Termination the Parent-Child Relationship I.P. v. Child Advocates, Inc.
| Decision Date | 29 October 2013 |
| Docket Number | No. 49A02–1303–JT–283.,49A02–1303–JT–283. |
| Parties | In the Matter of the Termination of the Parent–Child Relationship of I.P., Minor Child and his Father, T.P. T.P. (Father), Appellant–Respondent, v. Child Advocates, Inc., Appellee–Guardian ad Litem, and Indiana Department of Child Services, Co–Appellee–Petitioner. |
| Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Background: A petition was filed to terminate parental rights. The Superior Court, Marion County, Marilyn Moores, J., Larry E. Bradley, Magistrate, terminated parental rights. Father appealed.
Holding: The Court of Appeals, Baker, J., held that father's due process rights were not violated when one magistrate heard the evidence in termination of parental rights case, then resigned, and a second magistrate reviewed the record and issued findings of fact and the ruling.
Affirmed.
Vaidik, J., filed an opinion concurring in the result.Mark Small, Marion County Public Defender Agency, Indianapolis, IN, Attorney for Appellant.
Gregory F. Zoeller, Attorney General of Indiana, Robert J. Henke, Deputy Attorney General, Patrick M. Rhodes, DCS, Marion County, Dede K. Connor, Child Advocates, Inc., Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellees.
This case is one of several termination cases stemming from Magistrate Cartmel's resignation to reach this court. Magistrate Cartmel resigned after the hearing without reporting factual findings or conclusions to the juvenile court. As a result, the case was transferred to Magistrate Larry Bradley. Magistrate Bradley reviewed the record and reported factual findings and conclusions to Judge Marilyn Moores, who approved Magistrate Bradley's findings and conclusions and issued an order terminating Mother's parental rights.
In this case, T.P. (Father) challenges the order terminating his parental rights with regard to his minor son, I.P. Father was incarcerated on both days that the termination hearing took place, but he participated telephonically and was represented by counsel. Although Father does not challenge the substance of the order terminating his parental rights, he maintains that the judgment violated his right to due process and the provisions of Indiana Trial Rule 63(A) because Magistrate Cartmel, the magistrate who actually heard the evidence, did not issue the recommended order.
We conclude that Magistrate Bradley's subsequent recommended order terminating Father's parental rights did not violate the trial rules or Father's right to due process. Thus, we decline to set aside the order terminating Father's parental rights and affirm the judgment of the trial court.
I.P. was born on December 11, 2004, and formally removed from Father's care on May 9, 2011, after I.P. was found to be a Child in Need of Services (CHINS). 1 However, Father last saw I.P. in September 2010. The DCS filed a petition for the involuntary termination of parental rights between Father and I.P. on July 30, 2012, which was served on Father while he was incarcerated at the Putnamville Correctional Center (Putnamville). Father subsequently requested and received court-appointed counsel at the next scheduled hearing on August 31, 2012.
Father has a history of criminal convictions and periods of incarceration dating back to 1998 and continuing through the two days of the termination hearing that took place on December 20, 2012 and January 15, 2013. Father was represented by counsel at the hearing and he appeared by telephone from Putnamville. The Honorable Julie Cartmel (Magistrate Cartmel) of the Marion County Superior Court Juvenile Division heard the evidence during the two-day hearing.
It was established that Father had never scheduled visitations with I.P. because he never appeared in the CHINS court to make such a request. The last time that Father saw I.P. was in September 2010. The evidence also showed that I.P. has developed a “consistent bond” with his foster caregiver following the removal from Father. Tr. p. 120. Testimony was also presented that adoption is in I.P.'s best interests.
Following the hearing, Magistrate Cartmel took the matter under advisement. However, Magistrate Cartmel subsequently resigned before she issued a ruling. After reviewing the record,2 Magistrate Bradley issued a recommended order to terminate Father's parental rights as to I.P. that comprised of twenty-seven findings. Magistrate Bradley stated in his order that Appellant's App. p. 12. The order included detailed findings of fact and conclusions of law. For instance, Magistrate Bradley's findings included the following:
12. [Father] last saw [I.P.] in September of 2010. He had no contact with his son and in March of 2011, he became incarcerated.
