Terminal Ass of St Louis v. United States, 115

• Decision Date: 13 October 1924
• Docket Number: No. 115,115
• Citation: 266 U.S. 17,45 S.Ct. 5,69 L.Ed. 150
• Parties: TERMINAL R.ASS'N OF ST. LOUIS et al. v. UNITED STATES et al
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

266 U.S. 17

45 S.Ct. 5

69 L.Ed. 150

TERMINAL R.ASS'N OF ST. LOUIS et al.

v UNITED STATES et al.

No. 115.

Argued March 3, 4, 1924.

Decided Oct. 13, 1924.

[Syllabus from pages 17-19 intentionally omitted] Messrs. R. V. Fletcher, of Chicago, Ill., T. M. Pierce, of St. Louis, Mo., and Alex P. Humphrey, of Louisville, Ky., for appellants.

The Attorney General and Messrs. J. M. Bryson, Edward J. White, and Lon O. Hocker, all of St. Louis, Mo., for appellees.

[Argument of Counsel from pages 19-23 intentionally omitted] Mr. Justice BUTLER delivered the opinion of the Court.

In November, 1905, the United States filed complaint in the Circuit (now District) Court for the Eastern District of Missouri against the Terminal Railroad Association of St. Louis, two bridge companies, and a ferry company, subsidiaries of the association, certain railroad companies which owned the capital stock of the association, and the individuals who represented the shareholders on the board of directors of the association. The names of the defendants are given in a note printed in the margin of the opinion in United States v. St. Louis Terminal, 224 U. S. 383, 390, 32 S. Ct. 507, 56 L. Ed. 810. The complaint alleged a combination in violation of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act, c. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (Comp. St. §§ 8820-8823, 8827-8830), and prayed a dissolution of the association. Under the Expedition Act of February 11, 1903, c. 544, 32 Stat. 823 (Comp. St. §§ 8824, 8825), four Circuit Judges heard the case and entered a decree dismissing the complaint. On appeal to this court, there was a reversal. The case was remanded, and, March 2, 1914, a final decree was entered in the District Court in favor of the United States, in accordance with the mandate of this court. United States v. St. Louis Terminal, supra, 411, (32 S. Ct. 507). See also Ex parte United States, 226 U. S. 420, 33 S. Ct. 170, 57 L. Ed. 281. There was another appeal (236 U. S. 194, 35 S. Ct. 408, 59 L. Ed. 535) and, February 7, 1917, the District Court modified its decree in accordance with the direction of this court. The substance of the decree, as modified, so far as here material, is as follows:

'(1) The Terminal Railroad Association of St. Louis is an unlawful combination contrary to the Anti-Trust Act of July 2, 1890 (26 Stat. 209), when it and the various bridge and terminal companies composing it are operated as railroad transportation companies. The combination may, however, exist and continue as a lawful unification of terminal facilities upon abandoning all operating methods and charges as and for railroad transportation and confining itself to the transaction of a terminal business such as supplying and operating facilities for the interchange of traffic between railroads and to assist in the collecting and distributing of traffic for the carrier companies, switching, storing and the like, and modifying its contracts as herein specified. An election having been made to continue the combination for terminal purposes, the defendants are therefore perpetually enjoined from in anywise managing or conducting the said Terminal Railroad Association or any of its constituent companies and from operating any of the properties belonging to it or its constituents otherwise than as terminal facilities for the railraod companies using the same, and from making charges otherwise than for and according to the nature of the services so lawfully authorized to be rendered: Provided, however, that the right of said Terminal Railroad Association as an accessory to its strictly terminal business to carry on transportation as to business exclusively originating on its lines, exclusively moving thereon, and exclusively intended for delivery on the same is hereby recognized and nothing in this decree shall be construed to deny such rights.'

Paragraph 2 of the decree directs a reorganization of the contracts between the defendant railroad companies and the Terminal Association by providing for the admission of any railroad to joint ownership and control of the combined terminal properties on terms of equality with the then proprietary companies, and for the use of the terminal facilities by any railroad not a joint owner upon such terms as will, in respect of use, character and cost of service, place every such railroad upon as nearly an equal plane as may be, with respect to expenses and charges, as that occupied by proprietary companies, and by eliminating from the existing agreement any provision which restricts any proprietary company to the use of the facilities of the Terminal Association.

