Terpstra v. Soiltest, Inc.

• Citation: 218 N.W.2d 129,63 Wis.2d 585
• Decision Date: 20 May 1974
• Docket Number: No. 291,291
• Parties: Hendrick TERPSTRA, Appellant, v. SOILTEST, INC., et al., Respondents.
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Wisconsin

Page 129

218 N.W.2d 129

63 Wis.2d 585

Hendrick TERPSTRA, Appellant, v. SOILTEST, INC., et al., Respondents.

No. 291.

Supreme Court of Wisconsin.

May 20, 1974.

Conway & Conway, Baraboo, for appellant.

Schlotthauer, Johnson & Mohs, Conrad H. Johnson, Madison, for Brittingham & Hixon Lbr. Co.

Cross, Karch, Langer & Wagner, Baraboo, for Soiltest.

HEFFERNAN, Justice.

On this appeal, Terpstra argues that the jury erred in finding that he was a trespasser rather than a licensee.

Terpstra contends that, on the day of the accident, he heard the sounds of construction and walked the half mile from his home to where the building was going up. He said he saw a 'no trespassing' sign on the property, but when he talked to Soiltest's general manager and asked if he could walk around, he was told, 'Ya, help yourself. You can walk around all you want to.' Terpstra stayed on the premises until noon, when he returned home for lunch. When he returned to the construction site, only the carpenter, Herr, was present. He claims that he helped Herr in steadying a ladder and handing him pieces of lumber.

Terpstra testified that during the afternoon, while sitting on a sawhorse within the frame of the building, he suddenly saw the frame start to 'lean.' He dropped to the floor and did not remember anything until he regained consciousness shortly thereafter. A portion of the building frame had collapsed upon him. At trial, he said that he recalled no wind or gusts prior to the collapse. The carpenter, on the other hand, testified that just before the collapse of the building, there was a sudden 'whirlwind' and he saw leaves and branches fall from the trees and, after the collapse of the building, he saw a four-inch diameter branch upon the ground.

A statement was given by Terpstra prior to trial in which he stated that his first warning of danger was when he saw Herr's cap blown off by a strong gust of wind. This statement was introduced into evidence.

Herr denied that he received any assistance from Terpstra. He also testified that the building was specially braced to protect against whirlwinds, which were apparently common in the immediate area. A structural engineer testified after seeing photographs and reviewing testimony in respect to the type of bracing that, 'It all of it (the bracing) was there as described and it was properly secured, the building should not have fallen down.'

This review of the evidence reveals that it is immaterial whether the jury found that Terpstra was a trespasser or found that he was a licensee. Our review of the evidence, however, indicates that the jury improperly found that Terpstra was a trespasser. The jury was properly instructed by the trial judge that to find Terpstra a licensee it had to:

'(F)ind that the Plaintiff was upon the premises of the Defendant with the latter's permission or consent, either express or implied . . .. An implied consent or implied permission is equivalent to an implied invitation and is one given by an owner or occupant when a custom acquiesced in by him is, or when his acts or conduct are, such as would warrant a reasonable man, having knowledge thereof, in believing that the owner had given his consent or permission to another to come upon the premises.'

The undisputed testimony shows that there was at least an implied permission given. Under the facts, the jury should have found that Terpstra was a licensee. The evidence was undisputed that Terpstra was allowed to roam around the property with the full knowledge of the occupiers of the premises. This court has said:

'Where a person is upon the property of another with the other's knowledge, that is sufficient to establish the relationship (of licensor-licensee).' Hensel v. Hensel Yellow Cab Co. (1932), 209 Wis. 489, 500, 245 N.W. 159, 163.

Accordingly, there was no jury question in respect to Terpstra's status. The trial judge could have ruled as a matter of law that Terpstra was on the premises with the knowledge of the occupier--and in fact with at least implied consent--and hence was a licensee as a matter of law. However, plaintiff's attorney never asked for such finding, and instead accepted the instructions in respect thereto without objection.

While we consider the jury's finding that Terpstra was a trespasser to be contrary to the undisputed evidence, that error is immaterial. Even though we were to hold, as a matter of law, that Terpstra was a licensee, the facts, given the interpretation most favorable to the plaintiff, would not support his cause of action.

