Teodorski v. Teodorski
Decision Date | 12 August 2004 |
Citation | 857 A.2d 194 |
Parties | David TEODORSKI, Appellee, v. Melinda Sue TEODORSKI, Appellant. |
Court | Pennsylvania Superior Court |
Donald W. Grieshober, Erie, for appellant.
Frank L. Kroto, Jr., Erie, for appellee.
¶ 1 Melinda Teodorski (appellant/wife) appeals from the order of the Court of Common Pleas of Erie County (Connelly, J.) denying nearly all of wife's exceptions to the report of the Master in Divorce. We affirm.
¶ 2 The trial court aptly described the procedural history of this case.
Trial court opinion, 11/6/04, at 1-3. The trial court denied all of wife's exceptions, except that the court increased the Master's recommendation of attorney's fees to $2,310.00.
¶ 3 Wife presents four questions for our review.
Appellant's brief, at 3. For the reasons stated below, we affirm.
¶ 4 The parties dispute the date of final separation. Wife argues that the date of final separation is February 2, 1998, the date the divorce complaint was filed. Husband agrees with the Master and the trial court, arguing that the date of final separation is January 12, 1995, the date wife obtained a protection from abuse (PFA) order against husband.
¶ 5 Our standard of review is one of an abuse of discretion. "Absent an abuse of discretion, the trial court's findings of fact, if supported by credible evidence of record, are binding upon a reviewing court." Wellner v. Wellner, 699 A.2d 1278, 1280 (Pa.Super.1997) (citations omitted). Only property acquired "prior to the date of final separation" is marital property and therefore subject to equitable distribution.1 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3501-02.
¶ 6 The date of final separation revolves around the definition of "separate and apart."
( with )Britton v. Britton, 400 Pa.Super. 43, 582 A.2d 1335 (1990) ( ).
Wellner, 699 A.2d at 1281 ( ).
¶ 7 After a review of the record, we agree with the Master and the trial court that both parties lived separate and apart during the period between the entry of the PFA order (January 12, 1995) and the filing of the divorce complaint (February 2, 1998).2
¶ 8 First, husband and wife continued to have sexual relations between 1995 and 1998. In fact, a second child was born as the result of one of these encounters. While wife testified that these sexual encounters occurred with relative frequency, husband testified that they had sex only once during the separation period. Clearly, the Master and the trial court believed husband's account. But even if the Master and court credited wife's account, mere sexual relations is insufficient to support reconciliation. See Miller v. Miller, 352 Pa.Super. 432, 508 A.2d 550, 553 (1986)
(). See also Frey v. Frey, 821 A.2d 623, 628 (Pa.Super.2003).
¶ 9 Wife also testified that husband provided for her needs and the needs of the children. Husband did indeed purchase a trailer home, pay alimony and child support (albeit only for one child), and provide other necessities for his children. These facts do not dictate a finding of reconciliation. In Mackey v. Mackey, 376 Pa.Super. 146, 545 A.2d 362 (1988), we found that a husband and wife lived separate and apart despite the fact that they lived under the same roof and shared expenses.
For certain, the parties have shared some common household expenses, occupied common living spaces, visited family members together and occasionally entertained mutual friends at their residence. However, Mr. Mackey should not be denied a unilateral divorce merely because he and his wife have demonstrated a level of civility rarely seen in a divorce action.
Mackey, 545 A.2d at 365 (footnote omitted). The instant case is similar. Husband moved out of the marital home after the PFA order, but continued to financially assist his children, visit with his children, and occasionally visit with wife. Husband also provided financial assistance to wife via alimony payments.
¶ 10 Further, husband's agreement to marriage counseling does not imply that husband and wife reconciled to such an extent as to declare that the parties are no longer living separate and apart. Doing so would go against public policy. The legislative intent of the Divorce Code is to "[e]ncourage and effect reconciliation and settlement of differences." 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 3102(a)(2). See also Mackey, 545 A.2d at 365 n. 6
.
¶ 11 Wife argues that the PFA order she filed against husband did not show an intent to separate, and that the only evidence of an intent to separate was husband's filing of the divorce complaint in 1998. It is true that there ...
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§ 5.03 Determining What Is "Marital Property"
...1997).[95] Marriage of Fennelly and Breckenfelder, 737 N.W.2d 97 (Iowa 2007).[96] See 23 Pa. Stat. § 401. And see Teodorski v. Teodorski, 857 A.2d 194 (Pa. Super. 2004). Compare, Hutnik v. Hutnik, 369 Pa. Super. 263, 535 A.2d 151 (1987) (misapplying the law and including pension contributio......