13. [Father] was released from jail in December of 2011, and contacted the IDCSMC in January of 2012.
14. [Father] did not participate in the CHINS action and was reincarcerated in May of 2012.
15. [Father] has a substantial criminal history consisting of nineteen convictions since 1997, six being felonies.
16. [Father's] current outdate is in October of 2014.
...
18. There is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in [I.P.'s] removal and continued placement outside the home will not be remedied by his father. Although [Father] testified he was in his son's life before, he had no knowledge of [I.P.'s] CHINS action until it was open for approximately a year. He did not meaningfully participate in the CHINS case when he was not incarcerated, and will be unavailable to participate until October of 2014. Given [Father's] criminal history of convictions and probation violations, it is highly probable that he will continue to be unavailable in the future.
19. Continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to [I.P.'s] well-being in that it would pose as a barrier in obtaining permanency for [I.P.] through an adoption, permanency [I.P.] deserves and needs due to his special needs. Neither parent can offer [I.P.] permanency.
...
21. [I.P.] has been diagnosed with Reactive Detachment Disorder. [I.P.] needs a caregiver who understands his needs, acquires the skills necessary to manage his R.A.D., and provides him consistency.
22. Father met the clinician three times, and it is clear from his testimony that he is not clear on [I.P.'s] needs.
23. [I.P.] is in preadoptive foster care. His caregiver has been trained in, and is meeting, [I.P.'s] needs. She has moved her residence so that [I.P.] can remain in a school where he is doing well.
24. [I.P.] meets with a mentor, participates in sexually maladaptive therapy, and [is] in counseling. He appears to be thriving in his environment.
25. Termination of the parent-child relationship is in the best interest of [I.P.]. There is no benefit to give parents additional time where they both remain unavailable. [I.P.] has a chance to obtain permanency, [through] adoption, in an environment where he can continue to thrive.
26. There exists a satisfactory plan for the future care and treatment of [I.P.], that being adoption.
27. [I.P.'s] Guardian ad Litem recommends adoption as the permanency plan in [I.P.'s] best interests.
Appellant's App. p. 13. The regular judge of the Marion Superior Court, Juvenile Division, approved Magistrate Bradley's recommendation and also signed the final order terminating Father's parental rights.
Father now appeals, challenging the validity of the manner in which the final order terminating his parental rights was reached.
Father claims that the termination of his parental rights as to I.P. must be set aside. Father does not challenge the substance of the termination order. Rather, his sole argument is that the final recommended ruling made by a magistrate who did not hear the evidence violated his rights to due process and the provisions of Trial Rule 63.
The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects the traditional right of parents to raise their children. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65, 120 S.Ct. 2054, 147 L.Ed.2d 49 (2000); Bester v. Lake Cnty. Office of Family & Children, 839 N.E.2d 143, 147 (Ind.2005). But parental rights are not absolute and must be subordinated to the child's interest in determining the proper disposition of a petition to terminate parental rights. In re D.D., 804 N.E.2d 258, 264–65 (Ind.Ct.App.2004). Thus, “parental rights may be terminated when the parents are unable or unwilling to meet their parental responsibilities.” Id. at 265. The purpose of terminating parental rights is not to punish parents but to protect their children. In re S.P.H., 806 N.E.2d 874, 880 (Ind.Ct.App.2004).
When reviewing the termination of parental rights, we neither reweigh the evidence nor judge the credibility of the witnesses. In re G.Y., 904 N.E.2d 1257, 1260 (Ind.2009). Instead, we consider only the evidence and reasonable inferences that are most favorable to the judgment below. Id.
The Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution prohibits state action that deprives a person of life, liberty, or property without a fair proceeding. McBride v. Monroe Cnty. Office of Family & Children, 798 N.E.2d 185, 194 (Ind.Ct.App.2003).
Although due process has never been precisely defined, the phrase expresses the requirement of fundamental fairness. In re M.M., 733 N.E.2d 6, 10 (Ind.Ct.App.2000). When the State seeks to terminate the parent-child relationship, it must do so in a manner that meets the requirements of the due process clause. A fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner. Thompson v. Clark Conty. Div. of Family & Children, 791 N.E.2d 792, 795 (Ind.Ct.App.2003).
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