Terex Corporation v. International Union, Civil Action No. 2:97cv243-D-B (N.D. Miss. 4/__/2001)

• Decision Date: 01 April 2001
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 2:97cv243-D-B.
• Parties: TEREX CORPORATION, PLAINTIFF, v. INTERNATIONAL UNION, UNITED AUTOMOBILE, AEROSPACE and AGRICULTURAL IMPLEMENT WORKERS OF AMERICA, UAW and its Local 1004, DEFENDANTS.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Mississippi

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TEREX CORPORATION, PLAINTIFF, v. INTERNATIONAL UNION, UNITED AUTOMOBILE, AEROSPACE and AGRICULTURAL IMPLEMENT WORKERS OF AMERICA, UAW and its Local 1004, DEFENDANTS.

Civil Action No. 2:97cv243-D-B.

United States District Court, N.D. Mississippi, Delta Division.

April __, 2001.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Presently before the court are the cross-motions of the parties for the entry of summary judgment in the cause at bar. After careful consideration, the undersigned is of the opinion that the decision of the arbitrator in this matter should stand and should be enforced. Therefore, the court shall deny the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment and grant the defendants' motion for summary judgment.

. Background

On February 7, 1997, the plaintiff Terex Corporation ("Terex") terminated the employment of Michael Stump for violating an employee work rule which prohibited "[h]arassing another employee because of that employee's . . . sex . . . ." Arbitration Opinion and Award, p. 7. Terex determined that Stump sexually harassed another Terex employee, Jean Hodge. Pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement between Terex and the defendant International Union of United Automobile, Aerospace, Agricultural Workers of America ("UAW"), Stump pursued a grievance against the company through the established grievance procedure regarding his termination. Ultimately, the matter was presented to an arbiter, who rendered his decision in favor of Stump. The arbiter directed that Terex reinstate Stump's employment and be given an award of back pay and benefits.

Aggrieved with the decision of the arbiter, Terex now comes to this court seeking to have the undersigned overturn that decision. With regard to the incident itself, the arbiter made the following factual findings:

It appears of record that Hodge and the grievant were once on rather friendly terms and have routinely exchanged e-mail messages of a personal nature. (Tr. 58, 59). But, what Hodge complains of herein is that, on January 23, 1997, "he . . . (Stump) lunged towards me and grabbed me by my arms and attempted to kiss my neck." (Co. Ex. 2). Hodge also complains that soon after that encounter, Stump sent to her, via computer, a "wiz-mail" reading as follows:

i wish you'd let me!!!! pleeeeeasssssssssee let me ! ! ! ! ! ! ! to which she replied:

I DO NOT EVEN THINK SO ! ! ! ! ! !

followed by another message from Stump:

i `will' get you! and i'd appreciate your not calling me those ugly names too . . . Got it???

you know what you called me when i was talking about your walk . . . are you ready and or able to go out and play yet ???

. . .

According to Hodge, following the wiz-mail she "saw him on the packing floor and told him that I did not want him to put his hands on me again . . . he has not bothered me again." (Co. Ex. 2). Nothing further of record transpired between Hodge and the grievant. There has been no further offensive conduct. . . . it appears that following the grievant's attempt to kiss her, Hodge continued to work the rest of her shift that day, and there is nothing of record showing that she ever lost any time due to the events at issue.

Arbitration Opinion and Award, pp. 12-13 (text as in original). The undersigned declines to delve into a further, detailed discussion of the facts of this matter, and shall instead discuss the pertinent facts as they become necessary for the resolution of this matter.

. Discussion

. Summary Judgment Standard

Summary judgment shall be granted "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). The burden rests upon the party seeking summary judgment to show to the district court that an absence of evidence exists in the non-moving party's case. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 2553, 91 L. Ed. 2d 265 (1986); see Jackson v. Widnall, 99 F.3d 710, 713 (5th Cir. 1996); Hirras v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 95 F.3d 396, 399 (5th Cir. 1996). Once such a showing is presented by the moving party, the burden shifts to the non-moving party to demonstrate, by specific facts, that a genuine issue of material fact exists. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 2511, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202 (1986); Texas Manufactured Housing Ass'n, Inc. v. City of Nederland, 101 F.3d 1095, 1099 (5th Cir. 1996); Brothers v. Klevenhagen, 28 F.3d 452, 455 (5th Cir. 1994). Substantive law will determine what is considered material. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248; see Nichols v. Loral Vought Sys. Corp., 81 F.3d 38, 40 (5th Cir. 1996). "Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment. Factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248; see City of Nederland, 101 F.3d at 1099; Gibson v. Rich, 44 F.3d 274, 277 (5th Cir. 1995). Further, "[w]here the record, taken as a whole, could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, there is no genuine issue of fact for trial." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248; see City of Nederland, 101 F.3d at 1099. Finally, all facts are considered in favor of the non-moving party, including all reasonable inferences therefrom. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 254; Banc One Capital Partners Corp. v. Kneipper, 67 F.3d 1187, 1198 (5th Cir. 1995); Taylor v. Gregg, 36 F.3d 453, 455 (5th Cir. 1994); Matagorda County v. Russell Law, 19 F.3d 215, 217 (5th Cir. 1994). However, this is so only when there is "an actual controversy, that is, when both parties have submitted evidence of contradictory facts." Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994); Guillory v. Domtar Industries Inc., 95 F.3d 1320, 1326 (5th Cir. 1996); Richter v. Merchants Fast Motor Lines, Inc., 83 F.3d 96, 97 (5th Cir. 1996). In the absence of proof, the court does not "assume that the nonmoving party could or would prove the necessary facts." Little, 37 F.3d at 1075 (emphasis omitted); see Lujan v. Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871, 888, 111 L. Ed. 695, 110 S. Ct. 3177 (1990).

