Tepper v. Supreme Council of Royal Arcanum

• Citation: 47 A. 460,61 N.J.E. 638
• Parties: TEPPER v. SUPREME COUNCIL OF ROYAL ARCANUM et al.
• Decision Date: 19 November 1900
• Court: United States State Supreme Court (New Jersey)

47 A. 460

61 N.J.E. 638

TEPPER

v. SUPREME COUNCIL OF ROYAL ARCANUM et al.

Court of Errors and Appeals of New Jersey.

Nov. 19, 1900.

(Syllabus by the Court.)

Appeal from court of chancery.

Bill by Charles Frederick Tepper against the Supreme Council of the Royal Arcanum and others. Decree for complainant. 45 Atl. 111. Defendants appeal. Reversed.

Rudolph F. Rabe, for appellants.

J. E. Walsheid and James B Vredenburgh, for complainant.

W. Holt Apgar, for Royal Arcanum.

DIXON, J. On June 5, 1885, William Tepper became a member of Hoboken Council, No. 99, a subordinate lodge of the Supreme Council of the Royal Arcanum, and on July 8, 1885, he received a benefit certificate of the order, by which the supreme council bound itself to pay to Anna Plondrick, Antoinette Sieburg, Wilhelmina Ranges, August Zuber, Wilhelm Zuber, and Friedrich Tepper a sum not exceeding $3,000, on the death of said William Tepper. This certificate was issued to him on an application in which he described the persons above named as being "related to me as my children." He died January 16, 1898. Afterwards a dispute respecting the right to the $3,000 arose between Friedrich Tepper, who is the only child of William Tepper by nature, and the other beneficiaries, who were the stepchildren of William Tepper through his marriage with their mother; and thereupon Frederich filed a bill in chancery against the stepchildren and the supreme council to secure the payment of the whole sum to himself. By its answer the council declares itself ready to pay the money as the court may decree. The question in the case, therefore, is whether the complainant is entitled to the entire fund, or only to a share in conjunction with the stepchildren.

The Royal Arcanum was organized in Massachusetts on November 5, 1877, under a statute of that state passed May 9, 1877, which provided for the organization of such societies "for the purpose of assisting the widows, orphans or other dependents of deceased members." In 1882 a supplement to the statute was passed, empowering such organizations to adopt by-laws and provide funds "for the purpose of assisting the widows, orphans or other relatives of deceased members, or any person dependent upon deceased members." In 1884 the Royal Arcanum adopted an amended constitution, according to which a member's benefit certificate was to be made payable "to his family or those dependent on him, as he may direct," and also amended by-laws, which required the member applying for a certificate to "enter upon his application the name or names and relationship or dependence of the members of his family, or those dependent upon him, to whom he desires his benefit paid," and which also provided that "when no relation by marriage or consanguinity is shown in the direction for payment of benefit, proof of dependency must be furnished to the supreme secretary, before the benefit certificate is issued." William Tepper married the mother of these stepchildren in 1864 when the oldest of them was about 11 years of age, and thereafter they lived with him and his wife as members of his family, assisting, as soon as they were able to work in meeting the expenses of the household, until they married. But before 1885 they had all married and left their parents' home, in determining the right of these stepchildren to share in the fund, we must first consider the scope of the Massachusetts statute; for it is settled that these beneficial societies cannot create funds for the benefit of persons outside of the classes mentioned in the statute. Legion of Honor v. Perry, 140 Mass. 580, 5 N. E. 634; Same v. Smith, 45 N. J. Eq. 466, 17 Atl. 770; Britton v. Royal Arcanum, 46 N. J. Eq. 102, 18 Atl. 675, affirmed in 47 N. J. Eq. 325, 21 Atl. 754; Fraternity v. Martin, 59 N. J. Law, 207, 35 Atl. 908. But, in determining who constitute those classes, the supreme court of Massachusetts, in the case first cited, declared, "It is the duty of the court to construe the statute liberally, and in such manner as to carry out the benevolent purpose sought to be provided for, and in no event, unless absolutely required by its language, to construe it so as to defeat such purpose." 140 Mass. 589, 5 N. E. 636. The classes mentioned in the statute, existing when the present certificate was issued, are those described as "widows, orphans or other relatives of deceased members, or any person dependent on deceased members." According to the opinion of this court in Bennett v. Van Riper, 47 N. J. Eq. 563, 22 Atl. 1055, 14 L. R. A. 342, where the words "related to" in the by-law of a benevolent order similar to the Royal Arcanum was under consideration, the relatives of deceased members include relatives by affinity as well as relatives by blood. Following the lead of that case, we should regard stepchildren as relatives, within the meaning of the Massachusetts statute. But it is urged that the meaning of this word has been fixed by the supreme court of Massachusetts as being confined to relatives by blood (Esty v. Clark, 101 Mass. 36; Kimball v. Story, 108 Mass. 382), and that we are bound by that definition. We think, however, that these cases are not in point. They deal with a statute declaring the effect of a "devise of real or personal estate * * * to a child or other relation of the testator," when the devisee dies before the testator, leaving issue who survive the testator. Under the settled rule for the construction of wills, which limits the meaning of "relatives" to those who would take under the statute of distribution, the court held that this statute used the term in this "strict legal and technical sense." But to apply the same rule to the statute now in hand would certainly not be "to construe the statute liberally," as the Massachusetts court, in Legion of Honor v. Perry, ubi supra, said was proper; and we incline to think that that court would make the same distinction as was made by us in Bennett v. Van Riper, ubi supra, where the rule applied to wills was expressly held to be too narrow for these benevolent associations. We therefore conclude that the statute of 1882 permitted the designation of stepchildren as beneficiaries.

The next question is whether the constitution and by-laws of 1884 permitted such a designation. They authorized payment to be made to "a member's family * * * as he may direct," and required the member to declare "the relationship of the members of his family * * * to whom he desires the benefit paid," and provided for what should be done when "no relationship by marriage or consanguinity is shown." As to the term denoting relationship, we see no reason for giving it a narrower meaning than that borne by the same term in the statute. The express reference to relations by marriage adds to the probability that it was used in the broad sense, including not only the spouse, but also the kindred of the spouse. But these internal laws of the order indicate that the beneficiaries must also...