In Szafranski v. Radetzky (1966), 31 Wis.2d 119, 126, 141 N.W.2d 902, we said that a possessor or occupier of land may be liable to a licensee in but two situations--a trap on the premises or active negligence by the licensor. Here, there was no evidence of a trap. A trap exists only when the land occupier fails to disclose to the licensee a known but concealed danger. Szafranski, supra, p. 126, 141 N.W.2d 902.

Nor was there the slightest evidence of 'active negligence' that would expose the licensor to liability. The negligence of the defendants, if any, was the unsafe condition of the building's frame. We said in Kaslo v. Hahn (1967), 36 Wis.2d 87, 153 N.W.2d 33:

'The term 'active negligence' then, as used in licensor-licensee cases, connotes the carrying on of some operation or activity in a negligent manner.' (P. 92, 153 N.W.2d p. 36)

'A condition of the premises whether created through an affirmative act of a defendant or through natural causes is not an activity. An act, then, which creates a dangerous 'condition of the premises' is not an 'activity,' nor is it 'active conduct,' 'operational conduct' or 'active intervention.' Consequently, a licensor cannot be held liable for an act which creates a dangerous 'condition of the premises. " (P. 93, 153 N.W.2d p. 36)

Examples of conduct the court has determined to be active negligence are found in Szafranski, supra (where the defendants stored and handled explosives in their house and an explosion injured the plaintiff guests); Cermak v. Milwaukee Air Power Pump Co. (1927), 192 Wis. 44, 211 N.W. 354 (where the licensee was negligently hit on the head by a pipe wielded by the licensor's employee), and Taylor v. Northern Coal & Dock Co. (1915), 161 Wis. 223, 152 N.W. 465 (where the licensee was struck by a coal hoist operated by defendant's agents). Examples of situations where the court determined the owner or occupier was not guilty of active negligence are Kaslo, supra (where the licensee tripped over a shoescraper installed ten years previously by the owner), and Brady v. Chicago & N.W.R. Co. (1954), 265 Wis. 618, 625, 62 N.W.2d 415, 419 (where the deceased child had fallen from a catwalk along the railroad's bridge and '(t)he danger arose solely from the manner in which defendant constructed and maintained its premises and it was open and apparent').

Prosser, Law of Torts (4th ed., 1971), sec. 60, p. 376, states that the licensee takes the premises the way he finds them and has no right to demand the licensor to change his conduct. Prosser, pp. 378, 379, 380. However, in active operations the licensor must exercise reasonable care for the protection of the licensee. Prosser, p. 379. As to passive conditions on the land, the licensor is under no obligation to the licensee for conditions of which he does not know. Prosser, p. 380.

While there were allegations in the complaint that the defendants were negligent in their conduct while Terpstra was on the premises, there is no proof in the record of any negligent conduct. All that was arguably shown was a negligently constructed building. Even if such negligence were conceded, the building as constructed did not constitute a trap, for no danger was apprehended or known by the defendants. The negligence, if any, was pre-existing in time and did not constitute active negligence in current operations.

Accordingly, the requested res ipsa instruction is irrelevant to liability in this case. Under the instruction ¹ requested by the plaintiff, only an inference of ordinary negligence would be permissible. Under the law of this state governing the obligation of owners and occupiers of land to those who come upon it, there is no liability imposed as the result of a land occupier's ordinary negligence that causes harm to either a trespasser or licensee.

Under the facts, the plaintiff is not entitled of the informed thinking of the trial judge licensee theory.

The plaintiff now recognizes that current law prevents his recovery, for on this appeal for the first time he urges that we abandon our present law and hold that the rule of ordinary negligence--the reasonable man rule--shall apply in all cases where the dispute is between the owner or occupier of land and one who comes upon the land.

We decline to do so. Terpstra never raised the question in the trial court, and all the requested instructions were directed toward securing a verdict under the accepted law. The practice of this court is not to consider an issue raised for the first time on appeal.

In Cappon v. O'Day (1917), 165 Wis. 486, 490, 162 N.W. 655, 657, this court pointed out:

'The reason for the rule is plain. If the question and been raised below, the situation might have been met by the opposite party by way of amendment or of additional proof.'

The adoption of a new rule of law on appeal when the question was not raised at trial might well work hardship on the adversary. It would also deprive ...