the deadline is the original motion was flawed. In the original motion, Counsel failed to include the mandatory language required by local rules 7.01 and 15.01. Although the language was missing, counsel did execute the requirements themselves. Clearly, this error falls...
To continue reading
Request your trial