. Review of the Arbiter's decision

There is a strong preference in our system of justice for the arbitration of disputes, and specifically of labor disputes. Delta Queen Steamboat Co. v. District 2 Marine Engineers and Beneficial Ass'n,, 889 F. 2d 599, 602 (5^th Cir. 1989). This preference for arbitration results in a high deference for arbitrated decisions.

[W]e recognize that federal courts defer to the arbitrator's resolution of the dispute "whenever possible." Anderman/Smith Co. v. Tenn. Gas Pipeline Co., 918 F.2d 1215, 1218 (5th Cir.1990), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1206, 111 S.Ct. 2799, 115 L.Ed.2d 972 (1991). Congress's decided preference for arbitration, as reflected in federal statutes regulating labor-management relations, establishes a standard of review that is highly deferential to the arbitrator's bargained-for judgment . . . . Notwithstanding this admonition, however, arbitration awards are not inviolate.

Gulf Coast Indus. Workers Union v. Exxon Co., 991 F.2d 244, 248 (5^th Cir. 1993). While the federal courts have the authority to review arbitration awards, the district court's "review of an arbitration award is extraordinarily narrow." Antwine v. Prudential Bache Securities, Inc., 899 F.2d 410, 413 (5th Cir.1990); Delta Queen, 889 F.2d at 602. In a proceeding to confirm or vacate an arbitration award, the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA") circumscribes the review of this court, providing that an award shall not be vacated unless:

(1) the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means;

(2) there is evidence of partiality or corruption among the arbitrators;

(3) the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct which prejudiced the rights of one of the parties; or

(4) the arbitrators exceeded their powers.

9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(1)- (4); Gateway Technologies, Inc. v. MCI Telecommunications Corp., 64 F.3d 993, 996 (5th Cir.1995); Manville Forest Prods., Corp. v. United Paperworkers Intern., 831 F.2d 72, 74 (5th Cir.1987). Additionally, however, the undersigned may vacate an arbiter's award where the award violates public policy. United Paperworkers Intern. Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 42, 108 S.Ct. 364, 373, 98 L.Ed.2d 286 (1987); W.R. Grace & Co. v. Local Union 759, Int'l Union of United Rubber, Cork, Linoleum & Plastic Workers of Am., 461 U.S. 757, 766, 103 S.Ct. 2177, 2183, 76 L.Ed.2d 298 (1983); Manville Forest Prods., 831 F.2d at 74; Local 1351, Intern. Longshoremen's Ass'n v. Sea-Land Service Incorporation, 991 F. Supp. 825, 829 (N.D. Tex. 1998). Nevertheless, when reviewing an award of the arbiter, this court must accept as true the factual findings of the arbitrator. United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel and Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 596-99, 80 S.Ct. 1358, 1360-61, 4 L.Ed.2d 1424 (1960); Manville, 831 F. 2d at 75. Indeed, this court must not disturb even "improvident, even silly, factfinding." United Food & Commercial Workers v. National Tea, 899 F.2d 386, 389 (5^th Cir. 1990). As well, the court must in most instances accept the arbiter's interpretation of the arbitration contract and the applicable law. Manville, 831 F.2d at 75. In the case at bar, it appears that the plaintiff only contends that it is entitled to relief under two of the foregoing provisions — 1) the public policy exception and 2) the arbiter exceeded his powers, i.e., the decision "does not `dra[w] its essence' from the contract."

. Was the arbiter's decision in violation of a well-defined public policy?

Seeking to set aside an arbiter's decision based upon a violation of public policy is a colossal task at best. Those cases that have applied it have set aside awards "where employees violated public policies while performing duties...