Paragraph 3 abolishes the practice of billing to East St. Louis or other junction points, and then rebilling traffic destined to St. Louis or points beyond.

Paragraph 4 abolishes any special or socalled arbitrary charge for the use of the terminal facilities in respect of traffic originating within the so-called 100-mile area that is not equally applied in respect of traffic originating outside of that area.

Paragraph 5 extends the effect of the decree to all railroad companies thereafter admitted to ownership or use of the terminal facilities.

Paragraph 6 is as follows:

'Nothing in this decree shall be taken to affect in any wise or at an time the power of the Interstate Commerce Commission over the rates to be charged by the Terminal Railroad Association, or the mode of billing traffic passing over its lines, or the establishing of joint through rates or routes over its lines, or any other power conferred by law upon such commission.'

The cause was reserved for such further orders and decrees as might be deemed necessary.

Certain defendant railroad companies, for convenience, are called the west side lines.¹ Certain others are called the east side lines.² The Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Company and the Wabash Railway Company each has a line which enters St. Louis from the east and a line which enters it from the west, but they are aligned with the east side lines on this appeal. The capital stock of the Association is owned in equal amounts by all these companies, and they are called proprietary companies.

In August, 1920, the west side lines filed a petition and motion in the District Courts to have the Terminal Association and its subsidiaries and the east side lines and also their representatives on the board of directors of the Terminal Association adjudged guilty of contempt of court for violating the decree. The parties so complained of (appellants here) appeared and moved to dismiss the petition and also filed answer. An examiner was appointed, and, after the taking of evidence and a hearing, the court denied the motion to dismiss, and entered its decree that the appellants——

'have continuously since the entry of said final order and decree, in contempt of this court, violated the terms thereof and are still violating its said terms——

'(a) In that defendants, the Terminal Railroad Association of St. Louis and its subsidiary companies, are not acting in good faith as the impartial agents of the various proprietary lines.

'(b) In that the proprietary lines other than the petitioners, through the domination and control of the board of directors of defendant the Terminal Railroad Association of St. Louis and its subsidiaries compelled the petitioners to pay the Terminal Railroad Association its transfer charges for supplying and operating facilities for the interchange of both through east-bound and through west-bound freight traffic between the east side lines and the west side lines.

'(c) In that the defendants [the east side lines above named] * * * have not paid and are not now paying the reasonable transfer charges of defendant the Terminal Railroad Association of St. Louis and its subsidiary companies on west-bound through freight to the rails' of the petitioners and other defendants whose lines enter St. Louis from the West '(d) In that the said Terminal Railroad Association has been issuing bills of lading or receipts taking the place of bills of lading usable for the transportation of through freight from points on its lines to distant points beyond its lines, and has been issuing passes usable by passengers riding on passes or tickets from points on its lines to distant points beyond its lines.'

And the decree commands that within 60 days the appellant companies cease violating the final decree in the respects above set forth, and that the east side lines——

'be and they are hereby required to pay within 60 days after the amount of same shall have been ascertained and determined for the use and benefit of said west side lines * * * the total amount of the transfer charges of defendant Terminal Railroad Association of St. Louis and its subsidiary companies paid by said west side lines on west-bound through freight of said east side lines to the rails of said west side lines at St. Louis, Mo., from the date of the entry of said final decree, to wit, March 2, 1914, to the date of this order. * * *'

And the decree prescribed and directed how such total amount should be determined.

In these proceedings, the United States did not join in the complaint or participate in the hearing in the District Court, but has since appeared and is aligned with the appellees. The proceedings were instituted by the west side lines, not to vindicate the authority of the court, but to enforce rights claimed by them under the original decree. The controversy is between them and the east side lines as to whether the former or the latter shall bear transfer charges on west bound through freight. The nature of the proceedings is civil and remedial, not criminal. See In re Nevitt, 117 F. 448, 458, 54 C. C. A. 622; Bessette v. W. B. Conkey Co., 194 U. S. 324, 24 S. Ct. 665, 48 L. Ed. 997; Gompers v. Buck's Stove & Range Co., 221 U. S. 418, 441, et seq., 31 S. Ct. 492, 55 L. Ed. 797, 34 L. R. A. (N. S.) 874; In re Merchants' Stock Co., Petitioner, 223 U. S. 639, 32 S. Ct. 339, ...